The Political Uses of Madness

Who was Hitler? How elusive his character remains! What he did is clear. But still, when asked not what he did but how he did it, or rather how he was able to do it, historians evade the question, sliding away behind implausible answers. To historians there are no miracles. Whatever has happened they explain and it becomes to them, in retrospect, inevitable. But it is salutary sometimes to see events from their starting-point, not from their conclusion, and to judge thereby the prospect, not the issue, of success. Only thus can we appreciate the character of those who foresaw them. We rightly regard it as one sign of the greatness of Mr. Churchill that, from 1933, he appreciated, as few others did, the real danger of a new German Empire. We should, I think, recognize it as the sign of the genius of Hitler that he, twelve years earlier, when it seemed far more improbable, appreciated the hope of such an empire and believed—correctly as it proved—both that it could be built and that he, though then a solitary demobilized corporal, could be its builder. I have laboured this point because I wish to maintain—contrary as it appears, to all received opinion—that Hitler had a mind. (Hitler's Secret Conversations, Introduction, p. viii, New York, 1953. Trevor Roper.)

It is the task of our nuclear deterrence policies to make a surprise nuclear attack the act of a madman. It is not clear (March, 1959) that they have succeeded. Given the advantage of a first strike, the possibilities (given sufficient warning) for civil defense, the urgent incentive to avoid suffering a first strike by an opponent, and the possibilities for technological development, it is not certain that they will ever wholly succeed. For the 1960's at least, Albert Wohlstetter tells us, "a surprise thermonuclear attack might not be an irrational or insane act on the part of the aggressor." (231)

Still, if we survive the '60's, the era might some day arrive that the proponents of the Balance of Terror celebrate prematurely: the world in which the best-planned and executed nuclear surprise would be, literally, suicidal. Deliberately to choose to attack would, in that world, be insane. Yet it would not be insane, even then, to threaten, conditionally, to strike: or even to commit oneself to carry out the threat. Though no one rationally could choose war, still one might choose a risk of war, if the stakes were
high enough and the risk low enough. Thus armaments that aimed to deter war need not at all deter nuclear blackmail. And given the uncertainties obscuring the players' policies, the incentives for commitment and the possibility that commitment will not be believed or will fail, somehow, to influence, war in that age may still occur. It might result not from rational choices at the moment of attack, but from rational choices (commitments: gambles) made earlier.

The common belief that in a world where an attack would be strictly suicidal, blackmail would vanish along with war, rests on the fact that the threatener would have to be very sure, before committing himself, that the blackmail would succeed; he could accept at most a small risk that he would be called upon to carry out his threat. This is true. What is overlooked is that the victim, if he is to resist, must be very sure that the blackmailer will not carry out his threat. Under these circumstances, the blackmailer may not feel called upon to commit himself at all; he can make the threat, go through various maneuvers designed to make the victim uncertain of his behavior, and let the victim weigh the risks. Indeed, under our assumptions he may feel free to be particularly provocative, since, the advantage to first-strike having been eliminated, the opponent can have no rational incentive to pre-empt.

The blackmailer, then, need not be reckless or mad. But if neither is necessary, both of these help. For without some commitment, the blackmail is less likely to be effective. And for the man who is convincingly mad, the risks of commitment may be peculiarly small. For his commitment, perhaps only his, will be plausible; his claim to believe the risks are small, or his willingness to take large risks, will be credible. Against rational opponents, the madman in this world can win; more than that, he can win safely. This puts an
unprecedented premium on madness. To decide how likely it is that the supply will rise in response to that demand, let us consider the precise requirements.

Let us recall from the last lecture the concept "willingness to risk conflict". This is defined for a bargainer relative to a particular pair of ultimatums; it refers to the maximum subjective probability of "conflict" that he will risk in maintaining his demand, as opposed to accepting his opponent's offer. "Conflict" would result if his opponent likewise stuck to his ultimatum. The player estimates, in his own mind, the likelihood that his opponent will maintain, or commit himself to, his ultimatum; he compares this estimate to his own "willingness to fight," the critical probability of conflict above which he would prefer to accept. If he concludes that the "actual risk" is greater than this critical risk, he accepts his opponent's offer; if not, he sticks to his own demand and takes the risk of conflict.

The essential feature of bargaining under the shadow of the Balance of Terror, bargaining with the threat of mutual suicide, is this: with "normal" players and for almost any imaginable bargaining issues, the "willingness to resist" is very low for both players.

The payoffs for the prospective victim may look like this:

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<th>Accept I</th>
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If these payoffs are utilities, i.e., if they indicate the choices this player would make among gambles involving these outcomes, we can compute this player's "willingness to fight" at 1/100. This critical probability would make him indifferent between Rejecting and Accepting his opponent's offer.
offer. If he assigns more than 1% likelihood to the chance that his opponent will carry out his threat, will maintain his ultimatum, he will give in.

But if he assumes that his opponent is "normal," rational, like himself, then he will estimate his opponent's payoffs as being very similar:

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<tr>
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<th>Accept</th>
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His opponent's "willingness to fight" is likewise only 1/101, actually less, though only trivially different from his own. The blackmailer must be just as cautious in committing himself to his ultimatum as the victim in rejecting it. Can we predict that the victim will surely assign as much as 1% likelihood to the blackmailer's ultimatum; or that the blackmailer will be 100/101 sure that he will do so?

As we concluded in the last lecture, when the critical probabilities are this close, the payoffs alone do not seem to give us a reliable signal as to what the players will actually expect; hence, we can't make a general prediction about the outcome. Any of the outcomes may arise, including "conflict." (This is not, in itself, a trivial conclusion!)

However, there are two general ways a player can try to increase his chances of a favorable outcome: a) by manipulating his opponent's expectations; b) by changing the payoffs, or his opponent's perceptions of the payoffs, so as to create an asymmetry of bargaining power in his favor. Precisely the same tactics may be useful to either player, though they may not happen to be equally available to both. Purely for convenience, we will look at the problem from the point of view of the blackmailer, the one whose demand departs from the "status quo! In practice, these tactics, many of which involve a touch, or more, or madness, can turn up on either side of the bargaining table, or both.
The blackmailer's problem is to convince his opponent that he is more than 1% likely to carry out his threat. Let us say that he does not see any method for doing that with better than 99% certainty, so he is unwilling actually to commit himself.

The first method is simply to be unpredictable; to seem "a little" erratic, impulsive, unstable. The object: to make the opponent believe that, after all, this blackmailer is at least 1% likely to do anything. This would be duck soup if the "anything" were anything but suicide. Generally, nothing could be easier than to add an aura of uncertainty of 5% or so to your opponent's expectations; in fact, that much "fuzziness" is virtually automatic, without any special effort to produce it. But in this case the enemy's expectations might be unusually precise; he might expect the normal blackmailer to take special pains to suppress the little random influences that normally disturb his actions. At least, when a false move blows up the world, he might expect more than normal caution to avoid accidental discharge. The blackmailer, then, must take special steps to remove this influence.

The best method is to prepare for this long ahead of time, building a reputation for erratic, senseless, schizoid behavior. A hot temper is a useful asset; spells of temporary insanity, to be expected, in fact, just when he has been thwarted. "I didn't know what he might do," the observers report. "He could have done anything."

Question: when is it useful for a threatener to create the impression that his responses are, to some degree, random, or erratic? Answer: when two conditions are both present: a) he wishes to create some expectation that he will take a certain action, but doesn't in fact wish to commit himself to that action, or for some reason doesn't wish to reveal his commitment; b) he
thinks that even a small likelihood of this in his opponent's mind may be effective. (Most of the devices he can use will create general uncertainty in his opponent's mind; where he has more than two alternatives, this works in the direction of making them all seem "equally likely," denying predominant weight to any one.) Note: possible wishfulness or pessimism may exaggerate weights of best or worst outcomes.) These conditions characterize just the games we are considering, one of which is the game of nuclear blackmail in an era of "balanced terror"; so there is some interest in considering other tactics for creating this impression of unpredictability. Simple madness or rage are not available to all players.

The Chinese (March, 1959) are doing new work in the line of inscrutability. What adversary in this generation is going to forget that they have been spending the last six months, shelling the island of Quemoy every other day, excluding holidays?

As a matter of fact, the American position on Quemoy earlier in the crisis had been unusually inscrutable. In some ways, this is not as easy for a democracy; for instance, a decision, once made, tends to leak out. But by the same token, the fact that no decision has leaked out by a particular stage will suggest strongly that no decision has yet been made; the effect may be to keep the opponent guessing (unless he thinks he has a better theory than the American public). This effect can be enhanced by deprecating the influence on the decision by those sources of opinion, like Congress or prominent commentators, whose views are already public or predictable.

Secretary Dulles, of course, has been famous for his insistence that the United States avoid miscalculation in its opponents by making its commitments, decisions and intentions crystal clear. In this situation, however, he showed
a fine grasp of the tactical uses of obscurity. One lively press conference,
before the President's address to the nation, began with this exchange:

(September 10, 1958, New York Times)

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Army Chief of Information is quoted by the Associated
Press this morning as having said that the decision to aid the Chinese Na-
tionalists in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu was unanimous on the part of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This would appear to be the first official statement
by a Government official of such a decision. Is that correct?

A: That it is the first such statement?

Q: By anyone on the record.

A: Well, I don't quite get the purport of your question.

Q: Well, the purport of the question is, has the United States made a decision
to help Chiang Kai-shek defend Quemoy and Matsu?

A: It has made the decision reported in the statement which I made at Newport
on Sept. 4 with the authority of the President. That is the only such decision
made.

Q: But in that statement, as I recall it, you said that the President had taken
no decision.

A: I think that the statement is replete with decisions. There was no de-
finite decision because, as the statement pointed out, certain of the facts
could not be known in advance of the event. But certainly that statement was
a significant statement. It has been so interpreted at least by the Chinese
Communists and by the Soviet Union. Certainly they see significance in the
statement.

A: Well, if the United States has taken such a decision, why does not the
Government say so publicly and officially?

Q: Because the President has not taken any such decision.

Looking over the record of public statements during September, 1958, it
is hard to conclude that the United States was making a determined effort to
remove doubt from the Communists' minds as to the American response to an in-
vasion. Rather, it seemed to aim at creating doubt: to deny them certainty
that the United States would not respond. We can assume that Dulles was quite
aware that this was not a policy of "maximum deterrence," that it meant fore-
going maximum credibility for our threats. We must infer that he judged the
risks of more open, definite commitment to outweigh the possible advantages. Without commenting on that estimate or the merits of his policy in that particular situation, I wish to point out here that this could be a reasonable strategy; a doubt, a small likelihood of retaliation in the opponent's mind could be enough to deter him, where his possible gains are small relative to his possible losses if the retaliation were carried out.

Of course, if the opponent is prepared to accept a relatively large risk of conflict, the policy of "keeping him guessing" is unlikely to be effective. A deliberate effort to avoid open commitment will doubtless convince him that in fact, it is unlikely that we have committed ourselves. But if we have built up some reputation for unpredictability, he cannot drive that probability down to zero. For example, he may take account of the possibility that the United States is more heavily committed than its top decision-makers realize. Decisions may have become decentralized, actions may be planned and executed by subordinates or allies that will in fact involve the United States. At the height of the Quemoy crisis, Chiang Kai-shek announced that if he felt the continued blockade required air strikes on mainland batteries, he alone would decide; he admitted no obligation to the United States to refrain. If the Communists credited this as a possibility, they would no doubt regard the question whether the President had or had not made a "decision" to intervene as somewhat irrelevant to the likelihood of American involvement in the new situation. Again, a statement by President Eisenhower in a press conference might have cautioned the Communists against relying too heavily on apparent indecision as indicating total lack of commitment. When asked whether there were any circumstances under which a field commander might be authorized to use nuclear weapons on his initiative, the President's immediate reply was: "I don't know."
Incidentally, whether this policy of "randomness" will succeed in creating even a small uncertainty in the opponent's mind will depend partly on whether he tends to be wishful or conservative in his expectations. If he is very cautious, then raising even the remote possibility of a very bad outcome may influence his behavior; yet a wishful opponent, and this is scarcely less likely, may proceed to discount the possibility entirely.

Let us now consider quite a different class of tactics, designed to change the opponent's perception of the payoffs. The weakness of the blackmailer's position (as of the opponent's) is the presumption that his payoffs in this game must be such that his "willingness to fight," the maximum probability of conflict he would risk in actually committing himself to his ultimatum, must be very low. This presumption is based on the "normal" utility payoffs to be inferred in this situation. Instead of indicating that his behavior is erratic, impulsive, "irrational," the blackmailer may suggest that it is perfectly predictable, consistent, rational on the basis of certain payoffs and expectations: but that these payoffs and expectations don't happen to be the ones that the opponent would tend to expect. Again, madness helps.

Consider the blackmailer's payoffs, and the question: how would different payoffs strengthen his position?

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He wants to change his payoffs—or, basically, his opponent's perception of those payoffs—so as to increase his evident "willingness to fight." This depends, first on the utility interval between his demand and his opponent's offer; second on the interval between his opponent's offer and "conflict." He wishes to increase the first, and/or decrease the second. That is, "the more he has to gain" from sticking to his ultimatum relative to "what he stands to lose"
if he should stick to his ultimatum and his opponent should still refuse his demand, the higher the risk of conflict he will evidently accept in committing himself to the ultimatum. And the higher the likelihood his opponent (with a fixed, lower "willingness to fight") will attach to that event; so that his opponent is more likely to give in.

It is the relationship of these intervals that concerns him, then; but we can imagine shifts in the individual payoffs, say, relative to some outcome outside this context. Or, rather than consider these new payoffs "shifts," let us consider them deviations from "normal" payoffs, deviations that happen to occur in the mind of our "mad" blackmailer and contribute, inadvertently, to his bargaining strength.

First, he may deprecate the "badness" of conflict, relative to other outcomes: in particular, relative to the opponent's offer. Incidentally, all the tactics to be considered have perfectly "normal" counterparts. Typically, for instance, both the union leader and the management representative will claim that they have no fear of a strike, that they have "little to lose" by it, are perfectly prepared to last it out, and that they expect the eventual outcome of a strike to be favorable to them; thus they display, perhaps sincerely, perhaps not, their "willingness to fight." Likewise, they can emphasize the importance of achieving a particular bargain (perhaps, because it conforms to some "pattern" or precedent, or desire of their superiors) and the worthlessness to them of their opponent's offer. On the basis of any "objective" set of outcomes there will be a range of possible subjective evaluations of utility payoffs and expectations, and these tactics merely exploit the inevitable uncertainty.

What we are considering now are more extreme instances of these tactics:
cases where the (alleged or actual) subjective evaluations differ so far from "normal" ones or from "objective factors" as to seem removed from reality, in fact, to be tinged with "madness." Madness can be strength in any bargaining situation. Usually, however, there are preferable alternatives; the forms of commitment we will consider as "madness" generally involve unacceptable costs or risks. They look most interesting in contexts where the risks are great in any case, and where no other tactics may promise hope of success.

We will assume, then, that the judgments that the blackmailer makes, or purports to make, are (in this discussion) without obvious objective basis, or depart significantly from "normal" evaluations. To return to the question of the "conflict" outcome, he may refuse to believe that the objective consequences of "conflict" would be as bad as his opponent indicates. If nuclear war is at stake, he may reveal immense ("mad") confidence in his air defenses, or the effectiveness of his civil defense, or his ability to lessen the opponent's attack by a counterforce strike. If the physical devastation is too predictable to be denied, he can diminish its significance. This is a line the Russians have used intermittently for years (with some lapses): "Capitalism will be destroyed; communism will survive, even if the present communists perish. And this would be victory; this is all that matters."

Here we see the benefits of a well-known ideology, like those of a military doctrine, making plausible what would otherwise be incredible beliefs, values or expectations. Ideology and doctrine have other benefits to a blackmailer, or for that matter, to a prospective victim. They may make him impervious to counter-threats. To the extent that the player learns about the world from an immutable "doctrine" or an inaccessible authority, it is clearly futile to try to "educate" him, to try to influence his expectations or preferences even
in the direction of "reality." When a Communist says that a particular prediction is derived from Lenin, his opponents are forced to concede that he is fairly likely to believe that prediction and act on it--no matter how far removed from reality it may seem. Perhaps the test of a publicly-professed doctrine is not, "Is it true?" but "Is it what I want my opponents to think that I believe?"

Personal dogmas, idiosyncratic conceptions of the world, can serve the same purposes, making particular beliefs both plausible and rigid, impervious to communications from the opponent. Simple misinformation or ignorance, compounded by wishful thinking, can likewise enhance one's "willingness to risk," by overestimating the potential gains and underestimating the potential losses from commitment. Disbelief that they have the characteristics he claims; that one's own defenses or retaliatory force are vulnerable to his attack; that, if they are, the enemy is aware of these vulnerabilities, and knows how to exploit them; all these, which may be fearful distortions of reality, may yet be strength in bargaining.

Yet such defenses are treacherous; for unsupported as they are by a well-established and well-known ideology, the enemy may hope to teach his opponent the facts of life, bring him to his senses--when the appropriate moment should arrive. It is this hope that is dangerous for both. The blackmailer may believe, quite mistakenly, that he can dispel the opponent's wishfulness whenever he chooses, teach him his errors quite rapidly in the showdown. But when he comes around with his lesson, he may find his opponent's beliefs have hardened, or that his opponent is firmly committed on their basis; and meanwhile, he himself has committed himself too deeply to withdraw.

The more accessible the victim is to communication—the more open to rational influence—the more vulnerable he is to last-minute "briefings" such
as Goering delivered to his friend, Sir Nevile Henderson, after the first meeting between Chamberlain and Hitler at Berchtesgaden. If there were war, Goering informed him, one thing, at least, was quite certain; there would be "little of London left standing."

He then proceeded to give me fairly accurate details of the numbers of modern antiaircraft guns we possessed at the moment as well as of the unpreparedness of England's air defenses generally. He also mentioned, as was doubtless true at the time, that the German Air Force was numerically superior to those of Britain, France, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia combined." Henderson, 1956.

The only way to discourage such communications is to cultivate psychosis at the decision-making levels. If ignorance is good, madness is better. But both are risky; as with ideology and doctrine, the threatener may simply fail to be convinced that he has not gotten through to you: that you have quite literally cut the channels of communication and are invulnerable to information. Moreover, to insulate oneself from his threats and "propaganda" may involve deadening one's senses to all input from the outside world, including messages and cautions from one's own agents. When to believe your enemy's threats or warnings just a little is to capitulate or to abandon your blackmail, there are great temptations to become totally blind and deaf; so that one's policies will proceed on the basis of frozen perceptions, and the enemy must adjust to them. Perhaps.

Deprecating the worth of your opponent's offer, again, has the effect of lessening the cost of conflict. "I would prefer to fight," is the claim: i.e., in this case, "We would rather die than give in to that." It is extraordinary how frequently, and with what assurance, that statement is made, when "conflict" means literal annihilation. "Surrender," loss of face, loss of Berlin, or Asia, or Europe: none of these, it is asserted almost casually, are in any degree preferable to . . . national obliteration. Once again, an enemy might
well suspect that these "preferences" revealed only lack of reflection; when the
need arose, he might believe, he could force his opponents to look at the
alternatives seriously at last. Faced with the certain alternative of the
destruction of Prague, or Copenhagen, or Paris, governments suddenly found
that fates they had thought worse than death were, after all, worth living for.
Yet the Japanese convinced the Americans that they preferred to die to a man
on their homeland rather than surrender without preserving the Emperorship;
for it was true. And this point they won.

Finally, the fantastic, unassailable need: that is the factor most apt
to stiffen the "willingness to fight" when disaster is at stake. With normal
tastes, where "conflict" means mutual suicide, the difference between any
demand and any offer would scarcely justify accepting a large risk of conflict.
It is a talent to have desires so strong that an opponent will believe you
literally willing to gamble your life to achieve them. Thomas Hobbes named
this condition, in The Leviathan: "To have stronger, and more vehement Passions
for any thing, that is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call
MADNESSE." (59)

"Whereof there be almost as many kinds," he goes on, "as of the Passions
themselves. . . In summe, all Passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour,
are called by the generall name of Madnesse." (60) (New York, 1950).

"Of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that would take the paines, might
enrowle a legion," said Hobbes. And all of the forms of madness that might
benefit a blackmailer, Adolf Hitler enjoyed. Brilliantly perceptive of his
opponents' vulnerabilities, their anxieties and doubts, he was blind to their
strengths and real commitments, deaf to their counterthreats. No one could
reach him, teach him new values or beliefs, crack his confidence by magnifying
risks. "I go the way that Providence dictates with the assurance of a sleep¬
walker," said Hitler, proclaiming the triumph of his gamble in the Rhineland,
from which his own generals had failed to deter him. (B 343) Erratic, unpre¬
dictable, totally unbound by convention, honor, morality: he confronted his
opponent, who wanted nothing badly, with intense, obsessive wants; he found the
status quo they offered him unbearable, to be not merely broken but revenged.
Throughout his second interview with Chamberlain, he read dispatch after
dispatch brought in by couriers, each one sending him into a convulsive rage;
"Two more Germans killed by the Czechs," he shouted at the Englishman bargaining
with him; "I will be avenged for every one of them. The Czechs must be anni¬
hilated." (WB 133)

Hitler threatened war; so did his opponents. But these statesmen, who
were not mad, did not disguise the fact that they feared war, that they would
pay to avoid violence and risk. "War is a fearful thing," said Chamberlain,
two nights before he flew to Munich; "we must be very clear, before we embark
on it, that it is really the great issues that are at stake, and that the call
to risk everything in their defence . . . is irresistible." Hitler had other
payoffs. He was, to begin with, a gambler; he meant to take risks, not avoid
them. Measuring his payoffs by his willingness to take risks, the possible
gains from any gamble come out with a high value, the possible losses trivial.

More important: to Hitler, violence and war were values, not costs;
they were preferred means, and more than that, virtually ends in themselves.
More than to his unprepared opponents, war to him meant victory. But even without
victory, it meant the test and demonstration of strength, of daring, manhood,
racial and national superiority; there was no substitute for war. To Rauschning
he said in 1932: "None of these people any longer want war and greatness.
But I want war." (11)
"We shall not capitulate--no, never," he said; it was the summer before he became Chancellor of Germany. "We may be destroyed, but if we are, we shall drag a world with us--a world in flames." Thirteen years later, defeated by his enemies, he ordered a scorched earth policy for Germany from his bunker in Berlin. "If the war is to be lost," he told Speer, "the nation also will perish." (B 707)

Risk war? Hitler sought war. But others beneath him, in the early years, were more conscious of the risks; and he could satisfy them, and his own ego, with clever, riskless victories. For he alone knew how to turn his own mad willingness to fight into political power. As a politician, he knew well how to use madness; it happened that he was his own best instrument. If he had not been Hitler, he might have invented Hitler.

In the end, his lust for military victory rather than diplomatic victory led him to disaster; but earlier, this tension between his conflicting desires for the clever, political success and for the triumph of his war-machine, so evident beneath his impatience, gave him an immense advantage in negotiation.

His occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 comes closest to the sort of situation we have described. The "conflict" threatened was very far short of thermonuclear war; yet the stakes, for both sides, though not at all low, were low enough relative to the conflict outcome that both sides had very low "willingness to risk conflict." This was certainly true of England and France; it was true of the relatively "normal" subordinates of Hitler, such as his older generals; and it was relatively true even of Hitler. On this occasion, as usual, he was willing to take a greater risk of conflict than were his subordinates; but he was conscious enough of the possible costs this time that even he was not willing to take more than a very small risk.
For the Germans at this point, actual fighting, let alone victory, was out of the question. Only one division was sent into the Rhineland: three battalions across the Rhine. Against them the French alone could have mobilized ninety divisions, with 100 in reserve; and even without mobilization, they could have whipped them (as General Jodl testified later) with their ready "covering forces" alone. As it was, the troops marched in (at the generals' insistence) with orders to retreat at once if they were fired upon.

Militarily, it was a total bluff. But Hitler personally was committed up to the hilt. If his bluff were exposed, his prestige abroad, his authority over his own subordinates and generals, would be destroyed; at the very best, his program of rearmament would be overturned, the myth of daring and infallible intuition killed at birth. In diplomacy, unlike poker, it is never desirable to be caught bluffing. For Hitler, it might have meant the end.

He was not blind to this. He had to be nearly certain that the French and English would not interfere. And he was. Yet for all his certainty, even Hitler was affected by the enormity of the stakes once he had made his move:

"The forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking in my life," his intimates were to hear later, again and again. "If the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs."

Hitler's own generals, meanwhile, were certain that the French would march. His theory was better than theirs.

They saw that Germany should not accept more than the most minor risk. He saw that the risk was very low. Judging the French and English payoffs, he saw that their "willingness to risk conflict" was just as low as his, or lower; and he predicted confidently that they would estimate the actual risk as "not low enough."
For his opponents (and Hitler knew this, and counted on it) had to contend with a madman: a player whose payoffs were obscure, changeable, and tended to be insane; who might not calculate his risks, or might take them even if he judged them high; who could not be counted on to do the sensible thing.

The stakes for France were not small. The demilitarised Rhineland was the last of the military guarantees against Germany left from the War. By occupying it, Hitler moved his jumping-off position for an attack on France 100 miles west. By fortifying it, he made far more difficult any attempt by France to honor her Eastern alliances by a counteroffensive in case of Germany's aggression. Most important, by ignoring a clear-cut and ominous violation both of the Treaty of Versailles and the Pact of Locarno, Hitler's opponents demonstrated to Europe, as Churchill puts it, that "France would not fight, and that England would hold her back even if she would." (179) In other words, France had important prestige at stake. Yet France did not march.

One reason sounds quite contemporary: Hitler had presented France with a military challenge for which France possessed no suitable military counter. The French generals literally had no plan for dealing with a small aggression; there was no small, organized force ready to oppose Hitler's limited move. Both generals and politicians recoiled before the prospect of general mobilization.

As Hitler had predicted, in the councils of the French and English scarcely anyone pretended that the actual risks of counter-action were surely great. But all argument hinged on whether there would be any risk at all. The Germans might "welcome us with shots," the French High Command pointed out; there might be war; and if there any chance of that, there must be general mobilization.
(These discussions, as R. A. C. Parker recounts them* have a very contemporary tone. In the course of military briefings the politicians learned, to their surprise, that the military "contingency plans" and resources were such that France was incapable of anything between a token response and a massive one."

And at the thought of general mobilization, let alone open war, in the political environment of that moment, the politicians' blood ran cold.

In the end, two comments by the English summed up the Allies' problem neatly. Chamberlain entered the following remark in his diary:

March 12, talked to Flandin, emphasising that public opinion would not support us in sanctions of any kind. His view is that if a firm front is maintained Germany will yield without war. We cannot accept this as a reliable estimate of a mad Dictator's reaction.

It was, in fact, quite a reliable estimate; and that much could be guessed even then. It was ineffective because to move the English, whose willingness to risk conflict was as low as the French, it had to be extraordinarily reliable. Prime Minister Baldwin calculated his own critical risk at this juncture as precisely as if he had been reading these lectures. "You may be right," he told Flandin, "but if there is even one chance in a hundred that war would follow from your police operation I have not the right to commit England."

The "mad Dictator," they calculated, was at least 1% likely to bring on a war if opposed; and that was enough to deter them. Later, they were to be willing to take much higher risks; but then, the risks were higher: always, in fact, just a little "too high."

On this one, earliest occasion, Hitler posed threats which he had no capability, let alone intention or commitment, to carry out. But Hitler had

a standard blackmailer's advantage; he knew the victim's payoffs much better than the victim knew his. He knew his victims could stand only a small risk, and he was confident that he could present them with an unacceptable one, especially since they were much less well informed about his own payoffs and capabilities, unlikely to know how small a risk he himself was prepared to take.

By their unwillingness to take a small risk early in the game, the French and English leaders ensured that they would have to face great risks later. For the risks were never small again. Hitler had gained confidence in his estimates of his opponents. Expecting them to back down under threats, he planned new ones, to which he did not hesitate to commit himself. In subsequent blackmail, he lacked neither the capability nor the will to carry out his threats.

Moreover, the very fact that he had gambled--and won--in the Rhineland strengthened Hitler's hand in later bargaining. He had established publicly that he was capable of facing risks; and that the Great Powers he opposed were not. "England will not move one finger for Austria," Hitler told the Austrian Prime Minister, Schuschnigg, two years later. "And France? Well, two years ago we marched on the Rhineland with a handful of battalions, that was the time I risked everything . . . But now it is too late for France."

After the Rhineland, all too easy for Schuschnigg to believe that Hitler is right; easier still to believe that he thinks he is right, that he will not be deterred from marching by the risk that he is wrong. But the Anschluss, Hitler's occupation of Austria, is discovered in a separate chapter. Like the occupation of Prague after the Munich settlement, it is a case where Hitler's military relationship to his victim was that of a very strong to a much weaker power. That did not call for tactics of "madness." The Munich bargain did.
Munich, at first, presents quite different problems from the Rhineland. The demands that Hitler made on the English and French were very much higher than before: to acquiesce in the dismemberment of a sovereign nation, a member of the League of Nations, an ally toward whom France had "sacred obligations." If conflict had still meant what it meant at the time of the Rhineland, when war looked scarcely more terrible than general mobilization, there is no doubt that England and France would have found their "willingness to risk conflict" immensely higher than in the earlier situation. No longer would a 1% chance of war have caved in their resistance; in fact, if war had meant the same in 1938 that it meant in 1936, the Allies might well have preferred the certainty of conflict to accepting Hitler's demands. (Their critical risk would have become not 1% but 100%.)

But the meaning of "war" had changed. The objective situation was different; it is too easy to forget this in stressing subjective factors in the decisions of Chamberlain and Daladier. Hitler now had Austria and the Rhineland; he had a vastly increased war potential and mobilization base; he had the West Wall, locking the Western door of Germany to France. As Neurath had remarked to the American Ambassador, Bullitt:

As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign politics and a new constellation will develop. (Bullitt, p. 316)

Above all, he had his air force; by 1938 it cast a shadow over every bargaining table. In the opinion of Edward Meade Earle, Germany's victory at Munich "was primarily a victory for the Luftwaffe and perhaps the greatest victory of its entire existence."* This is obviously a very great simplification,

*Turner, History of Military Affairs in Western Society, 774.
and one which it is the purpose of this lecture to go beyond; but it is one worth pondering. Throughout these lectures we have consistently emphasized subjective elements in decision-making; but in order to understand or to predict changes in those subjective estimates, we must have at least a rough notion of the influence of objective changes upon them.

In order to base political influence upon his Luftwaffe, Hitler had to ensure that at the right time, the English and French were fully and correctly informed of its objective capabilities. Not too soon; it wouldn't do to reveal too early the force he was building, before it had reached impressive proportions, at a time of little tension when the revelation would pass unnoticed, or when, on the other hand, it might give his enemies time to repair the gaps in their plane production and in their air defenses. But when it became important to let his opponents know--to make them know--in detail, what could happen to them if their resistance led to war, Hitler knew better than to rely on their believing the shrill and controversial estimates of Winston Churchill (who had earned during this period the reputation that Joe Alsop enjoys in 1959). On this point Hitler no longer wanted ambiguity.

In August, General Vuillemin, Commander in Chief of the French Air Force, was invited to Germany by Goering. As Francois-Poncet, the French Ambassador to Germany who accompanied him, reports:

He was most cordially received. The most recent models were exhibited for his benefit; he was shown over the training camps, workshops, factories, and plants of the anti-aircraft organization; nothing was hidden from him and he was able to confirm the accuracy of information I had been filing in Paris for many months. At the end of his visit and of a farewell luncheon at Karin Hall, Goering asked the fateful question: 'If Germany and Czechoslovakia go to war, what will France do?'

'France will honor her signature,' the General answered.
"But a few minutes later," Francois-Poncet continues in his memoirs, "as we drove back to Berlin, he confessed: 'Should war break out as you expect late in September, there won't be a single French plane left within a fortnight!'"

"Amid such conditions," comments Francois-Poncet, "it is conceivable that the representatives of France had grounds for anxiety."*

The representative of England, Nevile Henderson, had his briefing from Goering after the first Berchtesgaden meeting. "There was no time to waste," Goering told him; and Germany was not bluffing. There was no need, with Henderson, to let him count the planes; he had considerable trust in Goering, for whom, he says, he had "a real personal liking." (76)

I remember his saying to me on this occasion, 'If England means to make war on Germany, no one knows what the ultimate end will be. But one thing is quite certain. Before the war is over there will be very few techs left alive and little of London left standing.'

So the mad Dictator, this time, had the bigger divisions; almost, one might say, he did not need to be mad. But that would overstate his bargaining strength. His revelations concerned his power to punish England and France for interfering; not even Hitler could claim confidence that he had the power to win victory in open conflict with them: to prevent them from punishing him mortally. Given the new meaning of "conflict," impressed upon the statement of England and France, so vividly, their "willingness to risk conflict" was not nearly so high as it would have been facing these immense demands a few years earlier. But still, on balance, it had probably increased; Chamberlain might not have demurred, as Baldwin did in 1936, at accepting a risk of one in a hundred of war. And, given the costs to him of war and the size of the

stakes demanded, a "normal" blackmailer would have had great difficulty in making his threats even 1%, or 10%, or 50% credible. Here again Hitler's madness was indispensable.

This is a different bargaining situation from the one we considered earlier. There, the victim's "willingness to risk conflict" was very low; it was sufficient there for the blackmailer to be merely mildly erratic, unpredictable: to create uncertainty about his motives, a feeling that he "might do anything": even carry out his threat. Now we consider a situation in which (a) the victim's "willingness to risk conflict" is not terribly low (in this case, because the demands are much higher); and (b) for one reason or another, a blackmailer who appeared to have normal expectations, payoffs, and habits would find it hard or impossible to make his threats sufficiently credible: to make the risks of conflict seem "too high" to his opponents.

Here another sort of madness pays off. The blackmailer's behavior must seem purposive, not random: but directed to mad ends. To find his threats credible, let us say, the victim must believe the blackmailer to have a very high "willingness to risk conflict". None but a madman, the victim might believe, would accept a high risk of major war for a small increase in territory, for the difference of a few days in an occupation. Very well: the situation requires a madman. Sometimes that can be supplied.

Let us look at Hitler's payoffs. First, his demands: demands for outcomes that were clearly terrible for his opponents and yet, for a "normal" blackmailer might have been only minor gains: minor at least compared to the awful costs of war. But Hitler, said Francois-Ponce, "was a Nimmersatt, a man never sated; he lacked all sense of proportion; he set a value only upon what he did not yet possess." (The Fateful Years, p. 258)
Thomas Hobbes named this condition, in the Leviathan: "To have stronger and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call Madnesse." Such passion, for Hitler, attached itself at each stage to his next goal.

See how easily we can represent such preferences in our payoff diagram!

\[
\begin{array}{c|cc}
\text{Victim} & \text{Comply} & \text{Refuse} \\
\hline
\text{Hitler} & \begin{cases} 
\text{Accept} & \begin{cases} 10 & \text{if Demand}\ 100 \\
0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\
\text{Demand} & 100 \\
\end{cases} & 0 \\
\end{array}
\]

Conflict? 0. His demand? Something, everything: say, 100. His opponent's offer to maintain the status quo? 0. Nothing matters but . . . the next prize. If he cannot win that, he is indifferent between the status quo and the conflict, the loss of all he had won before. Such a man, who wants one thing and is indifferent to all other outcomes, is himself invulnerable to threats; he cannot be blackmailed; and to offer him the status quo is to offer him nothing.

If this is an exaggeration, if Hitler's payoffs were not quite like this, still they approached it. Generally, conflict did have some cost for him; but that cost tended to seem small in comparison with the possible gains from achieving his demands--whatever those new demands were! These are the payoffs of the reckless gambler: the man who is ready to accept great risks of great loss in small hope of great gains.

Second, his attitude toward conflict, To Hitler, violence and war were values, not costs: virtually ends in themselves. More than to his unprepared opponents, war to him meant victory. But even without victory, it meant the test and demonstration of strength, of daring, manhood, racial and national superiority; there was no substitute for war. To Rauschning he said in 1932:
"None of these people any longer want war and greatness. But I want war."
(The Voice of Destruction, 11)

Where status quo meant the abandonment of struggle, the acceptance of stalemate, the end of demands, it was worse than conflict: worse than violent defeat. "We shall not capitulate--no, never," he said; it was the summer before he became Chancellor of the Third Reich. "We may be destroyed, but if we are, we shall drag a world with us--a world in flames." (5) He lived, his values unchanged, to enforce that will. Thirteen years later, defeated by his enemies, he ordered from his bunker in Berlin a scorched earth policy for Germany. "If the war is to be lost," he told Speer, "the nation also will perish . . . There is no need to consider the basis even of a most primitive existence any longer. On the contrary, it is better to destroy even that, and to destroy it ourselves. The nation has proved itself weak, and the future belongs solely to the stronger Eastern nation. Besides, those who remain after the battle are of little value; for the good have fallen."*

This was the man that Chamberlain, who was not mad, faced at Berchtesgaden. And there was one more factor in the matrix: his particular desires, the passion that drove him in the fall of 1938. It is named by Hobbes in the Leviathan:

The passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is . . . great vaine-Glory, which is commonly called Pride, and selfe-Concei^t . . . Pride subjecteth a man to Anger, the excess whereof, is the Madnesse called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe that excessive desire of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes Rage. (60)

We have seen, in the last lecture, the source of his rage: the "firm stand" by the Allies in May of 1938, the partial mobilization of the Czechs, that forced Hitler to back down publicly and drove him wild with humiliation.

*Bullock, Hitler, 707.
It had led immediately to the issuance of the directive beginning: "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future." Smash: zerschlagen: to obliterate, annihilate: a word that dominated his thinking and his references to Czechoslovakia and Benes after May. That was what he wanted: not the Sudetenland, but Czechoslovakia, all of it, and by a crushing military victory; the plans included poison gas on the Czech population and bombs on Prague.

Chamberlain did not learn these payoffs in their full detail on his trip to Berchtesgaden; but he learned enough. He didn't discover, then, that Hitler at that moment preferred war to a mere occupation of the Sudetenland (as Hitler said to the Hungarian Prime Minister after Chamberlain's first visit: "action by the Army would provide the only satisfactory solution. There was, however, a danger of the Czechs submitting to every demand."). Chamberlain did not know that Hitler's demands were meant to be rejected, to provide an excuse for military action. But he did learn unmistakably Hitler's mad--and thereby powerful --"willingness to risk conflict."

The Sudeten Germans must come into the Reich. Hitler said he "would face any war, even the risk of a world war, for this. Here the limit had been reached where the rest of the world might do what it like, he would not yield one single step." Details did not concern him. "Three hundred Sudetens have been killed, and things of that kind cannot go on . . . I am prepared to risk a world war rather than allow this to drag on." (Bullock, 416)

He limited his demands to some extent. "It's the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe," he announced in his Sportspalast speech 26 September, "but it is the claim from which I will not recede and which, God willing, I will make good." (Bullock, 423)
He was, in short, committed: for the others, the freedom of choice, the decision to surrender: or to start the Second World War. "I have made Herr Benes an offer . . . The decision now lies in his hands: Peace or War . . . We are determined! Now let Herr Benes make his choice." (Bullock, 424)

"He seemed tonight to have completely lost control of himself," reported William Shirer, who watched that speech. And next day, when Henderson and Sir Horace Wilson visited him to reject his ultimatum, their warning was greeted with evident satisfaction. Several times, as they talked, Hitler shouted: "Ich werde die Tschechen zerschlagen," which, Henderson notes, Schmidt translated faithfully as: I will smash-sh-sh the Czechs."* As the conversation continued, Hitler paced in one of the transports of rage that had earned him the name of "Rug-eater" (Teppichfresser) among his subordinates. When Wilson warned that if France should become involved in hostilities against Germany the United Kingdom would support France. That means, said Hitler, "that if France chooses to attack Germany, England feels it her duty to attack Germany also."** Wilson protested, and Hitler shouted him down. "IF France and England strike, let them do so. It is a matter of complete indifference to me . . . It is Tuesday today, and by next Monday we shall all be at war."***

War was not, however, a matter of complete indifference to his opponents. And it is hard, for that, to call them mad. It was their weakness, their vulnerability in bargaining with a man who wanted war. Chamberlain's "willingness to risk conflict" on these issues was less than absolute; there was

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*Henderson, 164.

**Schmidt, 105.

***Henderson, 165
some probability of war that could make him choose compliance. He chose accommodation in preference to what he regarded—as I think, correctly—as the certain alternative of war. He can be criticized for many things (I do not hint at them in this lecture) but can he be criticized harshly for that?

To be sure, he underestimated the scope of Hitler's plans, the advantages of stopping him early, the uses to which Hitler could put an extra year of peace, the costs of losing strong allies: the cost of lost honor. No one today, no doubt, would find it "horrible, fantastic, incredible..." as Chamberlain did, in his speech on the 27th of September, just before his final call to Munich, that one might prepare to fight "because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing..."

"However much we may sympathize with a small nation confronted by a big and powerful neighbour, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in a war simply on her account. If we have to fight it must be on larger issues than that."

We have not heard the full story of Munich. As in other lectures, I have drawn attention only to certain isolated factors in a bargaining situation that illustrate patterns we have analyzed. Hitler's mad payoffs, his mad willingness to risk, even choose, conflict, I have suggested, gave him an immense bargaining advantage, once they had been demonstrated unmistakably in face to face encounter, but his opponents were not powerless. Their threat of war could not preserve for them the status quo; but in connection with much more favorable offer to Hitler, their threats were enough, in the end, to force him to accept less than the total military victory and occupation that he wanted. If Hitler sought war, many of his subordinates, including his generals, did not. And in the end, his opponents forced on him peaceful rewards so great...
so great that even Hitler could not pretend to his generals that the uncertainties of combat were preferable. To his surprise, and eventual frustration, his opponents lowered drastically his "willingness to risk conflict" by their new offers. And then they sat down to "bargain."

The description of the outcome by Weizsacker, German Secretary of State, is not inaccurate: Hitler "had won the incorporation of the Sudeten Germans in the Reich. The three other statesmen had won peace. The Munich Agreement was one of the rare examples in modern history of important territorial changes being brought about by negotiation." Weizsacker is wrong, of course, when he concludes: "The whole thing was the work of twenty-four hours." (Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsacker, London, 1951, p. 155).

The bargaining in fact was over when the Munich conference began. The bargaining--had been the audiences, the speeches, the rages. What had the statesman confronting Hitler learned? That he was mad . . . enough to fight. They were not wrong. Which meant that he was mad enough . . . to win "peacefully". All of the forms of madness I have said that might benefit a blackmail, Hitler enjoyed. Erratic, unpredictable, invulnerable to reasoning and warning that he did not want to hear ("I go the way that Providence dictates, with the assurance of a sleepwalker," Hitler said, after the occupation of the Rhineland; he was the ultimate inner-directed man) totally unbound by convention, honor, morality, humanity: he confronted his opponents, who wanted nothing badly, with intense, wants. He found the status quo they offered him unbearable, to be not merely broken but revenged.

They found they did not want war; not then. They took advantage of the one impulse in Hitler's mind that conflicted with his lust for war: his pride, as a theorist of blackmail, in clever, riskless victories. As a politician,
he knew supremely well how to turn his own mad willingness to fight into political power. He understood how to use madness; it happened that he was his own best instrument. If he had not been Hitler, he might have invented Hitler.

He was, perhaps, unique in his perception of the opportunities for blackmail, in his willingness to gamble on his insights and in his talents for making his threats effective. Under cover of his threats, he sent his armies into the Rhineland, into Austria, into the Sudetenland, into Prague—without resistance! He transformed the face of Europe and all strategic relationships without firing a shot. These were the bloodless victories, for which he alone was responsible, that made possible the military successes of 1939 and 1940.

They formed a whole. Each one made him more confident, more willing to commit himself the next time; each one improved his strategic position, weakened his opponents' ability to resist his next move; each undermined his opponents will to resist, made his next threat more credible and formidable. Finally, it was this pattern of victory, fantastic and incomprehensible to all but himself, that undercut all German military resistance to his authority, creating an almost hypnotic reliance on his instincts. To win Europe, Hitler had to start with these successes. More than that, he had to advance by blackmail; only bloodless, fast, unheralded victories could have maintained his winning streak so long. And close study of his methods suggests that no other methods could have brought him success in his blackmail. To the student of coercion, these examples cry out: this is how it is done. Again and again it was done, because it worked; until it failed.

If one imagines that the word "war" in the following statement should not have reverberated so awfully in Chamberlain's ears at the time of Munich, then
to keep his decision problem interesting, and perhaps, still relevant, substitute for "war" in that final speech the phrase, "thermonuclear war":

War is a fearful thing, and we must be very clear, before we embark on it, that it is really the great issues that are at stake, and that the call to risk everything in their defense, when all the consequences are weighed, is irresistible. (WB)

No doubt, Chamberlain put the stakes too low. If he had seen all the issues involved, he would have seen Hitler's demands--relative to the other outcomes--as higher than he did. Chamberlain's "willingness to risk conflict" would have been higher than it was. But would it have been--should it have been--absolute? Should he have preferred the certainty of conflict? The costs of conflicts, some of them, were clear as could be; Goering had seen to that. The costs of accepting--the advantages of resisting--could not be so clear. Nor would they be as clear as the risks to a future statesman in Chamberlain's position.

Even given the inevitable uncertainties Chamberlain confronted, some would conclude--and I do not judge whether they are right--that he should have chosen to fight. And now that we have suffered the kind of war he faced, and know the stakes involved, no doubt we are willing to risk--for the same sort of stakes--much higher chances of . . . the same sort of war. Unfortunately, we might not have that option. Just as it changed in meaning from 1936 to 1938, "war" has become new since 1945. A blackmailer who could not hope to succeed with the threats that Hitler used, would find that he had "better" threats. If the plausibility of threats of war has gone down since 1945, has not also the "willingness to risk conflict"? What is the net result? I don't judge this; but I can still imagine temptations, possible rewards as well as risks, for a man who might be mad. Then we might see again the pattern of the thirties. One last time.
In the world of the Balance of Terror, will any ruler of a major state be able to persuade his opponents that he wants war; not only that he will risk it, but that he means to choose it? Perhaps not; they would have to think him very mad. But then, in that day they will not need certainty, or anything close to it, to capitulate; and where a little madness could win the world, it seems incautious to assume no madman will ever find authority. A man who was slightly mad—who looked, perhaps, at other things but risks, who wanted some things very much, who could act on impulse—could be "useful" to have in national politics: a man of whom it could be said, in negotiation, "If we don't get these demands, it's likely that he will take over; and then . . . ?"

A low willingness to wait, when it is there, remains no secret to one's fellow bargainers; and if it rests, a little bit, on "madness", that does not make it less influential. Dictators will go on having rages; in fact, much the same sort of thing enrages a dictator from one year to the next. After Hitler's humiliation by the Czechs in May, Paul Schmidt, his interpreter, reports:

The World Press announced jubilantly that the German dictator had yielded. One had only to stand up to him, as the Czechs had done, they said, to make him see reason. Anyone deliberately planning to madden Hitler could have thought of no better method. Openly to accuse a dictator of weakness is the thing least likely to make him see reason. (88)

Or as Henderson put it, speaking of the same incident: "If there is one thing which a dictator dislikes, it is being dictated to." (106)

It will be interesting to read in the histories, some day, how Mao Tsetung and Krushchev enjoyed being forced to back down at Quemoy and Berlin. In theory, of course, you can't insult a Communist. If that is so, which we may hope, the Berliners may not learn the Russian for zerschlagen.
There is indeed nothing to be learned from the experience of the Thirties unless we take the mental effort to seek out the essential transformations in the data, to decide which changes are relevant and somehow to allow for them. But the effort is worth making. For if Hitler was mad, his theory was not.

"The difference between Munich and now," Krushchev said recently (March, 1959) "is that I am not Adolph Hitler." (He didn't feel a need to distinguish himself from Chamberlain.) What Hitler was, no man--we must hope--aspires to be. But what Hitler knew, others can learn: and use. And win with it--until they fail, and smash all humankind.