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ARISTOTLE DE ANIMA

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITPY PRESS WARD ΓΕ ΤΊ ΣΈ,

C7. BF. CLAY, ALAN AGER, BHontborn:s FETTER LANE, EF. Ginsgow: oo, WELLINGTON STREET,

Mripsia: F. A. ΠΗΓΉ KR IEA, β Boch: (6: 8 BET SN ASS StS, Bombay anh Caleta: MACMILLAN ANTI Cr, Jit.

[til Migdds reserved}

ARISTOTLE DE ANIMA

WITH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

R. D. HICKS, M.A.

FELLOW AND LATE LECTURER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

CAMBRIDGE : AT THE UNIVERSIVY PRESS

1907

Wambridge: PRINTED BY JOIN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS,

TO HENRY JACKSON

WHO HAS INSPIRED MANY WITH HIS OWN LOVE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page 15, critical notes, line 2, a/fer ieliqui codd. add Bek. Trend.

3}

3}

48, Critical notes, line 4, for appendicem vcad Fiagmenta t., Il. 1—3, p. 164 Z7277a.

86, critical notes, line 12, after Bek. Trend. Torst. add Rodier.

56, critical notes, line 13, afte Simpl. Soph. || add ζώντων Ῥ |.

a7, translation, line 7, for body 7vad rest.

64, critical notes, line 9, for append. για Fraymenta 01, 1. 61, p. 166 fufra.

It4, critical notes, line 6, for rére...31. γίνεται read τότε... 31. καὶ ὁ,

116, critical notes, last line, fur 162 read 160.

145, Critical notes, line 12, for Hayduck read ITetnze.

150, critical notes, line 7, for 540 read τ40.

150, critical notes, line 13, after ap. crit. ad loc.) add” Bek. Trend.

182, critical notes, last line, affer Bek. Trend. add Biehl.

20... end of note on 403 b ὃ, edd A similar confusion of of Adyoe with of Adyorres τοὺς λόγους may he noticed yo7 b 13—17.

ast, end of first note on 406 b 13, aad The meaning of ἔκστασις ἐκ τῆς οὐσίᾳ», so far as ἀλλοίωσις 1» concerned, is given less bluntly and paradoxically 414 ULE SQ, 426 ἃ 4 5q-, Where ἡ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια is said to reside not ἐν τῷ ποιητικῷ, but ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι,

251, line 2 of note on Ὁ 17. for Koch vvad Kock,

386, end of note on 417 b 5, aad Ch 45ὺῸ 1 & Ὁ, 4300 14 ὁ τῷ πάντα yerdorda. The limitation, temporal or modal, which [ find in θεωροῦν, is often expressed by a dependent clause when the transition from ἔξες τὸ ἐνέργεια ts described, as here, in precise terms, e.g. ὅταν. φρονμῇ 41 tk, ἦταν νυῇ 430 b 16, ὅταν θεωρῇ 432 ἃ 8, b ay, and generally ὅταν Cvepya gig Ὁ ay: cf. τὸ ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν 417 ἃ 12, ὁ ἤδη θεωρῶν 417 ἃ 25.

377, line tt of note on yig b 24, for XI read No. XXX. (Vol. XEtL).

385, line 4 of first note on σα 21, add Ch tap. τοῦ Ὁ 25 δὲ...

goo, enc of first note on 4220 22 add’ Another Miltonie ceho contes from // Lenserosa (3-—~ 16 “ Whose saintly visage is too bright | To hit the sense of human sight, | And therefore to our weaker view | Overlaid with black.”

449, end of note on 427 ἃ 4 add Perhaps a 3 ἔστε bi... ἡ ἀδιαίρετον shold rather be paraphrased thus: ‘There is, then, ἃ sense in which the percipient of two distinct objects is divisible; there is another sense in which it perceives them as being itself indivisible”? If so, with ἢ ἀδιαίρετον we should supply τὸ αἰσθανόμενον or τὸ αἰσθητικόν, and not τὸ διαιρετόν, as is dane on pe 11g.

524, end of note on 430 1» 26, add’ In an instructive aete Torstrik (pp. τοῦ τα 19k) calls attention to the distinction between ὥσπερ and οἷον. The latter, he says, is used in citing examples or in passing from the genus ta its sub- ordinate species ; the former extends a predicate from one subject to another in sentences like the following: “The Greeks are sharp-wilted, as also (ὥσπερ καὶ) some of the barbarians.” Lf this be su, @omep fs quite in place in comparing the meaning of two terms. The termi φάσις denotes something predicated of something, as dues the term κατάφασις. But the writer passes from the term φάσις to the thing dented by the term when be adds in the next words that this predication is always true or false.

§32, line 15, after better instance is zzsert ὁ δὲ νοῦς., οὐσία τις οὖσα sok b τῷ sq. CE.

PREFACE.

HE first English edition of this treatise appeared in 1882 under the title of “Aristotle’s Psychology in Greek and English, with Introduction and Notes by Edwin Wallace.” It has been for some time out of print and, if Mr Wallace had survived to see his work through a second edition, he would probably have made considerable alterations, owing to the re- searches of the last quarter of a century. Of these I resolved to make full use, when, with their accustomed liberality, the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press accepted my offer to prepare an independent edition. Among the fresh materials which have accumulated, two are of special importance: I mean, the critical edition of De Anzma by the late Wilhelm Biehl and the series of Aristotelian commentaries re-edited under the auspices of the Berlin Academy. As regards the text, I have seldom had reason to deviate from Biehl’s conclusions, but in my critical notes, which are based on his judicious selection, I have gone further than he did in referring to, or occasionally citing from, authorities. The interval of time has enabled me to cite with greater uniformity than Biehl could do from the Berlin editions of the Greek commentators. I have followed the example of Wallace in printing an English version opposite the Greek text. A century ago, perhaps, the Latin of Argyropylus with the necessary alterations would have served the same purpose by indicating the construction of the sentences and the minimum of supplement needed to make sense and grammar of Aristotle’s shorthand style. But fashions have changed. The terse sim- plicity, not to say baldness, of literal Latin is now discarded for that rendering into a modern vernacular which, whatever its advantages, is always in danger of becoming, and too often is, a mere medley of specious paraphrase and allusive subterfuge. In compiling my notes I have drawn freely upon all my predecessors, not only on the Greeks themselves, who even in their decline were excellent paraphrasts, but also on modern editors and translators, from Pacius and Trendelenburg onward; while through Zabarella I have made some slight acquaintance with the views of the Latin

Vili PREFACE

schoolmen. Among modern critics few have the great gifts of Torstrik, who by his insight, candour and logic contributed beyond all others to improve Bekxker’s text of the treatise. Of this distinction nothing can rob him: haeret capiti cum multa laude corona. In matters of punctuation and orthography I have taken my own line, but, lest 1 should be accused of inconsistency, I must add that when citing from other editions J have been scrupulous in preserving their peculiarities. Thus, while for my own part I admit indifferently αἰεὶ and ἀεί, γίγνεσθαι and γίνεσθαι, when I cite the Metaphysics from Christ, [I follow him in always preferring αἰεὶ and ryiryveoGaz, to the exclusion of det and γίνεσθαι. Again, though I regard ζῷον and μέμεικται as alone correct, in citing from other editions where ζῶον and μέμικται are printed! I have been careful not to alter the spelling. In references to the Metaphysics, Ethics and Politics Ὁ have been content to give Bekker’s page, column and line without the addition of book and chapter, thus avoiding the confusion which arises from the double numbering of certain books and chapters. I have tried as far as possible to give in the notes the reasons for my conclusions, so that where I have erred it will be more easy for my critics to refute me. My own claims to originality are modest enough. In fact, in a subject like this, absolute novelty of view is almost unattainable, perhaps undesirable.

I am indebted to Professor Henry Jackson, to whom the work is dedicated, for permission to publish sundry proposals, chiefly textual, taken from his public lectures delivered in the year 1903. Mr Τὸ, M. Cornford kindly placed at my disposal for this edition various notes on the third Book, which, after I had made use of them, were communicated to the Cambridge Philological Society. My book has profited by the vigilance and insight of several friends, to whom I desire to make fitting acknowledement. In particular, Miss Margaret Alford, Lecturer of Bedford College, revised for me the first draft of the notes and added to them much of value. Nor must I pass over the good offices of Dr T. L. ILeath, who assisted in correcting the proof-shects, or those of the Rev. J. M. Schulhof, who aided me five years ago at the commencement of my task. Lastly, I must express very great obligations to the staff of the University Press, including their accomplished readers, for their able and zealous co-operation.

R. D. EL.

CAMBRIDGE, Vovember, 1907.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

PAGE List OF AUTHORITIES CITED. . . . . . ΧΊ----ΧΥ INTRODUCTION I.: SUBJECT . . . . . . ΧΙΧ---ἸΧΧῚ .» II.: Text . . . . . . ixxtti—Ixxxili SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE CRITICAL NOTES. . . . . . . . . Ιχχχῖν GREEK TEXT, CRITICAL NOTES AND TRANSLATION . . 2—163 FRAGMENTS OF AN OLDER RECENSION OF E 1n Boox II. 164—I17I NoTES . . . . . . . . . . 173—588 APPENDIX: FRAGMENTS OF T'HEOPHRASTUS ON INTELLECT 589—596 INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND PROPER NAMES . . . 597—598 INDEX OF GREEK WORDS . . . . . . 599—626

a5

LIST OF AUTHORITIES.

Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Trendelenburg (Ienae, 1833); ed. Belger-Tren- delenburg (Derolini, 1877).

Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Torstrik (Berolini, 1862).

Aristotle’s Psychology, ed. E. Wallace (Cambridge, 1882).

Aristotelis De Anima, ed. Guil. Biehl (Lipsiae, 1884); nova impressio (Lipsiae, 1896).

Aristotelis De Anima liber B secundum recensionem Vaticanam, ed. H. Rabe (Gratulationsschrift der Bonner philol. Gesellsch. an Usener, Berolini, 1891).

Aristote, Traité de Ame, ed. G. Rodier (Paris, 1900).

Translations of De Anima (other than those of Argyropylus, Barco, Wallace, Hammond and Rodier):

Ides Aristoteles Schrift iiber die Seele, H. Bender (Stuttgart, 1872). Des Aristoteles Schrift tiber die Seele, E. Rolfes (Bonn, 1901).

For ancient conimentaries on De Anima see Philoponus, Simplicius, Sophonias,

Themistius.

Editions of Aristotle before Bekker: Aldina (Vencetiis, 1495—1498) [collated by Trendelenburg]- Basileensis (Basileae, 15313; 1530; 1550). Sylburgiana (Francofurti, 15793; 1584; 1587).

Aristoteles graece ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri edidit Academia regia Beorussica (Berolini, 1831—1870): Vols. I, ΠῚ, Graece ex rec. 1. Bekkeri. 1831. Vol. III. Latine interpretibus variis. 1831 [De Anima I[oanne Argyropylo Byzantio interprete, pp. 209—226]. Vol. IV. Scholia, coll. C. A. Brandis. 1836. Vol. ΚΝ. Fragmenta. Scholiorum supplementum. Index Aristotelicus. 1870. Aristotelis opera omnia. Graece et latine ediderunt Bussemaler, Dubner, Heitz (Paristis, 1848—1874).

Editions of separate treatises of Aristotle: Organon, ed. Th. Waitz! (Lipsiae, 1844—1846). Physica, rec. Car. Prantl? (Lipsiae, 1879). De Caclo, De Generatione et Corruptione}, rec. Car. Prantl (Lipsiae, 1881). Meteoroloyica, rec. J. L. Ideler (Lipsiae, 1834—1836). Parva Naturalia, recogn. Guil. Biehl! (Lipsiae, 1898). De Sensu and De Memoria, ed. G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge, 1906). ἱστορίαι περὶ ζώων, Thierkunde, von H. Aubert and Fr. Wimmer (Leipzig, 1868).

1 My citations are usually made from this edition.

xii LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Editions of separate treatises of Aristotle (comdzzved) : De Partibus Animalium, ex recogn. B. Langkavel! (Lipsiae, 1868). (De Coloribus.) Ueber die Farben, von Carl Prantl (Munchen, 1849). Metaphysica, recogn. H. Bonitz (Bonnae, 1848—1849). Metaphysica, rec. W. Christ! (Lipsiae, 1886); nova impressio (Lipsiae, 1895). Ethica Nicomachea, rec. I. Bywater! (Oxonii, 1890). The Ethics, by Sir A. Grant (3rd edition, London, 1874). The Politics, by W. L. Newman! (Oxford, 1887—1902). Ars Rhetorica cum adnotat. L. Spengel (Lipsiac, 1867). Rhetoric with E. M. Cope’s Commentary, ed. J. E. Sandys (Cambridge, 1877). Ars Rhetorica, ed. A. Roemer? (Lipsiae, 1885). De Arte Poetica, rec. J. Vahlen! (3rd edition, Lipsiae, 1885). Fragmenta collegit V. Rose (Lipsiac, 1886).

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca edita consilio et auctoritate Academiac litterarum regiae Borussicae (Berolini, 1882—1907).

Aetius, Placita: in Diels, Doxographici Graeci.

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, De Anima cum Mantissa, ed. I. Bruns! (Berolini, 1887).

—— Quaestiones. De Fato. De Mixtione, ed. I. Bruns?! (Berolini, 1892).

—— In Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. M. Hayduck! (Berolini, 18yr).

In Aristotelis De Sensu, ed. Thurot (Paris, 1875); ed. Wendland!

(Berolini, 1901).

Anonymi Londinensis ex Aristotelis Iatricis Menoniis et allis medicis eclogae, ed. H. Diels (Berolini, 1893).

Argyropylus: see Berlin eclition of Aristotle, Vol. 111.

Aristoxenus, Die harmonischen Fraymente, von P. Marquard (Berlin, p88): see also Musici Scriptores.

Apelt, O., Beitriige zur Gesch. der griechischen Philosophie (Leipzig, τδο τ).

Bacchius: in Musici Scriptores, ed. Jan.

Bacumker, Clem., Des Aristoteles Lehre von den dussern und innern Sinnes- vermodyen (Leipzip, 1877).

——- in Philologische Rundschau 1882, Sp. 1356. 1360.

Das Problem der Materie (Miinster, 18yo).

Barco, G., Esposizione critica della psicologia greca. Definizione delP anima (Torino-Roma, 1879).

—— Del? anima vegetativa e sensitiva (Torino, 1881).

Bast, F. J.. Commentatio Palacographica: appended, pp. 703. 861, to Greporti Corinthii ct aliorum grammaticorum libri de dialectis linguae gracecae, ed. G. H. Schaefer (Lipsiae, 1811).

Beare, J. 1., De Anima LL. 8. 3, 419 b 22——25; De Sensu vit: in Hermathena No. XXX., Vol. XIII. (1905), pp. 73--76-

—— Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alemacon to Aristotle (Oxford, 1906).

Belger, Chr., De Anima A. 1. 4o2 b 16: in Hermes X1r (1878), pp. 302, 303.

Bergk, Th., Zu Aristoteles’ De Anima 1. 4: in Hermes xvi. (1883), p. 518.

Bernays, .. Die Dialoge des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1863).

Bichl, W., Ueber den Begriff νοῦς bei Aristoteles (Linz, 1864).

Bonitz, H., Aristotelische Studien 1.—v. (Wien, 1862— 1867).

1 My citations are usually made from this edition.

LIST OF AUTHORITIES ΧΙ

Bonitz, H., Ueber den Gebrauch von re γάρ bei Aristoteles: in Zeitschrift fiir die osterreichischen Gymnasien ΧΙ. (1867), pp. 74—76. —— Zur Erklarung einiger Stellen aus Aristot. Schrift uber die Seele: in Hermes VII. (1873), pp. 416—436. Brandis, C. A., Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-romischen Philosophie (Berlin, 1835—1866). Brentano, Fr., Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom vous ποιητικός (Mainz, 1867). Bullinger, A., Aristoteles’ Nus-Lehre (De Anima 111. cc. 4—8 incl.) (Dillingen, 1885). Burnet, J., Early Greek Philosophy (London and Edinburgh, 1892). Busse, Ad., De Anima 434a 12—15, in Hermes XXIII. (1888), pp. 469 sq. in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift x11. (1892), Sp. 549—552. —— Neuplatonische Lebensbeschreibung des Anstoteles: in Hermes XXVIII. (1893), pp. 252—276. Bywater, I., Aristotelia: in Journal of Philology xiv. (1885), pp. 40—52; XVII. (1888), pp. 53—74. Chaignet, A. E., Essai sur la psychologie d’Aristote (Paris, 1883). Chandler, H. W., Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions (London, 1866). Christ, W., Studia in Aristotelis libros metaphysicos collata (Berolini, 1853). Cornford, F. M., Plato and Orpheus: in Classical Review XVII. pp. 433—445. —— in Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society LXXV. (1906), p. 13. Dembowski, J., Quaestiones aristotelicae duae (Regimonti Pr. 1881). in Wochenschrift fur classische Philologie Iv. (1887), Sp. 430—433. Diels, H., Doxographi Graeci (Berolini, 1379). Studia Empedoclea: in Hermes XV. (1880), pp. 161-—179. —— Ueber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles: in Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften 1883, pp. 477—494. Leukippos und Diogenes von Apollonia in Rheinisches Museum XLII. (1887), pp. 1-- 14. —— Parmenides (Berlin, 1897). Poectarum Philosophorum fragmenta (Berolini, 1901). ——— Herakleitos von Ephesos (Berlin, 1901). Die Fraymente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1903). Dittenberger, W., Exegetische und kritische Bemerkungen zu einigen Stellen des Aristoteles (Metaphysik und de Anima). (Rudolstadt, 1869.) in Géttingische gelehrte Anzeigen 1863, pp. 1601—-1616. Dyroff, Αἰ, Demokritstudien (Leipzig, 1899). Essen, E., Der Keller zu Skepsis. Versuch tuber das Schicksal der aristotelischen Schriften. Gymn.-Progr. (Stargard, 1866). -——— Ejin Beitrag zur Lésung der aristotelischen Frage (Berlin, 1884). Das erste Buch der aristotelischen Schrift itber die Seele ins Deutsche iibertragen etc. (Iena, 1892). —— Das zweite Buch in kritischer Uebersetzung (Iena, 1894). —— Das dritte Buch (Iena, 1896). Empedoclis Ayrigentini carminum reliquiae, ed. 5. Karsten (Amstelodami, 1838). Eucken, R. De Aristotelis dicendi ratione (Gottingae, 1866). Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1868). ———- _Methode der aristotelischen Forschung (Berlin, 1872). Euclidis, De Musica: in Musici Scriptores. Fragmenta Comicorum Graecorum, coll. Meineke (Berolini, 1839—1841); Comi- corum Atticorum Fragmenta, ed. Th. Kock (Lipsiae, 1880-—1888).

xiv LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Fragmenta philosophorum Graecorum, ed. Mullach (Parisiis, 1860—1867, 1881).

Frazer, J. G., The Golden Bough (London and New York, 1890).

Freudenthal, J.. Ueber den Begriff des Wortes φαντασία bei Aristoteles (GG6ttingen, 1863).

—— Zur Kritik und Exegese von Aristoteles: in Rheinisches Museum, 1869, pp. 81—93, 392—419.

Gomperz, Th., Griechische Denker (Leipzig, 1896), Vol. 1, English translation by Laurie Magnus (London, Igor).

Granger, F., De Anima (On the Active and Passive Reason): tn Classical Review VI., pp. 298—301: also in Mind 1893, pp. 307—318.

Grote, G., Aristotle (London, 1872); 2nd edition (London, 1880).

Waecker, F., in Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasialwesen, 1864, pp. 198—215.

Hammond, W. A., Aristotle’s Psychology, translation of De Anima and Parva Naturalia (London and New York, 1902).

Hart, G., Zur Seelen- und Erkenntnisslehre des Demokrit (Leipzig, 1886).

Hayduck, M., Observationes criticae in aliquot locos Aristotelis, Progr. (Greifswald, 1873).

Heiberg, J. L., Mathematisches zu Aristoteles: in Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der mathematischen Wissenschaften, 1904, Heft 4, pp. 8 sqy.

Heitz, E., Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles (Leipzig, 1865).

Heracliti Ephesii reliquiae, rec. I. Bywater (Oxonii, 1877).

Hertling, G. von, De Aristotclis notione Unius commentatio (Berolini, 1864),

Materie und Form und die Definition der Secle bei Aristoteles (Bonn,

1871).

Hesychii Alexandri T.exicon, rec. M. Schmidt (Jenac, 1858 ~-1868).

Innes, H. M°L., On the Universal and Particular in -\ristotle’s Theory of

Knowledge (Cambridge, 1886).

in Classical Review XVI, pp. 461—463.

Jackson, FI., Texts to illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on the History of Greck Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle (London, τοι),

Joachim, ἘΠ. 1Π., Aristotle’s Theory of Chemical Combination: in Journal of Philology XXIX., pp. 72——-86.

Johnson, W. A. E., Der Sensualismus des Demokritos (Plauen, 1868).

Kampe, Ir. F., Die Erkenntnisstheorie des Aristoteles (Leipzig, 1870).

Karsten: see Empedocles.

Keil, Bruno, Analectorum Isocrateorum specimen (CGiyphiswaldiac, 188.4).

Kern, Ὁ. De Orphei Epimenidis Pherecydis theogontis quaestiones criticae (Berolini, 1888).

Krische, A. B., Forschungen auf dem Csebiete der alten Philosophie (Géttingen, 1840).

Lasswitz, K., Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis Newton (Hamburg, 1890).

Lobeck, C. A., Aglaophamus (Reyimontiit Prussorum, 1829).

Phrynichi Eclogae nominum et verborum atticorum (Lipsiae, 1820),

Madvig, J. N., Acdversaria critica ad scriptores graecos (Hauniae, 1871).

Maier, Η., Die Syllovistik des Aristotelis (Tubingen, 1896--1goo).

Marchl, P., Des Arist. Lehre von der Tierseele 1... 11, 1% (Metten, 1897-—180y).

Martin, A., in Revue critique, 1902, pp. 425— 428.

Michaelis, K. G., Zu Aristoteles De Anima 11. 3 (Neu-Strelitz, 1882).

Musicae antiquae auctores septem graece et latine restituit Marcus Meibomius

(Amstelodami, 1652).

ed. C. Jan (Lipsiae, 1895).

LIST OF AUTHORITIES XV

Natorp, P., Ueber Demokrits γνησίη γνώμη: in Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie I., pp. 348—356.

—— Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems im Alterthum (Berlin, 1884).

Neuhaeuser, J., Aristoteles’ Lehre von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermégen und seinen Organen (Leipzig, 1878).

Noetel, R, in Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasialwesen, 1864, pp. 131—144.

Ogle, W., Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, translated with introduction and

notes etc. (London, 1882).

Aristotle on Youth and Age etc., translated etc. (London, 1897).

Pacius, Julius, Aristotelis De Anima, Graece et Latine cum commentario (Francofurti, 1596; Hanoviae, 1611; Francofurti, 1621).

Pansch, Car., Zu Aristoteles de anima: in Philologus xxX1. (1864), pp. 543—545.-

Philippson, L., Ὕλη ἀνθρωπίνη (Berolini, 1831).

Philoponi, Joannis, In Aristotelis De Anima libros Commentaria, ed. Hayduck! (Berolini, 1897).

Poppelreuter, Hans, Zur Psychologie des Aristoteles, Theophrast, Strato (Leipzig, 1892).

Praechter, K., in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift, 1902, Sp. 193—2o01.

Prisciani Lydi quae extant (Metaphrasis in Theophrastum, pp. I—37), ed. Bywater (Berolini, 1886).

Riddell, Digest of Idioms, appended to his edition of Plato’s Apology (Oxford, 1877).

Ritter, B., Die Grundprincipien der aristotelischen Seelenlehre (Jena, 1380).

Rodier, G., Note sur un passage du De Anima d’Aristote, III. 2, 426b 3: in Revue des ¢tudes anciennes, 1901, pp. 313—3T5.

Roeper, G., Zu De Anima 11. 5, U1 3, 1. 6: in Philologus vil. (1852), pp. 238, 324, 768.

Rohde, E., Psyche (3rd edition, Tiibingen und Leipzig, 1903).

Sander, Julius, Alkmaeon von Kroton (Wittenberg, 1893).

Schaefer, G., Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus und die moderne Heraklitforschung (Leipzig, 1902).

Schell, J. Ἐξ, Mie Einheit des Seelenlebens aus den Principien der Aristo- telischen Philosophie entwickelt (Freiburg im Br., 1873).

Schieboldt, F. ©., De imaginatione disquisitio ex Aristotelis libris repetita (Lipsiae, 1882). “ae

Schlottmann, K., Das Vergiangliche and Unvergéngliche in der menschlichen Seele nach Aristoteles, Univ. Progr. (Halle, 1873).

Schneider, G., Ueber einige Stellen aus Aristoteles de anima III. 3: in Rheinisches Museum XxXI. (1866), pp. 444—454.

——— Ueber einige Stellen aus Aristoteles de anima ΤΠ. 3: in Rheinisches Museum XXII. (1867), p. 145-

—— Zu Aristotelis de anima (111. 3, 428 Ὁ 25): in Zeitschrift fiir das Gymnasial- wesen XXI. (1867), pp. 631—634.

Shorey, P., in American Journal of Philology, Xx11. (1901), pp. 149 —164.

Siebeck, H., Geschichte der Psychologie (Gotha, 1880—1884).

Zu Aristoteles in Philologus XL. (1881), pp. 347356.

Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De Anima Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck! (Berolini, 1882).

Sophoniae in libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, ed. M. Hayduck (Berolini, 1883).

1 My citations are usually made from this edition.

Xvi LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Stapfer, A. A., Studia in Aristotelis de anima libros collata (Landishutae, 1888). Kritische Studien zu Aristoteles’ Schrift von der Seele (Landshut, 1890). Steinhart, Car., Symbolae criticae, Progr. (Schulpforte, 1843).

Stewart, J. A., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1892).

Susemihl, Franz, in Jahresbericht iiber die Fortschritte der classischen Alter- thumswissenschaft (Bursian), Vols. IX., pp. 347-352; XVII., 261 sqc. ; XXX., 35-48; XXXIV. 25—35; XLIL, 26, 238-240; LXVIL, 103-111: LXXV., 95-100; LXXIX., 99 Sqq., 279; LXXXVIII, I2—I5.

—— in Philologische Wochenschrift, 1882, Sp. 1283 sq.; 1884, Sp. 784; 1893,

Sp. 1317—1320; 1895, Sp. 1031.

in Jenaer Litteraturzeitung IV. (1877), Sp. 707 sy. —— in Philologischer Anzeiger, 1873, pp. 683, 690. — in Wochenschrift fur classische Philologie, 1884, Sp. 1410.

in Philologus XLVI. (1888), p. 86. Appendix to Aristotelis quae feruntur Oeconomica, ed. Susemihl (Lipsiac, 1887). Tannery, P., Pour Phistoire de la science helléne (Paris, 1887). Teichmiller, G., Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe (Berlin, 1874). Themistii Paraphrases Aristotelis librorum quae supersunt, ed. IL. Spengel (De Anima in Vol. IL, pp. I—231). —— In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis, ec. R. Heimze! (Berohm, 1899). Theophrasti Eresii opera quae supersunt omnia, ex recogn. F. Wimmer (Lipsiae, 1854--- 1862). —— Fragmentum De Sensibus, ed. H. Diels! in Doxographi Graect, pp. 4y9— 527. See also Priscianus Lydus. Thompson, W. H., On the genuineness of the Sophist of Plato ete.: in Journal of Philology vill. (1879), pp. 290—322. Torstrik, Ad., Die Authentica der Berliner Ausgabe des Aristoteles: in Philo- logus XII. (1857), pp. 494—530; XIII. (1858), pp. 204 sq. —— in Rheinisches Museum XXI. (1866), p. 640. —— Der Anfang. der Physik des Aristoteles: in Neue Jahrbiicher fiir ’hiloleie XCV. (17G/), pp. 236-—244. “Zu Aristoteles’ Psychologie (Γ 4, 429b 10; T 3, 42848; I 4, 429 a 29-- b 5): in Neue Jahrbucher ftir Philologie XCv. (1867), pp. 245 sy. in Literarisches Centralblatt (1877), Sp. 1462 sq. Trendelenburg, Fr. Ad., Geschichte der Kategorienlehre (Berlin, 1846). Historische Beitrage zur Philosophie 11. (Berlin, 1855); 11. (Berlin, 1867). Elementa logices Aristoteleae, ed. 8 (Berolini, 1878). Vahlen, J., Beitrage zu Aristoteles Poetik (Wien) 1., 1865; 11, 18663 tL, 1V., 1867. -~—— Aristotelische Aufsatze 1. (Wien, 1872). —— Grammatisch-kritische Miscellen zu Aristoteles: in Zeitschrift fiir die ésterreichischen Gymnasien XVIII. (1867), pp. 721—725. Grammatisch kritische Miscellen zu Aristoteles, in Zeitschrift fiir die ésterreichischen Gymnasien XIx. (1868), pp. 11-21, 253—256. Wilson, J. Cook, Conjectural emendations in the text of Aristotle and Theophrastus, in Journal of Philology x1. (1882), pp. 119— 124.

1 My citations are usually made from this edition.

LIST OF AUTHORITIES xvi

Wilson, J. Cook, Interpretation of certain passages of the De Anima in the editions of Trendelenburg and Torstrik, in Transactions of the Oxford

Philological Society, 1882/3, pp. 5—13.

in Philologische Rundschau (1882), Sp. 1473—1481.

Wyse, W., The Speeches of Isaeus (Cambridge, 1904).

Xenocrates, Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung der Fragmente von R. Heinze (Leipzig, 1892).

Zabarella, J.. Commentaria in tres Aristotelis hbros de anima (Venetiis, 1605).

Zabarellae opera integra ed. I. L. Havenreuter (Francofurti, 1623, 1624).

Zeller, E, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Band I., δίῃ edition (Leipzig, 1892); Il., 4th edition (1889); 11. 2 Abth. (111), 3rd edition (1879); 111. 1 Abth. (IVv.), 3rd edition (1880); 111. 2 Abth. (v), 3rd edition (1881).

—— English Translation of 3rd edition of 11. 2 by Costelloe and Muirhead under the title “ Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics” (London, New York, and Bombay, 1897).

——— in Archiv der Geschichte der Philosophie IIL, 303, 311 sq.3 VI., 406 sqq.; VIIL, 134 5646. ; IX., 536 sqq.

Ziaja, J., Aristoteles De Sensu cc. 1, 2,3 bis 439 b 18 tibersetzt und mit Anmerk- ungen versehen, Progr. (Breslau, 1887),

—— Die aristotelische Lehre vom Gedichtniss und von der Association der Vorstellungen (Leobschuitz, 1879).

xx INTRODUCTION. 41

external soul, on which the life of the individual depends, plays the same part as in the folk-lore of savages to-day*. The opening lines of the ad draw a sharp distinction between the heroes themsclves, left a prey for dogs and vultures, and their souls, sent down to Hades or the invisible world. The ghost of Patroclus, which appears to Achilles ina dream, is an emaciated, enfeebled shadow, deprived of all its strength by severance from the body, which was the real man. In the underworld these pale, ineffectual ghosts are much alike in general condition. Apart from a few notorious offenders punished for their misdeeds, they pursue the shadows of their former avocations. Whether in Greek language and thought two separate conceptions are blended, whether the sum of the intellectual and moral qualities was associated at one time with the blood and at another with the breath, whether the breath of life superseded an older smoke-soul, the exhalation arising from spilt blood, and whether these two conceptions were connected with the practices of inhumation and cremation respectively, are matters of speculation on which it is hardly possible to arrive at a definite conclusion® When we pass from Homer to later poets we find the same primitive beliefs variously modified. In Hesiod the heroes go no longer to the underworld, but to the Isles of the Blest, and ancestral spirits have developed into “daemons” exerting a benefi- cent influence on their descendants’. From the dirges of Pindar we have two important fragments‘. One is a glowing picture of the lot of the happy dead. In the other we are told that, “ while the body of every man followeth after mighty death, there still liveth a likeness of his prime which alone is of divine origin, which slumbereth so long as the limbs are busy, but full oft in dreams showeth to sleepers the issue that draweth near of pleasant things and cruel.”

In the Orphic and Pythagorean brotherhoods the primitive Orphic beliefs were moulded into a thoroughgoing doctrine doctrine. of transmigration. Three main conceptions underlie Orphic asceticism. First, there is the opposition between body and soul. The soul is better than the body and is buried in the body for its sins, the body is its temporary prison. Next comes the necessity for a purification of the soul. All evil is followed by

1 Frazer, éoc, cit., vol. 11., 6. iv.

2 Etymologically θυμὸς is connected with Jumus: cf. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 1. PP- 249 Sq. ᾿

3 Hesiod, Works and Days, τῶι sqq.

* Fragg. 95, 96. |

INTRODUCTION. I ΧΧΙ

retribution. Through abstinence and penance alone may the soul hope to regain its former blissful state. Thirdly, there is the long series of incarnations in which, according to their deeds during a former existence, souls take a higher or a lower place in human or animal bodies or even in plants’. Though these ideas occupy so small a place in literature, they are clearly very old, for the extant burlesque of Xenophanes? attests the acceptance of metempsychosis by Pythagoras, and all probability points to his having derived it from the still older Orphic sect. At Athens the Eleusinian mysteries, at which some such ideas were symbolically inculcated, were under the patronage of the state; but nevertheless the belief in an after life in the underworld, as set forth by Homer, for the most part maintained its hold upon the ordinary educated citizen. Little is to be learned from the Ionian thinkers, whom Tonian Aristotle calls physicists or physiologists’, In the physicists. dawn of enquiries which, strictly speaking, were rather scientific than philosophical, men sought to explain to themselves of what things were constituted and how they had come into their present condition. Their problem, we should now say, was the constitution of matter and, if occasionally, when they found the primary element in air or fire or some other body, they also declared that this was the cause of vital functions, it was merely a corollary to their general doctrine and of no special importance. The subjects on which we find hints are the substance of the soul, the distinction between its various powers, and the nature of knowledge. So far as the substance of the individual soul was identical with, or a product of, the universal element, they all agreed in regarding it as not immaterial, but of an extremely refined and mobile materiality. The soul was credited with the power to know and perceive, as well as the power to move the body. Heraclitus, who had grasped the flux of matter in constant circulation, held it to be governed by an universal law. Knowledge to him consists in apprehending this law. In comparison with such knowledge he deprecated the evidence of sense: eyes and ears are better than the other senses, but are bad witnesses, if the soul does not understand. Meanwhile in the West other schools of philosophy had arisen, the Eleatic and

Heraclitus.

1 Cf. Rohde, Prycke, 11. pp. 103 8qq-

2 Frag. 7 D. |

$ ‘The philosophical speculations 6n the soul from Thales to Democritus and Anaxagoras mre reviewed by Rohde, 11. pp. 137-198. Cf. also Beare, Greek Theories of Hlementary Lagrttion. : : οὐ κα, b

Xxii INTRODUCTION. TF

Pythagorean. Xenophanes distinguished between truth and opinion. Parmenides derived the intelligence of man from the composition and elementary mixture of his bodily parts, heat and cold being the elements of things’. The pre- ponderant element characterises the thought of the individual man. But the chief legacy of Parmenides to his successors was his doctrine of the one immutable Being, which alone satisfies the requirements of an object of knowledge. The element of the Ionians did not satisfy these conditions, being endowed with the power to pass from one condition to another, whether intermittently or perpetually. Nothing, according to Parmenides, is ever generated or destroyed, however varied its manifestations and the changes it presents to the senses. On the foundation thus laid by Parmenides Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Leucippus constructed their systems, resolving apparent generation and destruction into combination and separation of primary elements or principles, themselves indestructible. They differed, Aristotle remarks, as to the number and nature of these indestructible elements, Empedocles made a mistake in accepting a crude popular analysis into air, earth, fire and water, elements which do not so much as correspond to a rough divi- sion of matter into the solid, liquid and gaseous states. Anaxagoras, with his homoeomeries, was in our view still wider of the mark. Leucippus and Democritus at last found in the atoms a working hypothesis of the constitution of matter, which has lasted down to the present day. It is these three physical systems which most profoundly influenced Aristotle. He unfortunately accepted the first with modifications and opposed the last, by the merits of which he was nevertheless profoundly impressed. Each of these three systems took up the problem of the soul. But in the meantime medical enquiries had been actively prosecuted, and it is to a Pythago- rean, Alcmaeon of Croton, that we owe the earliest advances towards the physiology of the senses. Fle was the first to recognise the brain as the central organ of intellectual activity. He dissected animals and by this means discovered the chief nerves of sense, which, like Aristotle, he called “conduits” or “ channels,” and he traced them to their termination in the brain. Deafness and blindness he held to be caused when bya concussion the brain was shifted out of its normal position and the channels of hearing and seeing respectively were thus blocked. He submitted the several senses to a searching examination, starting

1 Frag. 16 D. * De Anima 404. Ὁ 30 sqq.

Parmenides.

Alcmaeon.

INTRODUCTION. I ΧΕΙ

with the anatomical construction of the sense-organ. The air in the ear he regarded as a sounding-board, and he attributed to the moisture, softness, flexibility and warmth of the tongue its capacity to reduce solid bodies to fluid as a necessary preliminary to tasting. He noticed the phenomenon which we call seeing sparks when the eye has received a heavy blow, and this suggested a crude theory of vision, postulating fire in the eye, a mistake repeated by Em- pedocles and by Plato. But it is with the glittering or transparent element of water in the eye that it sees, and it sees better according to the purity of the element. Vision is effected by the image of the thing seen and by the rays which issue from the eye within and pass outwards through the water. He derived memory from sense- perception and opinion from memory; from memory and opinion combined he derived reason, which distinguishes men from the lower animals?. What scanty information we have about him comes chiefly from Theophrastus’, but it would be a great mistake to acquiesce in Aristotle’s neglect of him. He is only once mentioned in De Anza, as having held that soul is immortal, on the singular ground that by its incessant motion it resembles the heavenly bodies, which he also held to be immortal.

In Empedocles we are dealing not with a sober physical enquirer, but with a religious enthusiast and poet-philosopher. He accepted the transmigration of souls in a slightly altered form; he introduced wicked as well as good “ daemons,” condemned for their sins to wander for 10,000 years and to become souls of plants, beasts and men. In the course of their purification they become prophets, poets, physicians, princes, and again return to the gods*. Sensation in general he explained by the action of like upon like. Particles emanate from external bodies and enter our bodies by channels or pores. They cannot enter unless there is a certain proportion® between the emanation and the size and shape of the channel which is to receive it. Thus a sense-organ is a particular part of the body which, possessing channels of a certain size and shape, is adapted to receive emanations of a certain kind, of flavour, odour or sound. But his theory of vision was more complicated. Not only are there

Empedocles.

1 Plato, Phaedo 96 B, where, however, the name of Alemaeon is not mentioned.

t De Sensibus, 88 25, 26 (Doxogr. Gr. 306, 25 sqq.): cf. Philippson ὕλη ἀνθρωπίνη, pp. 20 sq. and Julius Sander, A/Awiaeon von Kroton.

5 405 ἃ 29 566. 4 Cf. Plato, Phaedr. 248 Ὁ), E.

δ συμμετρία, De Gen. εἰ Corr. 1. 8, 324 Ὁ 25 sqq-3 cf. Theophr. De Semsibus § 7. Perhaps Empedocles was seeking to express the same fact as was Aristotle when he afterwards applied the word μεσύτης to sense.

62

XXIV INTRODUCTION. 17

emanations from visible objects, but there are also emanations from the eye. To this he was led by the analogy of the dark lantern, of which the camera obscura furnishes a modern illustration. The transparent plates of horn or linen in the lantern, made to protect the flame from the wind which might otherwise extinguish it, correspond to the thin coats or films in the eye covering the pupil, whose contents are partly of a fiery, partly of a watery, nature. From the pupil fiery and watery emanations leap forth through funnel-shaped channels to meet the fiery and watery emanations coming, the one from light, the other from dark, objects outside. The principle of “like by like” accounts for the mutual attraction of similar materials and their meeting, and, when the two sets of emanations meet, vision takes place. The preponderance of water or fire in the eye accounts for the fact that some animals see better in the dark, others in the daylight’. Thus, then, we perceive like by like, the four elements of all things, air, carth, fire and water, outside, because air, earth, fire and water are present in our bodies? Blood is the most perfect mixture of these four clements and to this blood where it is purest, viz. about the heart, he attributecl thought. As we see earth by earth which is in us, water by water, so we think by means of blood, the bodily tissue in which all four elements are most perfectly blended. Tempedocles, then, con- sistently confined his attention to the bodily process. The mental or psychical state is either ignored in his explanation or reduced to its physical conditions. Yet on the problem of knowledge, aware of the imperfection of the senses, he counsels us to withdraw our trust from them and prefer the guidance of reason.

Anaxagoras distinguished sensation from intelligence and, whereas most of the Pre-Socratics agreed that we perceive things by having within us something like them, he held that we perceive in virtue of the presence within us of something opposite to the thing perceived®, Knowledge is not to be gained from the senses, because their powers cannot dis- criminate minute changes; while the reactionary physics which he propounded involved the presence in every sensible object of infinitesimal particles perceptible only in the aggregate and, blended with these, alien particles altogether imperceptible, because infinitesimal. Over against this infinity of homocomeries he set

Anaxagoras.

1 Aristotle, De Gen. ef Corr. 1. 8, 324 25 syq-y De Sense a, 437} 23--4588 By Theophrastus, De Sensibus, §3 7-~24.

2 De A. 204} t1—15, 409 Ὁ 23 sep. 417 ἃ 21 βῆ,

3 405 b 14-21, Theophrastus, De Senstbus, 3 1, 2, 29-—37.

INTRODUCTION. JI XXV

the other constituent of the universe, which alone is pure and unmixed and has nothing in common with anything else. This is Nous?. The part it played was to communicate the first impulse to that rotatory motion which ultimately evolved from the chaos in which all things were mixed the present order and regularity of the universe. Nous is in all living beings, great and small, in varying degrees. It governs and orders and knows. We fortu- nately possess the account which Anaxagoras himself gave of Nous, and upon the evidence the reader must decide for himself what was its nature’. Plato and Aristotle construed it as immaterial reason and censured the philosopher for not making more thoroughgoing use of its mighty agency. Returning now to sense, the contrast necessary to perception Anaxagoras found most clearly in touch, for our perception of temperature depends upon contrast. We know the taste of sweet and bitter only by contrast. Seeing, again, takes place by the reflection of an image in the pupil, but in a part of it which is of a different colour from the object seen. Eyes that see in the daytime are, generally speaking, dark, while animals with gleaming eyes see better by night.

In the Atomists the tendencies of earlier Greek thinkers reach Leucippus mature development. The problem hitherto had been Democritus. to determine what matter is, and Leucippus pro- pounded a working hypothesis which has ever since been sufficient for the purposes of science. Though this theory is derived from sense, it departs very widely from the evidence of the senses. Knowledge, said Democritus, is of two kinds, genuine knowledge that there are atoms and void and nothing else, and knowledge which is dark or obscure, by which he meant the information given by the senses*. The existence of void apparently contradicts obser- vation, experiment fails even now to obtain an absolute void. The properties of body are all given by sense. The Atomists accepted the evidence of sense for resistance, extension and weight (perhaps Democritus was unaware of this last quality), but rejected it for colours, sounds, odours and flavours. Out of impenetrable atoms of different shapes and sizes the whole universe is built up, and the different qualities in things are due either to difference of shape or size, or to different arrangements, of the atoms composing them‘. The soul is no exception. It is a complex of atoms within the

1 4oga 25 Sqq., 4o4b 1-—6, 4050 13---21,) 405 Ὁ 19---2 .., 429 a 18—20, b 23 56. 2 Frag. 12 D, quoted entire on p. 229 tafra.

* Krag. 11 D apud Sext. Emp. ἄν. Mathematicos, Vil. 138 sq.

4 De A. 4044 1-4, De Gen. et Corr. 1. 4, 315 Ὁ 6 sqq.-

XXV1 INTRODUCTION. 1

body. Soul-atoms are spherical in shape, extremely minute and mobile. They resemble the atoms of fire. In thus postulating a body within the body to account for vital and intellectual functions, Democritus reverts more consistently and systematically than any previous philosopher to the standpoint of the savage who, when he sees an animal move, is unable to explain the fact except by supposing that there is a little animal inside to move him. But there is this difference, that the little animal is imagined to be alive, the soul-atoms of Democritus are mere matter”, Thus to push the implicit assumptions of their predecessors to their logical con- sequences and make the half-conscieus hylozoism of the early Ionians blossom forth in materialism is the great merit of Leucippus and Democritus. Al]! processes of sensation, then, are instances of the contact® between bodies. They are caused by “idols” or films which are constantly streaming off from = the surface of bodies, of inconceivable thinness, yet preserving the relative shape of the parts. So far this agrees with Pmpedocles : but the latter made his emanations enter the body through chan- nels, while the Atomists conceived them as entering by the void between the atoms. The same explanation would apply ta thought, which is excited when the material image of an object enters the equally material mind. All the senses are thus but modifications of touch. This was made out satisfactorily for taste, and Democritus attempted to determine the shapes of the atoms which produce the different varieties of taste*+ Things made of atoms angular, winding, small and thin, have an acid taste, those whose atoms are spherical and not too small taste sweet, and κὰν θὰ. {{|5 four simple colours, white, black, red and green, are accounted for by the shape and disposition of atoms, but a similar analysis was not attempted for the objects of sound and smell.

In marked contrast with the attempts which the Atomists and Diogenca of EVEN Empedocles made to bring physics and physio- Apollonia. logy into shape is the retrograde system of Diogenes of Apollonia, whose fantastic absurdities have been immortalised! for us by Aristophanes. He was not satisfied with the resolution by Anaxagoras, himself a reactionary in physics, of bodies into infinitesimal particles possessing definite qualities, though he was

1 403 Ὁ 31—404.0 16, 405.8 5-—13.

2 Ch. De 4. 406 b 15—22, 409 Ὁ 7—15.

® De Sensu 4, 442.8 29 sqq- For what follows see Theophrastux, e Senséfus, @ 4 —83, who treats of Democritus very fully.

4 Theophrastus, De Sensibus, ὃ 64 9qq-

INTRODUCTION. TI XXVIII

more attracted by the supposition of unmixed Nous, which is the seat of intelligence. But he supplemented this theory by reverting to the position of the IJonians, one of whom, Anaximenes, had chosen air for his primary element. Diogenes endowed air with sentience and intelligence. “All creatures,’ he says, “live and see and hear by the same thing” (viz. air), “and from the same thing all derive their intelligence as well?” He thus made the air in us play an important part in the processes of perception and thought. From Alcmaeon he must have borrowed the idea that the brain is the central organ; the air in the sense-organs, the eye, the ear, the nostrils, transmitted the impression to the air in or near the brain. The common view that seeing takes place by the reflection of an image in the pupil he supplemented by postulating that this image must be blended with the internal air; otherwise, though the image is formed, there is no seeing. He pointed to the fact that, when the optic nerve is inflamed, blindness ensues because, as he thought, the admixture with the internal air is prevented. His account of hearing may be cited for the likeness it bears to that given in De Anza. “The animals which hear most acutely have slender veins, the orifice of the ear (like that of the nose) being in them short, slender and straight, and the external ear erect and large. For movement of the air in the ears sets in motion the internal air” [in or near the brain]. “ Whereas, if the orifice be too wide, the movement of the air in the ears causes a ringing in them, and what is heard is indistinct noise, because the air upon which the audible sound impinges is not at rest?”

In the fifth century the evolution of successive systems came to a halt. The progress of enquiry had been marked by the foundation of new sciences like geometry and astronomy, both in a flourishing condition, and new arts, like rhetoric and dialectic. The bustle and unrest of the times was attended by a growing mistrust, not only of the old traditional religious and moral beliefs, but of the bewildering intellectual movement which in so short a space of time had put forward so many brilliant and contradictory speculations. The professional educators, whom we know as the Sophists, turned as a rule to practical interests and made human-

ism, literary criticism, erudition their main themes.

Protagoras. Protagoras, the greatest of them, adopted a sceptical

1 See Simplicius, ὧς Physica, p. 151, 24—153, 24, Theophrastus, De Sensibus,

88. 39-—48. * Theophr. De Sensibus, § 41: cf De A. 4208 3 8qQ4-

XXVili INTRODUCTION. 1

attitude and maintained that man was the measure of all things, which, as interpreted by Plato, means that, as things appear to me, so they are to me, or the denial of objective truth. There were many sceptical currents in the sea of speculation on which Greece had embarked. The followers of Heraclitus pushed the doctrine of flux to an extreme. Things never are, but are always becomuny, they have no fixed attributes. When we say that a thing is, we must in the same breath pronounce that it is not. There are always two of these fluxes, one the movement or chanye producing sensations, flux outside, the other the movement which receives the sensations, the flux of our senses. The result of the contact between them is that, for example, wood becomes white wood and the eye becomes a seeing eye. When the flux of Socrates well comes in contact with wine, the wine will be sweet, but, if he ts ill, it will be sour. Both these statements will be true: tn facet, all statements are true. What wine is depends entirely on the man perceiving it. There is no criterion of truth in external things, they change so rapidly. On the other hand, Gorgias of Leontini in his essay on Nature or the Non-existent hardly caricatured the position of the younger Eleatics when he put forward the thesis that, if anything existed, tt could not be known, and, if anything did exist and was known, it could not be cam- municated. Such views as these or that of Futhydenius that falsehood is impossible are by no means universal amon the Sophists, many of whom had no psychological or epistemological theories at all; and, where their views were sceptical, it was the scepticism not of one school, but of many. Aristotle justifies the revolt of the Sophists against philosophy, he hokis that mast of the leading Pre-Socratic systems tend implicitly or explicitly te the doctrine of Protagoras. Protagoras first called attention te the importance of the knowing mind in every act of knowledee. In the view of a plain man like Socrates all the systems ware discredited and the question, what is knowledge, was for the time more urgent than the ambitious problems proposed by those who had sought to know the nature of the universe. Psycholovy can glean nothing from the ethical discussions of the historical Socrates. When he declared that virtue is knowledge, he was confessedly using the latter term as one which neither he nor his interlocutors could adequately define.

Plato in his writings is always talking about the soul, but not all that he says is intended to be taken seriously.

Plato. . We must allow for the mythical element, and in

INTRODUCTION. JI X XIX

particular for his imaginative sympathy with the whole mass of floating legend, myth and dogma, of a partly religious, partly ethical character, which, as was stated above, found a wide but not universal acceptance at an early time in the Orphic and Pythagorean associations and brotherhoods'. The Platonic myths afford ample evidence that Plato was perfectly familiar with all the leading features of this strange creed. The divine origin of the soul, its fall from bliss and from the society of the gods, its long pilgrimage of penance through hundreds of generations, its task of purification from earthly pollution, its reincarnations in successive bodies, its upward or downward progress, and the law of retribution for all offences, these and kindred subjects the fancy of Plato has embellished with all the beauty and sublimity which the art of a lost poet could bestow upon prose. Such themes stir his imagination. His approval of ethical fiction is attested by his own words, but it would be the height of imprudence to infer that any part of his philosophy is bound up with his gorgeous poetical imagery. Plato never set about writing a treatise De “σιώπα. We find anticipations of a science, but not the science itself. In each dialogue he has a particular end in view. He proposes to examine the doctrine of Protagoras or, it may be, the import of predication. Incidentally in the course of a long controversy we come across models of psychological analysis which for subtlety and insight have never been equalled. Such an analysis was something ab- solutely new. The psychical or mental states on which Plato fixed his attention had hitherto, when they were not ignored altogether, been confounded with their bodily concomitants: a mistake not unnatural, so long as both sensation and thought were regarded as changes in the body. In the TV eactetus® we find the following argument. We do not perceive by but through the senses. What we perceive through one sense we cannot perccive through another. Consequently, if we know something about both a sound and a colour, it cannot be known through sense. Now we clo know many such things; that they are, that they are different from one another, that both are two things and that cach is one. How do we know such facts? The soul appre- hends them through itself without any sense-organs. Being and Not-Being, likeness and unlikeness, number, identity and diversity are not apprehended through sense, but through the soul alone. The soul apprehends the noble and the base, the good and the

} See Cornford, “ Plato and Orpheus” in Class. Hee. XVUL. pp. 433-—-445>

XXX INTRODUCTION. 1

bad, not through the senses, but by calculating in herself the past or present in relation to the future. All men and animals from the moment of birth have by nature sensations which pass through the body and reach the soul, but to compare these sensations in relation to Being and expediency comes with difficulty and τὸ- quires a long time, much trouble and education. I[t is impossible to attain truth and know it without attaining Being ; knowledve does not consist in affections of sense because we cannot by them attain Being. It is by reasoning about sensations that this is alone possible.

In the Phaedo the Platonic Socrates undertakes to prove that learning is reminiscence, which indeed is implied by the fact that, if questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing that the knowledge sought, the knowledge, ee. of geometry, existed previously in the mind of the respondent, This proof is as follows. The picture of a lyre reminds us of the person who used the lyre, a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes or of Simtuias himself, so that the reminiscence may be brought about cither in- directly or directly. If it is effected directly and the abject seen is similar to the object it recalls, we cannot fail to see how far the remembrance is exact. Jfor instance, we affirm that there is an idea of equality which is called to our minds by our perception of sensibles which are equal. That this idea is something distinct from the equal sensibles is clear; for the sensibles may appear equal to one observer, unequal to another; but about the idea of equality no difference of opinion is possible. Now we are to observe that all sensible equals appear to us as falling short of the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the sensibles. And whereas (1) this sense of deficiency in the sensibles has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, (2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the idea must have been acquired before our birth. Now this of course applies te all ideas as well as to that of equality. Since, then, we have obtained this knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born in full possession of it and retain it through life, or we lose it at birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed on this ground: if a man knows a thing, he can give an account of it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the ideas: it

+ 728—76bD. In the summary of the argument I have mainly followed that given by Mr Archer-Hind, p. 77.

INTRODUCTION. I ΧΧΧΙ

follows then that the second alternative is true; we lose this know- ledge and all learning is but the recovery of it. And since our souls certainly did not acquire it during their human life, they must have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it. Many more passages might be cited to prove that Plato kept the mental process distinct from the bodily process and that it is the former which he sought to explain.

Though the various mental operations are often discussed and Classification distinguished, yet we find no exhaustive classification of mental in any dialogue. The reason is obvious. The varia- operations. . . .

tion is due to the fact that each attempt at partial classification is made, as above stated, for a special purpose, to prove a particular conclusion in a particular dialogue. Thus in the Republec' the tripartite division into reason, passion and appetite is brought in to show the relation of justice to the other virtues, and this, again, whether subordinate to, or coordinate with, the analogy between the individual and the state, is a means to the determination of a perfect political constitution, which is said in the 7zmmaeus* to have been the chief subject of the dialogue. Nor does this tripartite division itself tally either with that into know- ledge, opinion (or sense-presentation) and ignorance’, or again, with the fourfold division into thinking, understanding, belief and conjecture (an expansion probably of the distinction between know- ledge and opinion), which we find in other parts of the Repzb/zc'. In the Sophist® discursive thought is a dialogue of the soul with herself, opinion is the silent assertion of the soul in which this results, imagining is a combination of opinion and sensation. In the Philebus* Plato goes more into detail and distinguishes sen- sation, memory, imagination and recollection. When the affections of the body do not reach the soul, the state of the soul is said to be insensibility or unconsciousness. When the affections of the body are communicated through the body to the soul, there is sensation. The retention of such a sensation is memory, its non-rctention, the fading of memory, is forgetfulness. The recovery of lost memories by the soul without the aid of the body is recollection. Later in the dialogue’ the relation of memory to imagination is illustrated: the former is a scribe or recorder, what it records being propositions, opinions; the latter is a painter,

1 434 C445 K

217 B,C. 3477 A SY. 4 511 D, Ἐ, 533%, 5344. S 26,Nsqq. Ch Theactelus, 189%, Pile. 38 Ὁ.

© 33 σσσδασ, 7 38 E—4o Β.

XX Xii INTRODUCTION. 1

whose glowing pictures excite hope. In this dialogue also there is a practical end, all these distinctions being subservient te the classification of pleasures as true or false. Similarly in a memorable passage of the Theaetefus* the introduction of two illustrations, one from a waxen block and the other from a doveecot or aviary, is incidental to a refutation of the thesis that knowledge is true opinion. But the similes in themselves are contributions to psychology of permanent value. That of the waxen block presents in its sum and substance the entire theory of sensation conceived as an impression from without, like the print of a seal upon wax, and the theory of memory as the retention of such impressions, the different degrees of retentiveness in individuals being ascribed to the size of the block, the quality of the wax and the number of impressions crowded together in small compass*. The other, that of the aviary, conveys in a striking manner the relation between memory and reminiscence, the latter being the deliberate recovery of lost impressions ; at the same time it shows the relation between the mere possession of knowledae and tts actual application or exercise.

The most comprehensive view of Plato’s psychology is te be found in the 7rwaers. He starts with reason or with the operations of intellect. The soul thinks. This

process is first described as it goes on in the soul of the universe or universal soul and, because it is an activity, is compauredl with circular motion. The revolution of two circles, that of the Same and that of the Other, gives judgments of identity and difference, the two most important relations, and without such judginents there can be no knowledge. But this ceaseless activity of thought from time to time suffers disturbance, and the interference results in sensation. In the allegory the creation of particular souls follows upon the creation of universal soul, and it is to these particular souls, each united to a body, that the following description applies. When the revolutions of the immortal soul had thus been confined in a body, a body, as Plato says, “in-flowing and out-flowineg continually,” these revolutions, “being confined in a great river,

Sensation.

Ὁ 19re sqq-, 107 ὦ sqq.

* The comparison of a present sensation with a previous impression implies sone representative faculty; in this passaye we hear of ἔννοια and δόξα, but not of φαντασία, Plato often uses ἔννοια for free constructive imagination. It is carious to find that, for the sake of an Homeric allusion and perhaps under the influence of a false etymology, Plato substitutes ἐνσημαινόμενα els τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ (104. (7) for εἷς τὸν σὴς ψυχῆς

κηρόν. But it would be a mistake to infer that he here favours the heart rather than the brain as the organ of senses communis.

INTRODUCTION. JI XXII

neither controlled it nor were controlled, but bore and were borne violently to and fro. For great as was the tide sweeping over them and flowing off which brought them sustenance, a yet greater tumult was caused by the effects of the bodies that struck against them; as when the body of any one came in contact with some alien fire that met it from without, or with solid earth, or with liquid glidings of water, or if he were caught in a tempest of winds borne on the air.” The body of the animal, be it remembered, is composed of the same four elements, air, earth, fire, water, with which the animal comes in contact in alicn bodies, whether in the process of nutrition or in that of sensation. “And so the motions from all these elements rushing through the body penetrated to the soul. This is in fact the reason why these have all alike been called and still are called sensations’. Then too did they produce the most wide and vehement agitation for the time being, joining with the perpetually streaming current in stirring and violently shaking the revolutions of the soul, so that they altogether hindered the circle of the Same by flowing contrary to it, and they stopped it from governing and from going; while the circle of the Other they displaced....So that the circles can barely hold to one an- other, and though they are in motion, it is motion without law, sometimes reversed, now slanting, and now inverted....And when from external objects there meets them anything that belongs to the class of the Same or to that of the Other, then they declare its relative sameness or difference quite contrariwise to the truth, and show themsclves false and irrational; and no circuit is governor or leader in them at that time. And whenever sensations from without rushing up and falling upon them drag along with them the whole vessel of the soul, then the circuits seem to govern though they really are governed. On account then of all these experiences the soul is at first bereft of reason, now as in the beginning, when she is confined in a mortal body*®.” The soul, according to this account, is in ceaseless activity, and such normal activity, or thought, is from time to time disturbed by sensation, which has a tendency to pervert right thinking into falsehood and error. We might compare the definition from the Phzledus above summarised’, in which it is said that when the bodily affections pass through both body and soul and give rise there to a sort of shock or tremor not only peculiar to each, but shared

1 Plato connects αἴσθησις with dlocev. 2 Tin. 43 A sqy-, Archer-Eind’s translation, 3 33D.

XXXIV INTRODUCTION. 1

by both in common, the movement which body and soul thus share may properly be called sensation.

Plato started with intellect and thought. Rightly understood, Sense and he does not oppose body to soul, but rather sense to reason. reason, as one faculty of soul to another. But what are the limits of sense and reason? To which should be referred the knowledge of relations of cause and effect, of good and evil? Sense, we are told in the Republic’, is sufficient where a thing does not tend to pass into or be confused with its opposite; where the data tend to become confused, sense is insufficient ancl we must appeal to intellect. What sense perceives confusedly thought thinks distinctly and in isolation. Sense at the best can only give opinion, but reason and true opinion are distinct “because they are different in origin and unltke in nature. The one is engendered in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is ever accompanied by right understanding, the other ts without understanding; the one ts not to be moved by persuasion, the other yields to persuasion; true opinion we must admit fs shared by all men, but reason by the gods alone and a very sinall portion of mankind.” Sense and thought are concerned with different objects, the particular and the universal. The defects of sense are not in the subject, but in the object, because the particulars of sense are in flux and have no fixed being. Prota- goras held that sensible things have their so-called qualittes only by acting or being acted upon and, as activity and passivity are always relative, no quality belongs to anything fer se We cannot say that they are per se anything in particular, or even that they are at all. They only become: things are always becoming, not being. When an object comes in contact with our scnse-organ and interaction takes place, a sensation arises in the organ and simultaneously the object becomes possessed of a certain cpuality. But the sensation in the organ and the quality in the object are results which are produced only by the contact and last only as long as it lasts. In this doctrine of Heraclitus and Protagoras Plato acquiesced, so far as it relates to sense and sensibles. The testimony of Aristotle on this point is explicit* and the dialogucs confirm it. But, instead of concluding with Protagoras that all presentations are relatively true and that there is no such thing as objective truth, he drew a different inference, viz. that, if there

1 523 4 sqq. 7 Tim. 51 8, Archer-Hind’s translation. * Metaph. 987 a 32 sqq., 1078 b 12—17.

INTRODUCTION. TI XXXV

is such a thing as knowledge, which he firmly believed, its object must be an intelligible object and an universal.

The process of sensation in the separate bodily organs is Physiology of thus described in the Tewzaews. “When that which the senses. is naturally mobile is impressed by ever such a slight affection, it spreads abroad the motion, the particles one upon another producing the same effect, until, coming to that which is conscious, it announces the property of the agent: but a sub- stance that is immobile is too stable to spread the motion round about, and thus merely receives the affection, but does not stir any neighbouring part; so that, as the particles do not pass on one to another the original impulse which affected them, they keep it untransmitted to the entire creature and thus leave the recipient of the affection without sensation. This takes place with our bones and hair and all the parts we have which are formed mostly of earth: while the former conditions apply in the highest degree to sight and hearing, because they contain the greatest proportion of fire and air!.” For the process of vision Plato adopts with modifications the theory of Empedocles, for the process of hearing that of the Pythagoreans. As to smell, he holds that odours cannot be classified according to kinds. For no element in its normal state can be perceived by smell, because the vessels of the nostrils are too narrow to admit water or earth and too wide to be excited by air or fire. They can thus only perceive an element in process of dissolution, when it is being liquefied or decomposed or dissolved or evaporated. The object of smell, then, is either vapour, which is water changing to air, or mist, which is air changing to water. The only classification we can make is that scents which disturb the substance of the nostrils are unpleasant, while those which restore the natural state are pleasant. In his account of tasting Plato makes the sensation depend upon the contraction or dilatation of the pores of the tongue by substances that are dissolved in the mouth, the peculiar effect of the principal flavours being briefly indicated. He made the flesh the organ of touch and, considering the various tactile sensations as relative to the tangibles, proceeds to explain what constitutes bodies hot and cold, hard and soft, heavy and

light?.

1 Cf. De A. 4254 3-—-7, 4358. 11--- 3. 2 Hor the various senses see Zim. 45 Β 544.) 61 Ο 564.» 65 CSqq., 66 Ὁ 544.» 67 A—68 Ὁ. See also Theophr. De Sensibus, 88 61, 83-91.

XXXVI INTRODUCTION. 4

I have dwelt at what some may think inordinate length upon Plato, because in psychology, as elsewhere, making allowance for the fundamental difference between the two philosophers, we find nothing in Aristotle but the development in a systeinatic form of the Platonic heritage. It was the disciple’s task to maintam on independent grounds the essentials of the master’s doctrine on the subject of the soul, and to do this in face of the widely conflicting views and the general uncertainty which, as the foregoing sketch sufficiently shows, were prevalent at the time. With the conscicus or half-conscious materialism of his predecessors sAristotle has no more sympathy than Plato and, as compared with this point of agreement, the differences between them count for little, however much Aristotle may exaggerate them. In the criticism which he passes upon the 7zzaeus! he affects to take the narrative literally. The point at issue is whether the activity which both Plato and Aristotle ascribe to the thinking soul can justly and reasonably be called a movement. The doctrine of the two philosophers is on all important points the same: they agree that there is an tinimortal soul and a mortal soul, that the immortal clement thinks always and that thinking must belong to its essence. What Plato calls “movement” is familiar enough in Aristotle as “energy "oor “activity’” If Plato would only say “energy,” there werd seemingly be no room for objection. But in the tenth book of the Laws, the work of his old age, when he may have been perc. sumed to have had some acquaintance with the views of his disciple, Plato obdurately refused to say “energy,” and by his clussitication of the ten species of motion assimilated physical movement and change to the only activity which in his view had reality, the “movement” of thought’, defining the soul as that which is able to move itself. And after his death Nenocrates persisted tn attribut- ing “movement” to the number which is the soul At this point a brief summary of the first part of Aristotle's treatise may be Aristotle's the best means of indicating the way in which the treatise. writer approaches his subject and the conclusians at which he arrives.

At the outset, he says, we wish to ascertain the nature or substance, and the accidents, of the soul, which is a principle of

1 De A. 406 b 26 sqq.

* “ Breaking Plato’s metaphor on the wheel,” to cite a happy phrise, Aristotle elipes back occasionally into the use of the melaphurical term himself, avin Wefaph. ropa to. Compare my sole on 433 Ὁ 17.

3. 893 B~-895 A, 8085 Ἐ 566.

INTRODUCTION, I XXXVI

animal life. A few preliminary enquiries are suggested. Is soul “something”? Substance? Or quality? Or to which category does it belong? Is it potentially existent or is it an actuality? Is it divisible or without parts? This suggests the further question, Is it homogeneous in all species of animals? If not, are the differences between souls generic or specific differences? If it is without parts, it must be variable, there will be many sorts of soul. If it is homogeneous, the homogeneous soul must be made up of different parts. Ought we, then, to start with the whole soul or with the parts, ought we to study the parts first or their functions, and, if the functions, why not first the objects? As an apology for not deciding, it may be remarked that, while in order to know the properties of a thing, we ought to know its essence, yet knowledge of properties contributes to knowledge of essence: in fact, the one is involved in the other.

The attributes of the soul cannot properly be separated from those of the body. ‘The one that seems most separable is thinking : but, if this is akin to imagining or if it involves an image, neither is thinking separable. If any attribute is peculiar to the soul itself, then soul may be independent of body; if not, soul cannot be so independent. The attributes of soul are notions or forms in matter and, as such, fall within the province of the physicist or natural philosopher, while the dialectician studies and defines their form apart from their matter. Here is the point of difference between the objects of physics and of mathematics: the attributes of soul as such, e.g. fear and anger, are inseparable from the physical matter of the animals to which they belong; the mathematical objects, eg. line and surface, though really inseparable, are separable in thought from the concrete things to which they belong.

From this discussion of method we pass to consider the opinions of our predecessors. The characteristics of animate being are motion and sensation. Hence some have regarded the soul as par excellence the cause of motion, Democritus, who thought it fire, and Anaxagoras, being typical instances. All assumed that if a thing causes motion, it is itself moved. Others, again, start with the assumption that like is known by like and infer that the soul is composed of all the elements, whether they are one or many: Empedocles that it is composed of earth, air, fire and water; Plato of number. All definitions may be reduced to three: that it causes motion, is perceptive, is incorporeal, The last characteristic leads those to choose the finest matter, who acknowledge none but

Fi. ἔ

ΧΧΧΥΙΙ INTRODUCTION. ἡ

corporeal elements. Subsequently it is objected that if the soul is a fine matter, as the soul is in all the sensitive body, we have two bodies in one.

The application of the idea of motion to the soul leads, it is argued, to absurdities. There are four kinds of motion, loco- motion, qualitative change, decay, growth, and our enquiry 15 whether the soul is moved in and through itself, and not as sailors inaship. All kinds of motion are in space; therefore, if the soul is moved, the soul must be in space. As it moves the body, it would naturally move like the body; and in that case it would go up and down in, and in and out of, the body. In general, we contend, the soul does not move the body, as Democritus supposed, by physical agency, but by means of purpose of some sort, that ts, thought. The most thorough application of motion to explain soul, and in particular the soul which thinks, was made by Plato in the 7vmaeus, and this is criticised at some length. Like other theories, it neglects the rclation between soul and body in virtue of which the soul acts, the body is acted upon, the soul moves anel the body is moved.

Another definition of the soul makes it a harmony or blendingr of opposites. This notion may be applicable to health or any bodily excellence, but will not apply to the seul. Harmony will not cause motion. Harmony means cither (1) a close fit or adjust- ment of bodies, or (2) the proportion in which clements are mixed. It is needless to show that the first meaning Is Inapplicable, there are so many fittings of the limbs. As to (2),in flush and bleed the elements are mixed in different proportions; which mixture is the soul? Returning to motion, we conclude that the only metion of which soul admits is motion per aceidens, due to motion af the body, as whiteness is moved when a white body is moved. ἃ stronger argument than any our predecessors have adduced is derived from the attributes of the soul, such as pain and pleasure, fear, anger, and other emotions, sensation and thought, all of which are commonly believed to be movements. In them, however, the soul is not moved: it is merely the cause of movement in the heart or some other bodily part. It would be better to ascribe these attributes to the man and say that he perceives or thinks or feels pleasure and pain with his soul, This leads to an interesting

; digression on intellect, followed by a refutation of Nenocrates, who *,defined the soul as a self-moving number. Hlow can the attributes which are known to belong to soul possibly be deduced from such a definition? It will not afford even the slightest bint of them.

INTRODUCTION. TI XXXIiX

The same argument had previously been used against the definition of soul as a harmony.

Two characteristics of soul, (1) that it moves itself, (2) that it is composed of very fine matter, have now been dismissed. Against the third, that it is composed of the elements and that like knows like, it may be urged that then the soul ought to have in it all compounds, all categories. Moreover, a unifying principle would be needed. The soul is not to be held divisible into parts independent of each other, for in that case what keeps its parts together? That must be the real soul. Again, as the whole soul keeps the whole body together, each part of the soul should keep a part of the body together: but we can assign no such function to intellect.

Book II. begins by defining the soul. We premise that of entities to which categories are applied substance is one, where by substance we mean either (1) matter, which is not yet anything in particular, or (2) form, which makes it something in particular, or (3) the union of matter and form in the particular thing. Under substance in the last sense is included a natural body partaking of life. What we mean by life is the power of the body to nourish itself and to grow and decay of itself. Body is clearly matter here, therefore soul is form. And, if for matter and form we substitute potentiality and actuality and distinguish the first stage of actuality, corresponding to knowledge, from the second, corresponding to the exercise of knowledge, the soul will be the first actuality of a natural body furnished with organs, or of a body that has in itself the principle of movement and rest. Thus soul is the quiddity or formal essence, to which we have analogies in the cutting power of the axe and the visual power of the eye, both actualities in the first degree, as contrasted with actual cutting and actual seeing, which are actualities in the second degree.

The definition thus found is the most comprehensive possible, applying to life in all its various forms, (1) intellect, (2) sense, (3) locomotion, (4) motion of nutrition, growth and decay. Plants exhibit life in its last form only. Animals, in addition to this, have sensation. Of the different senses touch is indispensable. Experiment shows that most of these vital functions are really inseparable from one another, though at the same time separable in thought. Whether this holds of intellect also it is not so easy to

1 Aristotle's own view is that the sense-organs are composed of the elements, in touch all are blended. But sense is not this corporeal organ itself, lut rather the character or power which resides in the organ.

th

ΧΙ INTRODUCTION. I

decide. If to these vital functions be added appetence, which clearly is present where sensation is, a certain gradation can be recognised. They may be arranged in an ascending series. The lower can exist without the higher, but the higher in mortal creatures always involve the lower. And there is a similar gradation in the senses. It scems, then, that there is one definition of soul exactly as there is one definition of rectilinear figure. Alike in figures and in the various types of soul, the earlier members of the series exist implicitly and potentially in the later; the triangle is implicit in the quadrilateral and the nutritive faculty” in the sensitive. The definition does not dispense us from investivating in detail what is the soul in the plant, in the brute, and in man. Having reached this point, we naturally expect that each of the four main vital functions, nutrition, sensation, intelleet, locomotion, will be investigated in detail; and this in fact is what the writer proceeds to do. Nutrition, growth and decay and reproduction, are dealt with briefly in Book IL, G 43 sense-pereeption at very great length, Book IL, c. 5—Book ML, ο΄. 2; and imagination, which is intimately connected with sense, in Book IIL, ὦ 35 Upon imagination follows intellect, Book IIL, cc. 4-—8; and, lastly, the principle of propressive motion in animals, which ts identified with appetence, occupies us in Book IIL, ce, g—it. The treatise ends with an attempt, from the standpoint of teleology, to answer the question why the various forms of life occur in this ascendinuy, scale, Aristotle himself was not consciously constructing a new science. Tis discussion of the soul was forced upon him when, traversing the wide domain he had set apart for his science of nature or physics, he passed from inorganic to the borders of organic life. The method of science laid down in the Ovgazoz, and hitherto pursued, is a method partly inductive, partly deductive, aiming to establish rational theories on empirical data and often falling short of its aim, because either the data were at fault or the theories inappropriate, or because there were defects in both. Natural science has to do with nature and with natural bodies, which by common consent are pre-eminently substances, sensible substances, Nature is itself a cause of things, the power in the things themselves which makes them what they are Hts characteristic is that, like human intelligence, it devises means to ends. In this respect natural bodies or natural substances may be compared with the products of art and skill, but in the former

Method,

1 sighs 16 sq.

INTRODUCTION. JI xii

case the cause is, and in the latter case is not, in the product itself. We wish to know what are (1) the concrete natural substances, (2) their properties, (3) their physical changes, (4) the causes of these changes. If we could answer these questions, we should know the ends of nature in making concrete substances, the means used to realise these ends, the form and matter of which the substances consist. In logic we proceed from one determination to another. Psychology is concerned with mental acts or operations. In some of these operations we are conscious of a process; for example, in operations of reason we know how we reason, by what steps we advance. To search for a method is to aim at determin- ing the order and arrangement in which these processes follow one another in any science. In geometry certain principles are assumed and necessary conclusions are deduced from them. Induction generalises from known particulars in order to obtain principles. Both induction and deduction may be combined in a more com- prehensive method which, after establishing general principles, deduces derivative laws and verifies the particular conclusions which follow from them. But it may be impossible to apply this complete method directly in its simplicity. The effects, which are conclusions, may be known, while the causes are to seek. If so, it is necessary to infer backwards and discover the causes from the effects. The early progress of mathematics and astronomy, with their applications to optics and harmonics, led to the belief, which Plato endorses, that deduction is the method of scientific research. Aristotle agreed for pure mathematics, while in applied mathe- matics he regarded induction from the materials collected as, strictly speaking, lying outside of the science and subsidiary. But in the natural sciences, where we rise from effects to causes, a thorough description of facts is a necessary preliminary to the discovery of the ultimate principles, and the inverse method must be applied. The method of astronomy, we are told, was to collect the facts, the phenomena, and from them to deduce astronomical laws. The whole method is summed up with convenient brevity thus: “In every department of nature we must first ascertain the facts and then after that state the causes.” The task to which the History of Animats is devoted is thus described: “First let us ascertain the existing varieties of animals and the properties of each, and after that we must try to discover their causes. This is

1”

the natural method which puts the collection of material first’.

1 nal. Prior. 1. 30, 460 1958qq., De Part. 44.1.1) 6400 14, Hast. Am 1.7, 493 4 δ, 966.

ΧΙ INTRODUCTION. Jf

Characteristic of Aristotle’s mind is the notion that some things can be got at both deductively and inductively: it is the con- silience of fact and theory. The soul being a part of nature, psychology must needs be a branch of general physics, as all preceding thinkers, including Plato, agreed. The presuppositions of Aristotle’s metaphysics refer life to a cause. Vital phenomena, wherever found, are sufficiently alike in their manifestations to justify the assumption of one such cause. The treatise, then, is a preamble to all parts of the system dealing with plants, or animals, or with yet higher beings, if endowed with life. As one of the series of biological works, it stands in the closest connexion with the tracts known as the Parva Naturalia, with the morphological treatise De Partibus Animalinm, and with that upon embryolary, De Generatione Animalium, The part which the enquirer professes to take calls for very careful demarcation. It is impossible tea say what contributions, if any, Aristotle himself made in the field of psychology: the presumption is that they were but small The evidence of his dependence upon Plato for all that relates to psychical phenomena is so overwhelming”, so constant. Possibly the repeated illustrations from zoophytes or stationary animals and from worms, which give signs of life after they have been severed into parts®, are original; but in the main hus facts are precisely the facts of his predecessors, the scantiest stock now at the disposal af any ignorant layman, Speculation had outrun observation. Nor is there any complaint of the scantiness of the data. Ne. Such as they are, they have already called forth tee numereus and tad divergent explanations. The writer’s modest aim is by preliminary discussion to settle a few, just a few, fundamental questions as te the nature and attributes of the one principle of Hfe and mind. Aristotle’s enquiry is founded on his metaphysies. Et is the Body and business of natural science to discover form and soul. matter in natural substances. Every animal, every plant is a natural substance, compounded of body, which is matter, and soul, which is form, and the science of nature has therefore to investigate both body and soul. Yet here a provises is needed. Natural science does not necessarily treat of the whole : The ae SS De part. An. ᾿ r, Ggta 17 BC 3 cf Plata, θύρα, 170 (μι. , east; but Aristotle's real merit comes ont θη» spiionsly in the tracts Je Some and Qe Memoria. "6.8: 410 Ὁ 19, 432} 20, 4rrb 10 sqqey 413 16 sqq. Aristotle may alse be credits with the simple experiment of placing a sensible object upon the sense-organ itvelf as userdt

to show the necessity of a meclium, grgar2, 420 b rg Β΄. 423 b 17 Sip, and the appeal to experiment, as e.g. 421 Ὁ rg.

INTRODUCTION. TI xliti

soul. Wherever soul as form is in matter, wherever it employs a bodily organ, we are still in the domain of natural science; but anything included under soul which is independent of the body and which cannot be thus defined must be reserved for meta- physics’. The meaning which Aristotle attached to independence or separate existence must be grasped, if we would understand what he conceived by a substance or thing. Primarily this separate existence is the attribute of concrete particulars presented to sense in the external world. They are bodies locally, numerically and by magnitude separate. From them the conception is trans- ferred to whatever the mind thinks as distinct, and even for immaterial notions Aristotle has no other formula. They, too, like concrete bodies, are described as being in time, in space and in conception separate or distinct? In reducing soul to the logical essence or form of body Aristotle, according to his own presup- positions, so far from favouring materialism, secures once and for all the soul’s absolute immateriality. The living body has in- dependent existence, has its own form and its own matter. Even a dead body or an inanimate thing is something existing inde- pendently, to which we can apply the pronoun “this*.” But the soul does not exist in the same way. Nor, again, is it a thing capable of being added to or subtracted from another thing, the body, any more than form in general is a thing which can in mechanical fashion be united to and separated from its appropriate matter’. If a brazen sphere be melted down, the brass remains. It is still “this” something, “this” mass of metal; but we cannot then say of its spherical shape that it is “this” anything or that it any longer exists. The lifeless body is like the eye which cannot see or the axe which is spoilt for use.’ We may apply to them the same names as before; but, as the nature is no longer the same, the application is irrelevant, misleading, equivocal. But, though the lifeless body is still a concrete particular and a sub- stance, the soul apart from its relation to the body is no such thing at all. Now the soul as form stands to the body as matter of the concrete individual precisely as the spherical shape to the brass, as vision to the eye, as cutting power to the axe. In every case the form is a quality predicable of the matter. But the

1 De Dart, Amt 1. το 6412 14-—b το,

2 Meaph. 1016) 1--.3.

5. Biological writers now avoid the ambiguity attaching to the use of the term “body” in two distinct senses by means of the term ‘‘organism.”

4 Cf. Metuph. 1045 Ὁ 12 8qq- ® 412b τὸ 866.

xliv INTRODUCTION. 1

body is not predicable of the soul, we cannot explain the soul in terms of body or make it a material thing, however fine the materials. On the contrary, we must explain body in terms of soul. It is form which determines and we only know a thing as determined. Primary matter, the absolutely indeterminate, is in itself unknowable’. Therefore, if we would know the living bady, we must study its activitics and operations and all the attributes which it acquires in virtue of soul. Soul and body, then, are nat two distinct things, they are one thing presenting two <listinct aspects. The soul is not body, but belongs to body ?: it is not itself a concrete particular, although its presence in the beady makes a concrete particular; it resides in a body and, what is more, in a body of a particular kind, furnished with the means whereby the functions of the soul can be exercised. The relation of matter to form in the particular thing is one instance of a relation of higher generality, that between potence and act be- tween the power to become and the realisation of that power in actuality. Before it is,a thing may be or may not be, and when it is, if it has the power to act, it may act or it may not act. Now body stands to soul, and matter to form in general, as the potential to the actual which has reached the first stage: ane already is. In other words, the soul is the power which the living body possesses and the lifeless body lacks. This is first actual- isation or first entelechy. Again, the actual possession of facultics unused still stands to the exercise of these faculties in the relation of potence to act. Life itself, the use of actual power, is the seconcl stage, energy. The actual use must be preceded by actual power. Soul is actual power to live, but is not life. Τὰ Plate body is opposed to soul. The body could be trained te obey the soul by gymnastic and music. In Aristotle the body is the natural instrument of the soul, and so the body into which a particular soul enters must be adapted to its use. This fact renders the Pythagorean idea of transmigration absurd‘ Soul is Ukewise both the final and efficient cause of the body* It is the final cause, because the soul is merely means to vital power and life; it is the efficient cause not only in the obvious case of progressive motion, but also in all the various changes which the body under-

goes in the exercise of vital functions, including nutrition, growth, sensation.

1 Metaph. 1036 ἃ 2—9. 4 gtah δ aay, 414.ἃ ty μὰ 5 4t2ag sqq., a 22 sqq., b 27 qq, 4 407) 20—~26, 5 grab Bane.

INTRODUCTION. TI χὶν

Such, in brief, is the description of soul considered in and by Classification itself, including the various separate powers, which of vital are assumed to account for the varieties of vital and powers. . . .

psychical operations. The great problem is how this multiplicity of acts or operations should be classified. Plato in some dialogues divides soul into parts, an immortal part, reason, and two mortal parts, passion and appetite. His pupil is more cautious. He does not go beyond the supposition of certain powers or faculties. In one sense, he says, this division into powers is illusory, for the powers of soul are really infinite in numbert But he contends that his own groups are convenient groups. Faculties, like every other basis of classification, are only means to an end. Plato, he thinks, should have added the nutritive and sensitive faculties. Desire, again, runs through all operations: there is the rational wish, the angry impulse and the instinctive appetite. Here at least it is clear that the different powers are but different capacities of the single soul. Yet his ignorance of the bodily conditions of thought and his consequent assumption of a separable and immortal part of soul leave Aris- totle much in the same position as Plato. In order to get a clear view, special stress must be laid upon the statement that the powers of soul are arranged in an ascending scale% In mortal creatures, at all events, the higher faculty always presupposes the lower, without which it cannot exist*, The lowest power, that of nutrition and propagation, is common to animals with plants; in plants it exists alone. Animals have sensitivity in addition: of the senses they must possess at least touch. So far we are on safe ground. From this point we may simplify in one of two ways. In the third Book the two faculties, sense and intellect, tend more and more to be conjoined as the judging faculty, while appetency, which in its lowest form is implied by sense‘, is made the principle on which progressive motion depends® These con- siclerations lead to the following scheme :

t. Nutritive 2. Discriminative 3. Motive [ Γ ἰ ᾿ Sense Intellect Appetence Faculty of locomotion

On the other hand, intellect is said to be the highest of all our powers, and the lower forms of appetency, as well as the power

1 4324 22 sqq., 433 Ὁ 1---- 2 arab 28—q4isa τ. δ 4rsa II. 4 414 1 sqq. 8 4324 21 560:

xlvi INTRODUCTION. 2

of progressive motion, are associated with sense, while an inter- mediate place must be found for the imaginative faculty. These considerations suggest the following table of faculties:

1. Nutritive; 2. Sensitive, which is also appetitive ; (this is in most animals joined with) 3. Locomotive; 4. Imaginative; 5. In- tellective.

In the ascending series of vital functions we start with the The soul of lowest, which constitute the sole life of plants and the plant. are an indispensable element in the life of animals. Their isolation from all others in the vegetable kingdom facilitates their study. We accordingly assume! a power of self-nourishment, the nutritive faculty. But we must be careful to remember that this faculty has also to account for growth, decay and reproduc- tion; by which last it partakes, so far as it can, of immortality, the species of plants, as well as of animals, being imperishable, though the individual members of the species perish. If we are to define things by their end, the primary soul, the soul of the plant, is that which is capable of reproducing the species. But if the individual plant or animal is to be capable of this, it must be kept alive. Hence in a certain sense the subsidiary functions of nourishment and growth are even more important than the end to which they are means. Tfood or nutriment is the cor relative object of the nutritive faculty, and we must determine how. things are nourished. It was a common opinion that contrarics are nourishecl by contraries. This is generally, but not always, true of the clements or simple bodies. Fire, Aristotle points ont, is nourished by water, but not water by fire. Others said like was nourished by like These two views can be reconciled. Undi- gested food is unlike, but food, when digested, has been assimilated to that which it nourishes, and then like is nourished by lke. Nutrition, then, is motion or change, and it is casy to discever the movent, the instrument and the moved. Soul is the nourisher, food the instrument of nutrition, body the nourished. Vital heat, as well as food, is employed by the soul in the process, and we have an analogy in the steersman, who employs his hand to move the rudder with which he steers the ship.

Little suspecting what advances botanical science was to make, Aristotle denied that plants have sensitivity. He admits that they are affected by heat and cold, but only, he argues, as inanimate things are affected; that is, they are simply heated and covledd.

11, c.g Cf also grit bb rg-——30, 4138 15 βῆ.» 4240 32 Mdey $326 17 MIT, 4358 27-30, 4354 28 50.

INTRODUCTION. JI xlvii

They cannot receive the form of objects without the matter, and this because they have no organ in which the elements are so blended as to give the means of discriminating, say, cold and heat. When a plant touches an object, there is merely physical contact. Thus the excessive preponderance, as Aristotle supposed, of “earth” in the structure of plants precludes sensation, because it precludes the proper blending of the elements, which would be necessary to make organs of sense. The insensibility of certain tissues of the body, eg. bones, sinews, hair, he explained in a similar way as due to the presence in them of too much earth: and in this erroneous view he followed Plato.

The characteristic of animals when contrasted with plants is Sense- that they not only live, but have the power to per- perception. ceive, which the Greeks regarded as essentially a cognitive power. They thought that we cannot perceive by sense without perceiving something, and interpreted this something objectively, as something which exists. The distinction so im- portant for modern psychology between sensation and perception had not yet received much attention. For Aristotle, as for his predecessors, the main question is, in what does this operation of perceiving consist and how does it take place? We must describe the various kinds of perception and determine how perceiving is related to thinking, since both are cognitive. One distinctive mark is that by sense we perceive individuals. But we have much knowledge of individuals which the five senses cannot give. Does, then, all this knowledge come from sense, or must it be referred in part to intellect, or must we invent new faculties or powers to account for it? Suffice it to say that, whenever per- ception takes place, an universal is perceived, but not directly and per se, only per accidens*, Directly sense perceives only “this,” just as directly sense perceives it here and now. The operation of perceiving something existent is made by Aristotle to depend on his own physical theories of motion, of efficient cause and of essential form. One specics of motion he defines as the production of an effect in matter by an efficient cause, as, e.g., the production of an impression upon wax by a seal or of an image in a mirror by a candle. Motions may be classified according to the categories as qualitative, quantitative or spatial, and the species of motion to which sense-perception is referred is the first species or qualitative change, the alteration or transformation which a thing undergoes

> 417 19 564. 2 Anal. Lost ts 3t, 87 Ὁ 28 sqq., 11. 19, 1000 173 Metaph. 10874 19 syq-

xIvili INTRODUCTION. 1

when it loses certain qualities and acquires new ones, remaining itself numerically the same. The form or essence without the matter is transmitted by the efficient cause or agent to the patient upon whom it acts, as when fire transmits heat to fuel. The form or essence is one in all the things thus affected. The one universal heat is the same wherever actually found, in fuel ignited, in water heated or in molten iron. Applying this physical theory, we should define the particular motion or qualitative change which we call perceiving by sense as the production of an effect in a particular part of the body, which we call a sense-organ, by a particular external thing, which we call the sensible object. But this is inadequate. Plants receive heat and cold and the air receives odour, but they do not perceive’. It is not enough, then, to say that perceiving is undergoing some affection or being acted upon. Besides, what is affected? Not the single organ, but the percipient as a whole; and we have scen that the animal is a particular case of composite substance, the body being matter, the sentient soul form. Now it is with the soul that we perceive, as it is with the soul that we live and think® Let us, then, amend the definition. Perception is an alteration in the soul. It consists in the production by an external object of an effect in the sensitive faculty. This effect is the reception of the form, without the matter, of the external thing perceived’.

Thus Aristotle is able to decide between the conflicting views of his predecessors, according to some of whom like acts upon like, while Heraclitus and Anaxagoras insisted that for any change to be perceived object and percipient must be unlike. As we saw about nutrition, both are right and both are wrong. The /er- cipiendune is unlike, the perceptum is like, that which perceives its, for, when the process of percciving takes place, both the external thing which causes it and the percipient affected by that cause have in the very act one common form which, like every universal, is the same wherever it is found. That which sees is in the act of vision in a way coloured’, for it receives the same one form of colour which existed and exists in the coloured object perceived. But we may go a step further. Where one thing acts upon an- other, both the action and its effect reside in the patient, in that which is acted upon. Previous to their interaction, if they are physical bodies, the one is merely a potential agent, the other is

1 4242 32—b 18. 3 4148 12 5q., 408 b 13—r18. * 4248 17 ΒαΩ, 4 416 b 35, 417 ἃ 18—20, 4184 3—6, 5 425 b 22.

INTRODUCTION. 2 xlix

merely a potential patient, whatever else they may be actually. Applying this to perception, the external thing is always per- ceptible, a percipiendum, a potential percepfum, the sense-faculty is always potentially percipient: but in the process of perceiving the potential in both cases has been transformed into an actual. The eye, eg., becomes a seeing eye, the whiteness whiteness per- ceived, and these two actualities reside in that which ts passively affected,in the sense. In other words, the actuality of the sensible object is one and the same with (not merely similar to) the actuality of the perceiving subject!, sense and sensible having in the act of perception one and the same essence, since the whiteness seen in the object is transferred to the visual faculty and, being an universal, a form, is one and the samme, wherever it resides. Is this, we ask, a doctrine of relativity? Most certainly not. The followers of Protagoras are supposed to argue that, if the sensible quality is alone real, nothing would exist at all unless there were living beings to perceive, for without them there would be no perception. 1 grant, Aristotle replies, that in the absence of living beings there would be no act of perception, no affection of the percipient. But for all that, it would be impossible to get rid of things, which are potential causes of perception even when they are never perceived. Jor perception does not perceive itself, there is something beyond the perception; and this must be logically prior to the perception, since whatever causes motion or change must be prior to that which it moves or changes: and this is not the less true because sensible object and percipient are relative to cach other’. In other words, the object perceived actually exists with its own form, its own qualities, even when it is out of all relation to a percipient. And similarly we may conccive a percipient out of all relation to an object, none such being actually present. It is then what it always was, a power of perceiving, a faculty of sense, mere sensitivity.

These considerations apply most emphatically and most natur- ally to sense regarded as a whole, a single power which resides in the body of the animal, likewise regarded as a whole. But this power of perceiving is localised and pluralised. Wherever a part of the body subserves a particular end or function, it becomes an organ or instrument, and the general power of perception, as specialised in the five senses, employs its separate sense-organs,

1 425 Ὁ 26 sqq.- 2 Melaph. τοιοῦ 30—-1orr ἃ 2.

] INTRODUCTION. ἡ

the eye, the ear, the nostril and the organs of taste and touch. For the detailed account of the modes in which they are employed, the medium which they necessarily imply and their special objects or provinces, the reader must be referred to Book 11. ce. 7—11}. Here there is space only for a few general remarks. First, the parallelism between sense as a whole and the single special sense, e.g. sight or touch, must never be overlooked. “As the sensation of a part of the body is to that part, so is sensation as a whole to the whole sentient body as such.” ‘Thus the sense of vision presides over its own special province of colour, bounded by the opposites, white, black, and embracing every intermediate shade®. The sense of touching has its special province, or rather provinces, especially temperature and resistance, bounded the former by the extremes of hot and cold, the latter of hard and soft, and inclucling all varieties of temperature and resistance intermediate between the extremes in each province. Vision resides in the eye, touch in the internal organ of touch (probably the heart) or in the intra-organic medium, the flesh, according as we adopt the more scientific or the popular standpoint. To perceive is to undergo a qualitative change. In order, then, to become assimilated to the object, the organ must be capable of undergoing such change in the direction of either extreme or of any of the intermecliate grades between these extremes. If it could not respond to the stimulus, as modern psychologists would say, at any point in the scale of colour, of temperature or of resistance, the failure on the part of the organ would be attended by mal-perception or non- perception on the part of the faculty. This is brought home to us whenever we try to employ our senses upon objects either altogether out of their range or such that the perception is at-

1 As might be expected, the contributions to the physiology of the senses, and especially vision, are worthless. ‘See Beare, Greek Zheortes, Introduction; alsa pp. 9—11- The mathematical researches of the Pythagoreans finally developod a more correct doctrine of sound and its propagation, to which the spurious treatine Jv Audibilibus, probably by Heraclides, bears testimony, See Jan, Musii Serintores, pp. s0—57, who also traces (pp, 130 sqq.) to Archytas some of the theories found in Plato’s Zimaeus. For the helplessness of the Greeks in empirical science cf. Zeller, Aristotle, 1. p. 443, Eng. Tr. From our superior knowledge we can afford to smile at the naive simplicity, the sheer audacity, which professes to explain growth, while knowing nothing of cells, discusses sensation and movement without understanding the nature and functions of the nervous system, and treats fire as an element in blissful ignorance of the chemical changes which go on during combustion. If Aristotle had been in possession of a microscope, it is probable that he would have made no better use of it than did Huxley’s unsophisticated correspondent (see Life of Mluxley, vol. τὰ, pp. 365 8qq-)-

4 4xab 23——25. ® 426 Ὁ 8 sqq,, 422 Ὁ 1 sqq.

INTRODUCTION, J li

tended by pernicious effects, when we try to see in the dark or to look at the noonday sun or to plunge the hand in boiling water or to touch the air’. Now what is it which justifies our expectation that in normal cases a sensible object, when present, will be per- ceived? What are the physical or physiological grounds on which, with the science of his day, Aristotle based this belief? He ac- cepted from Empedocles the false physics which resolved all bodies into four elements, air, earth, fire, water, with four primary qualities, hot, cold, wet, dry. These elements are found in their compounds in the outside world. They are also found all four mixed (we might say, chemically combined) in the tissues or homeveneous parts of animal bodies, of which, again, the hetero- geneous parts or organs of animal bodies are composed. Hence there is a new application of the old maxim that like is known by like. The characteristic of cach object perceived depends not so much upon the materials which enter into its composition as upon the combining ratio of those materials, which constitutes its form. When Empedocles resolved bone into definite proportions of his four clements, he was not far from realising that this com- bining ratio is the form which makes bone what it 153, So, too, with the sense-organ. It also has its combining ratio which con- stitutes its form, and this form, again, is the faculty residing in the organ. Hence sense as a whole, and each special sense, Is a form, because it is the determining: proportion or combining ratio of the tissues composing the organ". In perceiving, form receives and apprehends form. In order that it may perceive all the quali- ties which came within its range, the sense must be neutral or indifferent to all, must be a mean between the opposite extremes which it can perceive and be actually neither of them“ In the organ of sense the constituent elements are blended in a certain way, «og. the finger has a certain temperature. But, as by the definition perceiving is qualitative change, this temperature must be capable of variation in the direction of either extreme or of any grade intermediate to the extreines, and the constituent elements of the organ of sense must be blended in such a way as to allow of this. This possibility of variation serves to explain the discriminating power which attaches both to sense as a whole and to the single special senses. Whatever is intermediate be-

1 424 tr κήηή.

t goa t3 sq, s10a 56..; Melaph. οὐ 0 15 aq]. 3 τοὶ τ4--τῷὸ, 46 Ὁ 3, 4340 2 BY.

4 423 b 30-4242 τὸ, 4168 27-- 7.

1 INTRODUCTION. Lf

tween two extremes is differently related to the one and to the other. In Aristotelian language, any point in the middle of a line is the beginning of the line in relation to one extremity, the end of the line in relation to the other. The single sense sight dis- criminates two shades of colour. It is in a certain relation to the first when it perceives the first, it is in a different relation to the second when it perceives the second. The discrimination measures the difference between these two relations.

The parallel between sense as a whole and the separate special senses extends to the objects directly perceived. The objects which the special senses directly perceive are known by two marks: they cannot be perceived by another special sense and the appropriate special sense cannot be mistaken about them’. The objects not exclusively bclonging to this or that special sense, but perceived by two or more special senses, are referred to sense as a whole, often called sensus communis. Such percepts are shape and magnitude, unity and number, motion, rest and time. They include what Democritus considered and Locke called the primary qualities of body. About this common function of sense as a whole there has been much needless mystification. The sentient soul is one, and all the more important and more intellectual of its functions belong to it in virtue of this unity. As one, it perceives the common sensibles ; as one, it pronounces judgments of identity and differ- ence between sensibles; as a single faculty attendant upon each and every special sense, it is self-conscious% That to sense as a whole, the so-called sexsus communis, should be assigned functions which in degree, if not in kind*, exceed those of the separate special senses, need not surprise us. τ in sense we have a whole which is something more than the sum of its different parts. Analysis into its elements does not completely explain it, nor will the simple addition of these elements reproduce what was subjected to analysis. The operation of this single faculty is temporarily arrested in slecp, permanently in death. Lastly, to this faculty belong imagination, dreams and memory, which we are now to discuss.

1 4188 7 5464., 4158. 14 8qq-, 428 b 18 sq.

2 4254 27, 426 Ὁ 20 sqq.3 De Somno 2, 455 ἃ 12 Sqq.

5. Some of these functions appear to be delegated by sensus communis to the special senses, if we interpret strictly the statements that each special sense discriminates the objects within its own province (426 b ro), and that it is by sight that we perceive that we see (4250 12 sqq.). Probably, however, both statements require careful qualification, which the latter receives from De Somso ἃ, 4558 12 sq. Cf. Beare, Greek Theories, PP- 233, 72. 2, 277.

INTRODUCTION. I liii

Sensation is defined as the production of an effect in the sense- Images and organ, a part of the body, by an external object. It Sleep. is, then, a movement or impression affecting the body and, so far as we are conscious of it, the sensitive soul as well. Now this movement does not always vanish with the disappearance of the object which caused it. Instances may be given of its persistence, as our inability at first to see in a darkened room if we have just left the sunlight ; or what is known as the after-image {more correctly, the after-percept) when, if we close our eyes after looking at the sun, we see a succession of images of it in different colours’. It is by facts like these that Aristotle explains imagination. He defines it as a motion generated by actual per- ception, a motion distinct from, yet similar to, the motion which constituted the original sensation’, or, as Hobbes translates, “ All fancies are motions within us, reliques of those made in the sense.” In order to learn how wide is the range of the imaginative faculty we must turn to the tracts on Sleep and Memory. Sense itself is often mistaken in regard to the common sensibles and the things to which sensible qualities belong, for example, as to what the coloured or sonorous body is and where it is+: and these errors of sense are shared in and increased by imagination, especially when the sensible object is perceived from a distance. Illusion in gencral is due to the clifference between imagination and judgment and between the standards they employ® It may sometimes be corrected by one sense coming to the aid of another, as when the object perceived as double by crossed fingers is seen to be single‘. The illusion that objects seem to move past us, when we in fact are travelling past them, implies that a movement is set up in the eye of the same kind as would occur if we were stationary and the objects themselves were in motion, In fact, the bodily movement induces a picture of the very object which might have been its cause. It is to the imaginative faculty that dreams must be ascribed’. Sleep is the arrest of the sensitive faculty as a whole or seusus coummnunis, by which when awake we are conscious that we are awake and have sensations’, Plants, having no sensation,

1 Cf. go8b 18, 4151} 24 sy, 4208. 43 De Ζιφ τ, 2, 4508 24—28,

% De ον. ἃ, 489 5-20.

* 428 Ὁ ro—429 a 5.

4 4180 18 56., 428b 20 sqq-

δ De Lnsont. ὦ, 460b 16 sqq., 1, 458) 9 sqq.

6 16. ἃ, 4690 b 20—-27.

7 De Insomn. i, 4808 L422. 8 De Somuo 1, 444 25-27, 4, 455 12-—b 2.

liv INTRODUCTION. 1

do not sleep. In order that sense, which is charged with motive as well as perceptive functions, may recover from fatigue, sleep 15 necessary’, and it is brought about ultimately by the process of nutrition?, An evaporation from the food in the stomach rises to the head‘, is there cooled and descends, causing a feeling of drowsiness. The surface of the body is cooled and what heat there is in the system collects about the heart® It is clear that dreaminy is not a function proper to sense as a whole nor to any special sense, much less to understanding or opinion® Yet the tmages seen in dreams have sensible qualities. It only remains to refer dreaming to the same faculty as illusions in our waking hours. The residual movements in the organs are no doubt present in the daytime, but at night, when the action of the spectal senses ts suspended’ and the environment is peaccful, the imagination ts most active’, Then ev Aypothesi these persistent effects reach and stimulate the central organ of sense. We are most Hable to illusions when labouring uncer emotion or morbid states", as, fear example, when a patient in sickness mistakes figures on the wall for real animals” and even makes bodily movements to escape from them. In sleep, again, the judging faculty is weak", owing to the increasing pressure of blood around the heart There are, of course, cases in which creams are the result of seimi-conmsecious sensations, half-heard sounds or half-seen lights", which would have escaped attention in our waking hours: and reflections and ideses are often added to them, But in itself dreaminc is simply the result of the movement of our sensations curing the portod of sleeps as such*#, Dreams are movements which give rise to images within our serise-organs",

The most important of all our images are those of memory. Tf Memory- imagining is consciously referred to an carlier per- image. ception of which the image is a copy, then we call it memory”, For memory there are two conditions, the affection mew

1 De Sono i, 454) t7——485 ἃ 3. Ὁ 6. 2, 488 λ΄ 28. 3 20. ἃ, 4560 32 sqq. 4 ibe 3, 56 1 «ἢ τη,» 4b. ἃ, 457 33 BYq.3 Me Jresomin. 3, 461% 3 sqe).

6 De Lusomn. t, 488 Ὁ 9--- 480 α 9. 7 th. 3, αὔτ 4.

5 26. 3, 461.4 14--} 30. ® ih, a, αὔο Ὁ ἃ νη. W 7, 2, 460 bie 566. It sd, 4, Gt by Rom, 2 ἐξ, 3, 462 τὰ 840... 26 sq. fh, 3, 4620 Sy mY Wid. 1, 458 15 βή.. 3, 4620 5---ἴ. 1S Jb. 3, 402 A τὸ 54}.

1b γῇ. 3, 462 0 8 sqqy.

17 Oe Mem. τ, 4490 24 Sq 450} δ᾽ πάλι a 2, 15 Φανγάσματοι, as εἰκόνων οὐ φάντασμα, ἕξις, where ἕξις, which is usually understood to mean * retention,” may mean ‘ reference.”

INTRODUCTION. JI lv

present, and the perception of time’; in other words, not only images, but images regarded as decayed copies of earlier im- pressions, and this involves the perception of time. By memory we see distance, not indeed in space, but in time? As memory is not confined to man, but extends to some of the lower animals, these latter must be credited with the imaginative faculty and the perception of time®. Here are very promising beginnings of a comparative psychology, which Aristotle, though he desiderated it in his predecessors, did very little himself to supply. His denial of understanding to brutes was a prejudice which a little research would have been able to surmount. As a matter of fact, he not only holds absolutely that, though the lower animals remember, they have no reasoning power, but, further, that, if memory were a function of pure intelligence alone, even man himself could not remember, since intellectual acts cannot be remembered fer se‘. What, then, can be remembered? The instrument of memory is the image. Hence whatever can be presented as an image can be directly remembered, all that cannot be presented as an image can only be remembered indirectly by means of the images with which it is associated. But how can we know the past which is not present, if our only instrument is a present affection, the image which survives after the original impression is gone®? Let us revert to the formation of images. The fact that a present move- ment of sensation sets up a subsidiary movement of imagination may be expressed in a clifferent way, if we employ the metaphor of an finpression, by which perception has been so often illustrated". The act of perceiving, as it were, stamps a particular impression upon the sense-organ, as a seal ring stamps an impression upon wax. This impression, which remains, is a potential image so long as it is latent, an actual image when we become conscious that it is still present. Is it, then, this image, the reproduced impression, and not that of which it is an image, which we remember? If so, it may be urged, remembrance is not of the past at all. δὲ that rate we might just as well suppose that in actual sensation also we sce and hear what is not present to sense ; an objection which cuts at the very root of cvery representative theory of perception. The objection is met by pointing out that in a certain way it is true that actual perception has for its object what is not present’. Wesee a

1 fe Mom. τέ, 449) 18—29, 450 b Li—-20, 2, 4512 20-31.

4 #6. 2, 4520 7 sqq. 3 2b, 1, 4508 15---22. * 1. τὸ 4802 τὸ τοῖα. 6 ib. I, 4508 25 Sq., 450 b £1 sqq. ὅδ δια 48O 30 SIG. 7 76. χ, 450 b 20 5646.

a2

lvi INTRODUCTION. 4

likeness of an absent person: the picture is present, the original 15 not. The picture, though numerically one and the same, may be regarded in two ways, either as a simple picture or, in relation to the original, as a likeness. Apply this to the memory-image. . [t, too, may be regarded in itself simply as an image before the mind, or in relation to something else of which it is a representation. If viewed in the latter aspect, it is a memorial or reminder of an earlier perception which it recalls. It is distinguished from other images by its reference to time past and by the fact that it is, what many images are not, a copy or representation. Memory may accordingly be defined not simply as a retention, but rather as a reference, of a mental presentation as a likeness to the original of which itis a likeness. All representations are likewise presentations. Images are before us in memory, in present sensation and in expectation, whether hope, fear, or desire, but we refer these images to the past, the present, and the future respectively) In all three cases something is presented, and the only way of cistingsuish- ing them is the accompanying perception of time, one of the common sensibles. Confusion of memory with imagination is one case of hallucination: thus Antipheron of Oreus was a type of mental derangement when he mistook what he only fancied for a past experience*, So far, then, like imagining in veneral, memory is a function of sexsus comununis, and hence it is to the central organ of sense that we must refer this movement or impression or image, or whatever else we call the corporeal change in question.

The distinction between memory and reminiscence or recollec- tion is never very clearly stated by Aristotle, but, if we attend te what he says about acquiring knowledge and reacquiting it, he. about learning for the first time and learning over ayain what we have forgotten (neither of which, of course, is to be identitied! with memory or recollection), it seems that the case may be put as follows®, When we retain what we learn, whether by sense or thought, we are said to remember. Recollection iimplies the recovery of what has temporarily been obscured without poaing through the process of re-learning, and this whether the recovery is due to voluntary effort or is involuntary. We can remember without recollecting, if the image has never been lost, but is latent or potentially existent in us. When we recollect by voluntary effort we are conscious that it is lost and seek to recover it. Llere

1 De Mem. 1, 440 Ὁ 25-——28. 2b. 1, 451 ἃ ἢ Heep. 5. 2b. 2, 4518. λο---ῷ ro.

INTRODUCTION. TI Ivii

I cite at length the account given by Wallace, p. xcv: “ Recollec- tion may take place either intentionally or unintentionally : we may, that is to say, recall some event of past experience either accidentally as it were or by the help of a distinct effort to call it back to mind; but in either case it is regulated by certain laws which it is one of the great psychological merits of Aristotle to have tabulated for us. The laws which thus express the mode in which the mind attempts to recall its past impressions are what have commonly been designated since Aristotle’s day, the Laws of the Association of Ideas. But to Aristotle, it must be added, the laws in question have little or none of the significance which they have acquired in the hands of modern inquirers. To him they are simply a statement of the manner in which we seek to regain some fragments of knowledge which have for the moment got outside our consciousness. Recollection in short being the recalling of our past impressions, it follows that the success of our efforts to recall them will depend to no inconsiderable extent on the degree to which we can recall the order in which other impressions stood to that of which we are in search. But our impressions follow one another in memory in an order similar to that in which the actual sensations succeeded one another. Recollection thus involves a study of the laws of sequence in the order of our ideas: and Aristotle analyses the method of recalling past impressions in the following manner. ‘When engaged in recollection we seek to excite some of our previous movements, until we come to that which the movement or impression of which we are in search was wont to follow. And hence we seek to reach this preceding impression by starting in our thought from an object present to us or something else whether it be similar, contrary or contiguous to that of which we are in search; recollection taking place in this manner because the movements are in one case identical, in another case cuincident and in the last case partly overlap’ Similarity, contrariety and contiguity are thus to Aristotle the three principles by which for purposes of recollection our ideas and impressions have to be guided. Our sensuous movements and impressions really follow one another in an order corresponding to that of external nature. Thus, the more order and arrangement there is in the elements of our experience—the better connected our ideas are— the more easily will they be remembered. And again the greater number of times we have established a connection between our

1 De Mem. 2, 451 b 16-—22. 2 ah. 2, 452 a I—3.-

Iviii INTRODUCTION. 1

ideas, the greater will be the ease with which we can recall them. Habit in short becomes a second nature: and the constant con- junction of two phenomena in outer experience will lead to their being so completely connected in the mind that the one will never

177

show itself without the other’.

I have reserved to the last the highest employment of mental images in the service of the intellect. It 15 impossible to think without such an image before the mind* When we are contem- plating the object of thought, we must have an image before us. The past experience which we remember includes not only perceptions, but thoughts, and the reference of the image to sensus communis compels Aristotle to declare that nothing but what is sensible is remembered directly, fer se, ancl that the whole of our thoughts, notions and conceptions are remembered indirectly, per acctdens. Our thinking is conditioned by continuity, Le. oxten- sion, and by time. Just as in proving a geometrical proposition we are aware that the size of the figure does not affect the proof, but we nevertheless draw the figure of a determinate size, so in thinking, even though the object is not quantitative, we think of it as a quantum, and, if it is quantitative but indefinite, we neverthe- less think of it as of a definite size*, What affections of sense are to the sensitive faculty, such images are to the thinking soul, The total loss of a sense cuts off the man from all the knowledge available through that sense’, Without the sensations in question he will not have the corresponding images, and without them he cannot have the thoughts ancl conceptions. Intellect itself dos not think external things without the aid Of sense-perception® ‘Further, the use of images in thinking implies their usc in that process of deliberation in which the mind balances the present against the future, and after due calculation decides upon a course of action’. When reason is obscured by passion, images of sense themselves directly move to action, and such images control the movements of the lower animals generally*.

Intellect forms the subject of Book HL, cc. 4-8. But the detailed treatment there by no means exhausts what is said about it in the treatise. It will be convenient to collect here the more important of the scattered remarks

Intellect.

1 De Ment. 2, 4528. 27-—30.

2 De A. 4314 16 8q., 4328 8—13; De Aven. t, 449) 81.

3 De Mem. 1, 450 α I—14. 4 431 a 14sq. 5 4320 7 ay. 6 De Seusu 6, 445 Ὁ 16 3q. 7 430b 2 sqq-, 4348 5 sq δ 4298 4.Sqq-, 43329 Sqq., Ὁ 28—go, 415 ἃ 11.

LNTRODUCTION. I lix

previously made on thinking, on intellect, or even on the soul, where the context suggests that Aristotle, like Plato, is using soul for that which thinks.

If to think is a species of imagining or not independent of imagining, even thinking could not exist apart from body. Anaxagoras made soul the moving cause when he said that intelligence set the universe in motion. But, whereas Democritus absolutely identified mind with soul and did not use the term mind to denote a faculty conversant with truth, Anaxagoras was less consistent. He often made mind the cause of goodness and order; elsewhere he identified it with soul, as when he attributed it to all animals, great and small, high and low. And yet, Aristotle adds, mind in the sense of intelligence is not so widely distributed as soul or vital principle. Anaxagoras took mind as his first principle and said it alone of all existing things is simple, unmixed, pure. He attributed to one and the same principle that it knows and that it causes motion. Mind, according to him, is impassive and has nothing in common with anything else?.

The criticism? of the Ziizaeus suggests that in Aristotle’s opinion the mind in the universe is not a magnitude; it is one and continuous in the same sense as the process of thinking, which consists of a series of thoughts; the unity of these thoughts is a unity of succession, the unity of number, not that of a magnitude. Hence, mind not being continuous like a magnitude, there are two alternatives: either it has no parts, or it has parts and is con- tinuous, but not like a magnitude. A magnitude is incapable of thinking ; if mind can apprehend with any one of its parts, it need not revolve nor have magnitude; it has to think two kinds of objects, the one kind divisible, the other indivisible. Thinking, as we know it, has limits which determine it, viz. the end in view or the new truths that the thinker discovers. Both thinking and inference bear far more analogy to rest or pause than to motion. In thinking the thinker ought to realise happiness. Thinking is the essence of the mind. Many held that entanglement in the body was a hindrance to thought ; a satisfactory theory ought to explain why the thinking soul is enclosed in the body and ‘under what conditions of the body.

In criticising the doctrine of harmony, he asks, what part of the bodily compound combining with the rest, can we assume to be intellect?? In another connexion Aristotle says that intellect

1 403 a 8—10, 4044 25—b 6, 405. a 13—19, Ὁ 19—21. + 407a %2—b 26. 3 408 a 12.

Ix INTRODUCTION. 1

would seem to be a self-existing substance which comes into play in us and is in itself imperishable, in spite of senile decay. Thought and its exercise are enfeebled when something internal is destroyed, but the intellect in itself is impassive. Memory, love and hate are not affections of the intellect, which is something more divine and is impassive’. In criticising Empedocles, Aristotle remarks that it is impossible for soul, and still more impossible for intellect, to have anything superior to it and overruling it, to it belongs a natural priority and authority*. It is difficult to conjecture what part of the body intellect holds together or how it can hold together any part’. After soul has been defined, we are told that there is as yet no evidence to show whether intellect is, like some of the other faculties of soul, really inseparable and only logically separable, from the rest, It would seem to be a distinct species of soul and capable of separation, as the immortal from the perishable’. Sensation is of particulars, knowledge of universals, which are in a manner in the soul itself. Hence it is in our power to think whenever we please®, To think is not the same thing as to have sensation, though they were identified by the ancients, who believed both to be corporeal changes". Nor is thinking the same as imagination or as belicf? Imagination leads to action in the lower animals because they have no intellect, and sometimes ἴῃ man when intellect is obscured by passion, discase or sleep*

What conclusions can be drawn from these scattered remarks ? Apparently in one passage we have a choice of alternatives τ cither intellect is without parts (and therefore by the presuppositions of the Aristotelian system must be immaterial and an energy), or it is something continuous, which is, however, continuous only like a number or series, by sequence, and not by coherence, ke a magnitude A bodily organ, which has parts, would alone secure the continuity of coherence; and for such an organ there is, or so Aristotle believed, no evidence. With this agrees the tentative assumption that intellect is something impassive, independent and imperishable, since its decay in the individual is an accident and not its real essence.

The account of intellect in Book IIL, cc. 4—8, is condensed and imperfect and falls far short of the clearness which marks the exposition of sense-perception. Intellect is especially concerned with quiddities and universals. It employs no bodily organ, for of

+ 408 b 18—a9. 4 gtob 1a—15. Yo grab rk.

7 413 Db 24-27. 5 417 b 22 sqq, 9 437 a τῷ Μ}. 7 7 ( 4 427 14. 560. 4298 4-~8,

INTRODUCTION. TI Ixi

the functions of the nervous system Aristotle and his contem- poraries had no idea. It contains a divine element, which is independent of the body and immortal. This summary tells us hardly any more than we have collected from the casual or polemical remarks in the previous part of the treatise. But Aristotle might fairly claim to have set before us his view both of (1) the difference between intellect and sense, and (2) the way in which thinking comes about: and this is all he promised at the outset.

(1) There is an analogy between sense and intellect, there is also a difference. Both furnish knowledge, both pass judgments, both are intermittent, sometimes in act, sometimes not. When in activity both have an object, the transition from the dormant power to its actual exercise does not depend upon sense alone or upon thought alone, and, when the activity is over, the alteration thus undergone leaves intellect absolutely, and sense to a great degree, unaffected. Sensitivity in the abstract is a form which knows or apprehends sensible forms. Similarly intellect is a form which knows or apprehends intelligible forms*. Moreover, in both sensation and intellection alike at the moment of apprehension, there is identity between the form which apprehends and the form which is apprehended. Again, sense-perception is always true of its own appropriate object, and similarly thinking is always true in respect of quiddities®. On the other hand, the external object which stimulates the sense-faculty to activity is an individual, a particular, and it is external to the percipient; whereas the universals, the forms which we think, are present in the understanding, at any rate, of the mature man. Sensation cannot dispense with a bodily organ, a part of the body appropriated to its special functions. For intellect no such organ can be discovered. Yet, when a sense-organ is wanting, the action of intellect is impeded, for all knowledge through that sense is cut off Moreover, excess in the sensible fatigues or destroys the organ of sense, but the activity of thinking cannot be thus impaired. Again, intellect is the higher faculty of the two and implies the lower ; the lower does not imply the higher. For actual thinking the indispensable condition is the presence of a mental image, for, as we saw above, we think of nothing apart from continuity. Even when the object conceived is not itself a quantum, we nevertheless think of it as such. And we never think of objects without thinking them in time®

1 429 a 12 Sq. 2 431 Ὁ 20—432 4 3. 3 430 b 29—31, 433 4 26. * 4324 7 sq. 5 De Mem. τ, 450a 7—9.

Ixil INTRODUCTION. Lf

(2) The process of thinking an object is explained in much the same way as the process of perceiving an object by sense. In spite of the differences stated above, both, as acts of apprehending, are assimilated to the process of reciprocal action between physical bodies. Apprehension is reception of form. If the mind knows objects by receiving them, since nothing receives what it already has, it must be assumed to be at first without them; and further, so long as it remains capable of thinking, the same condition must be fulfilled for every fresh act. Hence intellect must be itmpassive, suffering in no way by the change from power to act and, since it thinks all things or, in other words, is capable of receiving all forms, it must in itself be devoid of any form, though at the same time it “provides room for forms.” It may be called, then, a mere aptitude or capacity to think. Until it actually thinks them, it is none of its objects, but becomes cach object in turn when it thinks that object. In physical action there is a transference of essence or form: in combustion the form of heat is transferred from tire actually alight to combustible fuel. When a white object Is perceived, the form of whiteness is transferred from the object te the eye and, as there is but one such form, is the same in the percipient sense as in the external object. Amd so when we think a stone, a horse, a triangle, the form or essence in our mind, the object of thought, is identically one with the form or essence outside in verum natura. As a contribution to the theory of knowleduc, this explanation is adequate. External things affect our sense, By sense we apprehend hot and cold and whatever other sensible qualitics are accidents of flesh’. We think cach sensible quality, gcneralising and abstracting the universals, of which sense by itself informs us only fer weeidens, The substance in which the attributes inhere, which is said to be indirectly perceived by sense, is directly judged and known by thought.

50° far intellect has been treated as one. It is possible τὸ apply to this unity the analysis which resolves particular things. When nature gencrates or art produces a concrete particular. three conditions are fulfilled. There is the efficient agent transmitting form, there is the passive recipient upon which form is impressed, and there is, lastly, the result of the process, the new particular inte which matter impressed by form has been made. To manufacture a brazen sphere, we need the craftsman with the design in his mind and brass to receive that design, The form of a sphere is

429 b rg—r16.

INTRODUCTION, I Ixill

impressed upon the brass and a new particular is made, precisely as the form of humanity is transmitted from father to son'. Our knowledge and actual thinking answer to the manufactured product, they are generated in the receptive intellect by something which must be assumed in intellect itself to correspond to the efficient cause. That which on one view is the reception of essence, is on another the spontaneous transition from potence toact. This is true of sense. Sense becomes like its object, in quality identical therewith. But it is just as true to say that sense has risen from the lower stage of potence to the higher stage of act and realised itself in full activity. So, again, thinking is reception of the form or essence, but it is just as true to say that intellect has risen from the lower stage of potence to the higher stage of act and realised itself in full activity. Perception, it is true, cannot be explained without assuming interference from without. The occasion which supplies the stimulus to the transition must be something given. With thought it is different. The occasion, the stimulus, are not external, but internal. I may say, if I like, that my potential or passive intellect has been acted upon and educed into actuality : but what brought this about? A mental agent, the active intellect, has called forth this activity and produced the thought. In my individual experience the power to think precedes actual thinking, but the transition cannot be explained except by assuming the prior existence of the efficient cause which brought it about. This point once reached and the unity of intellect being resolved into agent and patient, it follows that the agent which we postulate must have the same attributes as the patient, of which we have experience. It must be separable, impassive and unmixed, because its essence is activity, as the essence of the other factor is poten- tiality. Could it be actually separated and exist independently, it would be eternal. But this eternity is not communicated to the other factor of intellect, or to the intellect as a whole. Is such a hypothesis necessary? Can the potential intellect be affected by external things? So far as these things have matter in them, they are objects of thought only potentially. The intelligible forms are implicit in the sensible forms, and intellect er hypothest has no special bodily organ. But so far as knowable things are pure forms, no such expedient is required. The question, then, why an active’ intellect is introduced, may be thus answered. It is in order to provide a cause of that transition from potence to act

which takes place whenever we actually think. 1 Metaph. 1032 a 12—1033 Ὁ 26,

Ixiv INTRODUCTION. ἡ

The difficulty in understanding what Aristotle did or did not Diverse inter. intend by this analysis of the intellect, or rather this pretations. distinction of the intellect which makes from the intellect which becomes, is notorious. The scanty comments of Theophrastus! develop various lines of acute criticism, which in my judgment are not incompatible with an acceptance of the doctrine. So much is clear, that Theophrastus considered intellect in both tts forms, as making and becoming, to be our human intellect, which ts connatural and in us from birth to death, though its origin is elsewhere. In face of the difficulties which he is at pains to develop he seems content to regard the passive intellect dependent upon the body and the human intellect which results from the union of the passive with the active as in a sense distinct, yet as in another sense one nature, in so far as the two are related to one another as matter and form are in the unitary thing. That the active intellect exists ger se in man independent of the passive ts nowhere stated or implied either by Aristotle or Theophrastus. From a casual criticism by Themistius® it appears that certain of his predecessors had identified the active intellect with the premisses from which all our knowledge is derived and with the knowledge itself which we gradually acquire. Alexander of Aphrodisias*, who cndeavoured to preserve faithfully the teaching of Aristotle and to present it as consistent, distinguished a material intellect ancl an intellect ει A@drin, which the former becomes by actual thinking and reception of the intelligible form. The material intellect is the mere aptitude for thinking: this is a power or faculty of the individual human seul, the form of the body. Lastly, there ts the active intellect which is not a faculty or part of the human soul, though it is in it from birth to death whenever we actually think : not only when we think it or any of the immaterial forms with which it is identical, but also when we think forms in matter, for it is only through the agency of the active intellect that actual thinking is possible. Being wholly immaterial, enerpy devoid of all matter and potentiality, it always is, even when it is not thought by men; it is an eternal, imperishable, self-existent substance. There can be but one such substance: it must conse- quently be identified with the deity, the first cause of motion in the universe, whose nature and essence is activity, the energy of

1 See Appendix, p. 580 sqq. 7 y02, 32 sqq. 11., 189, 17 syq- Sp. This view follows from an extremely one-aided Interpretation of the statement that νοῦς is τὰ νοητά.

8 De An, 80, t6-—g2, 11, Mantissa 106, 19-113, 24.

INTRODUCTION. J ᾿ Ixv

thinking. In individual men it supervenes as something coming in from outside. It finds in the capacity of thinking which does belong to the human soul an instrument ready for its use, upon which it can work and produce actual thinking. As to the reason why men think not always, Alexander has no better explanation to offer than a suggestion of his teacher’, that the craftsman is still a craftsman even when he has laid aside his tools. The eclectic Themistius? refused to identify the active intellect with the deity outside man. He appeals to two expressions of the master (1) “that these differences must be present in the soul,” (2) “this alone is immortal and eternal,’ which he thinks Alexander’s interpretation forces out of their natural meaning. As to (1) Alexander has his own explanation to offer, according to which the active intellect, and therefore the deity, is in our mind whenever we think: but there is some force in the contention that Aristotle would never have described the deity as “alone” immortal and eternal. However, the point in which Themistius agrees with Alexander is more important than the points in which they differ. He fully admits that the active intellect is one and the same in all men, it is distributed among different individuals as light is divided into single rays. Of the other commentators, the Neo-Platonist Simplicius* distorts Aristotle’s account in order, as far as possible, to adapt it to his own philosophical presuppositions. According to him, the rational human soul is one immortal substance, It has three states: in the first it remains in itself; this is the active intellect. In the second it enters the body; it then knows nothing, but is the pure potentiality of thought. Intellect of the first stage acts upon intellect of the second stage, and the result is the third stage, when intellect is iz Aadztu and acquires knowledge. The passive intellect is mortal, because it ceases to be passive and is absorbed in the higher or active intellect. It is not worth while to pursue the course of speculation further among Arabian philoso- phers and the schoolmen, in both of whom the theological bias is unmistakeable. Avicenna‘ was an original thinker who exerted a

1 fJantissa 110, 4 ἤκουσα δὲ περὶ νοῦ τοῦ θύραθεν παρὰ ᾿ἈΑριστοτέλους, ἃ διεσωσάμην κτὸ. If this is not a pleasant fiction, which would be more incongruous in Alexander than the one joke in Thucydides (ὁ λέων γέλασε), we must acquiesce in Zeller’s con- jecture ᾿Αριστοκλέους, Phil, der Gr. 1v.3, p. 785.

2 98, 12—109, 3 H, 181, 3-200, 25 Sp.

3 217, 23 SQq-, 243, [0—245, 2, 246, 10-—-248, 17.

* I have not studied the mediaeval philosophers at first hand. Fox my acquaintance with them I am indebted mainly to Zabarella, Brentano, Psychologie des Aristoteles,

pp- 8 sqq., who gives copious extracts, Ueberweg, Geschichie der Philosophie, Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie.

Ixvi INTRODUCTION. JI

great influence on his successors; but neither his distinction of universals, ate res, in vebus, post ves, nor his doctrine that these universals are at once substantial forms in things outside us and intelligible forms to the mind which thinks them by abstraction has any direct Aristotelian authority, and when he makes both forms alike emanate from the active intellect and ultimately from God, this doctrine becomes nearly akin to that of the Neo-Platonists. Averrocs and Aquinas, though both professing to interpret Aristotle, modify his doctrines to suit their own preconceptions. «s\ccordingr to the former, neither passive intellect nor active intellect is part of the human soul as defined in the definition. In scholastic language each is forma assistens, superveniens and not ferma dans esse homintz. Fach is immortal and each is one and the same in all men. According to Aquinas, active intellect as well as passive intellect is a faculty of the rational human soul, which was created by the will of God and is yet immortal, having the power as form to provide a vehicle for itself after it is separated from its present body. Regarded as interpretations of z\ristotle’s doctrine, these two conflicting views, which clivided the allegiance of the later schoolmen, cannot both be right, but may both be wrong. Aristotle himself was free from the preconceptions of his two commentators : he was not a Moslem mystic nor a Christian theologian.

These successive attempts to fill in the meagre outline presented by the text of De “πέρα proceed mn two directians. Either they make the two intellects two faculties of the human soul, or they seek to identify one, if net both, of them, with an intelligence outside man. Alexander, Averroes, and in modern times, Ravaisson and Renan, have gone to the greatest lengths in the latter direction. ut, if the act of thinking is independent of, or alien to, man’s nature, how can the aptitude for thinking be any longer a part of it? Averroes no doubt is consistent: he declares the passive intellect also to be an immaterial substance ancl ne part of the soul which is the form of the human body. But, in order to maintain this, he is obliged to do violence to the lanyuave of the treatise. In particular, his wzrtus cogtfativa, with which, according to him, the definition of soul endows man, has to be divorced from intellect proper and reduced nearly to the level of sensus connaunis or imagination, Jéven then he is unable to explain why, after the definition of soul has been obtained, it should have been left an open question whether intellect properly so called is or is not a part of the soult, or why it should be designated as a “ part” when

1413 13-26, 41K a τὰ sp

INTRODUCTION. JI Ixvii

at last it comes up for special treatment?, But in fact all views in which human intellect or a part of it is identified with the activity of divine intellect are met by the same insoluble difficulty: what is to be made of the intellect which becomes all things? Modern enquirers are hopelessly divided as to what the passive intellect is. Trendelenburg answers “all the lower faculties in contradistinction to the active intellect?,” Zeller “the sum of those faculties of representation which go beyond imagination and sensible percep- tion and yet fall short of that higher Thought, which has found peace in perfect unity with its object®,” Ravaisson “the universal potentiality in the world of ideas‘,” Brentano ‘“ imagination’,” Hertling “the cognitive faculty of the sensitive part*,”’ and Hammond, if I understand him rightly, “the life of sensation as a potentially rational mass,” “the sum of the deliverances of sense- perception and their re-wrought form in memory and phantasy, regarded as potentiality”.” The last two would seem almost to identify its functions with those of sewsus communis as a judging faculty. Now these various answers do not accord with the description in De Azzma of the process and act of thinking, whether as apprehension of the intelligible object or as the judgment which makes two concepts one; they do not fit either the conception of intellect zz haditu, the process by which knowledge is acquired, or the sharp distinction drawn between a thought and a mental image. Thinking is not the same as receiving or retaining or remembering or judging the percepts of sense, which are all individual and lack the universality required. Abstraction alone renders thought possible, and abstraction cannot be restricted to the active intellect. Again, all the operations of thought imply a single judging power. This position, which Aristotle has maintained for sense, he would certainly maintain as strongly for thought. When he controverts the Protagorean maxim and points out that it must lead to universal relativity, he contends that there is such a thing as absolute existence, a something determinate in itself apart from all relations, for presentation of an object implies a subject to whom the object is presented®. The

1 4294 Io,

3 >. 308: ‘*Omnes illas, quae praecedunt, facultates,in unum quasi nodum collectas, quatenus ad res cogitandas postulantur, νοῦν παθητικὸν dictas esse iudicamus.”’

* Aristotle, 11. Ὁ. 102 Eng. Tr.

4 Essai sur la Métaplysique α Aristote, 1., pp. 586 sqq.: cf. 11., pp. 17, 19.

5 Psychologie, p. 208 sq.

8 Materie τε. Form, Ὁ. 174.

7 pp. lxxxiii sq. 8 Metaph. 1011 a 17-—20.

Ixviil INTRODUCTION. 7

object of thought, then, implies a thinking subject. If these modern interpreters were right in equating the intellect which becomes with one or other of the lower faculties or with the sum of them, then the functions of these faculties would be identical with the function of thought, so far as the intellect becomes all things. But the lower faculties, sense and imagination, never succeed in obtaining an object which is a true universal.

If, however, we vindicate the right to think for the intellect which becomes all objects and is said to be ἐκ Aabitu when it acquires knowledge, it would seem that this can only be done at the expense of the intellect which makes all objects. The functions of the latter are then reduced within the narrowest compass, According to some, it does not really think at all, it does little more than “illuminate” the mental image, thus facilitating the abstrac- tion of the universal form. But Aristotle speaks of its perpetual activity, he says there is no intermission in its thought Yet it is not unreasonable to suppose that determinations so unlike is “pure potentiality” and “incessant activity” refer to the same thing under two different aspects. IJach describes it abstractly, and, to know the whole, the two determinations must be combined, If there is within us a thought which is continuous ancl always in activity, at any rate expericnce does not tell us πὸ" it can only be a conclusion of reason. ILow, then, did Aristotle reconcile this con- clusion with the facts? Apparently he mace this thinkiny latent. The intellect always thinks, but we do not remember. This, then, is what the attribute “ potential” means as applied to the intellect4; and this agrees with the conception of the powers or faculties of the soul in general, which are permanent possessions, all dormant and unconscious, until roused to activity in conscigusness. Tere we may recall a previous use of the antithesis between potential and actual in Aristotle’s account of jinagination. “Phe images or survivals of sensation are not always present to consciousness, yet Aristotle treats them as still in existence; they continue, he says, in the organs of sense, they are potential images while they are dormant, actual iinages when they are revived and reappcur, as we should say, in consciousness’ It may be worth while to hazard the conjecture that the intellect which docs not consciously think is

1 So, at least, I understand 430 a 22.

2 Cf. Anal. Post. 11. τὸν οὐ Ὁ 25 wérepov...al ἕξεις. ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν.

4 Aristotle conceives νοητὰ to be directly presented, much as meuderm paycheh opiate conceive perceptual objects to be directly presented and ty form a perceptual continuum.

Cl. Meflaph. 1087 ἃ 1o-—25. + Cf. 4256 24 8q., De Insomn. ἃ, 460) 2 Βα.7) ἃ, 461 b T1107. See alse p. liii.

INTRODUCTION. JI Ixix

similarly described as potential intellect, and yet all the time its thoughts are there, though its incessant activity is subconscious. It will be seen that, though I do not entirely agree with Wallace, I nevertheless recognise a certain element of truth in his solution of the difficulty. He thus conceives the relation of the two intellects : “the creative reason is the faculty which constantly interprets and as it were keeps up an intelligible world for experience to operate upon, while the receptive reason is the intellect applyine itself in all the various processes which fill our minds with the materials of knowledge.” And again: “the two it must be remembered are not ‘two reasons’: they are merely different modes of viewing the work of reason®.”

In the account of sense and thought, with which we have been Desire and hitherto mainly occupied, the cognitive element is very Volition. prominent. It is natural to infer that our philosopher regards man chiefly on the intellectual side, as a spectator of the universe, a being who contemplates. And this impression would seem to be confirmed when we learn from the E¢h#ics wherein man’s chief good consists. But no Greek could overlook the other side of human nature. The conclusions of the #¢fhkics must be taken in conjunction with the wider gencralisations of the Polzzzcs; and, if the self or ego is identical with intellect, intellect is practical as well as theoretic. The true is in the same class with the good; good, real or apparent, is the goal of all striving and effort. With his teleological bias, Aristotle would have endorsed the words of a modern psychologist*: “ Looking broadly at the progress of life, as it ascends through the animal kingdom and onwards through the history of man, it secms safe to say that knowledge is always a means to ends, is never an end by itself—till at length it becomes interesting and satisfying in itself. Psychologically, then, the sole function of perception and intellection is to guide action and

{ p. xeviil.

2 p.cxv. Wallace was not alone in holding that Aristotle never intended to afhrm two distinct intellects, but only to distinguish two phases or aspects of the one intellect. A similar view is maintained on very different grounds by Bullinger, Wzs-ZLekhre, pp. 3489q., and by Mr F. Granger, Class. Kev. V1. pp. 298—301, who states it as follows: ‘‘the reason is passive and affected by corporeal conditions, so far as it uses the φαντάσματα, grasping the εἴδη from among them. It is purely active only when it concerns itself with vonrd, among which itself is included.” Cf. Brandis, Gesch. der Antw. τ. Ὁ. 518, Handbuch, ul. Ὁ, 1178. Kampe and Grote came to the conclusion that intellect, though separable from the human body, is not separable from body in general. They affirm that it has for its necessary substratum the ether, the most divine of the elements: Kampe, Lrkenntiisstheorte, pp. 12—49, Grote, Aristotle, U. p. 220 sqq. See, however, Zeller,

Aristotle, 11. Ὁ. 95, π. 2, Eng. Tr. ® Professor James Ward, Znc. Brit., Article on Psychology, p. 56.

H. é

Ixx INTRODUCTION. 72

subserve volition—more generally, to promote self-conservation and betterment.” In De οἱ ριΐμα, a professedly biological treatise, with the soul in all living things for its subject, this part of the enquiry is not pushed far’. The main outlines are given, but we must look elsewhere, and particularly to the £7¢/zcs, for further details. The problem is presented in a very simple fashion. In the animal world motion, in the sense of locomotion, is an all-pervading fact, and but slight observation suffices to show that this motion ts not random or irregular, but is directed to an end. To what power or faculty, then, is it to be ascribed? The nutritive faculty, Aristotle thinks, sufficiently accounts for movements of growth and decay, whether in animals or plants, but not for the progressive move- ments of animals, movements prompted by want and directed ta an end. If the nutritive faculty were sufficient to produce such movements, Aristotle adds with unconscious irony, plants would move spontaneously and would have organs adapted for the purpose. Nor can these movements be explained as due to the sensitive faculty, since there are whole genera of perfectly-developed animals of a low type which do not move from place to place. But if locomotion were implied in sensation, they, too, would have organs adapted for locomotion. Is intellect, then, the cause of which we are in search, as Plato thought? No. Intellect is etther theoretical or practical. The former fssues no command as to what we should avoid or pursue and, although the latter does issue such commands, they are not necessarily obeyed. The analogy of the arts, too, shows that, in order to produce action, something else is required beyond the mere knowledge of what is to be pursued or avoided. Shall we say, then, that there are two motives to action, (1) desire and (2) the intellect which calculates means to ends, the place of which latter in animals devoid of reason is taken by imagination? If so, how are the two connected? Desire ts always of an end, and this end is the starting point for the calcula- tions of the practical intellect. Intellect and desire, then, are connected by the ultimate unmoved movent, the end of action. It is this which stirs desire, while intellect, assuming that the end can be realised, calculates the steps towards its attainment. Thus the physician whose aim is to cure an apue assumes this to be done, just as if he were trying to solve a geometrical problem, ancl then reasons backwards from the patient's recovery to the normal temperature which this implies, from the normal temperature to the production of heat or cold, and from that to some remedy at 1 See Book 111, ce. Q—-11.

INTRODUCTION. I Ixxi

his command; and thereupon, having reached the end of his calculations, he proceeds to act. Hence the statement that there are two motives to action calls for qualification. Had there been two, they would have had some common character, but as a matter of fact intellect is never a motive apart from desire. On the other hand, desire does sometimes move to action in spite of reason. Desire is thus found in all forms of mental life. In reason it is rational wish, but there are also irrational desires, anger and appetite, or mere desire of pleasure. In fact, an appetitive faculty must be assumed in which Plato’s anger and appetite are both included, and Aristotle says quite fairly that the soul may be divided into many faculties, any two of which are more distinct than these two of Plato. Wherever in the animal world there is sense-perception, there is also the feeling of pleasure and pain. The pleasurable prompts desire, the painful aversion, and the survival of sense-impressions, which is imagination in its lowest form, can prompt to desire no less than the present object in the moment of perception. For the intellect images take the place of present sensation. A conflict of desires may arise, for though reason will judge correctly, anger or appetite may be blinded. They may take apparent good for real good, or they may interpret good as the pleasure of the moment. Every desire, whether rational or irrational, implies a corresponding image of the object desired. Hence a distinction between images, according as they proceed wholly from sense (and this class of images alone belongs to irrational animals) or proceed from reason, calculation; in fact, deliberation. This latter class of images is peculiar to man. Yet even in man in the abnormal state of incontinence the irrational desire gets the better of reason and controls action. In order to ex- press the antecedents of action, whether of the normal or abnormal kind, Aristotle resorted to the analogy of the syllogism. From a universal major premiss and a particular minor a conclusion is inferred. For example, all men should take exercise, Callias is a man, exgo Callias should take exercise. His taking exercise is regarded as an inference from the premisses. It resembles the conclusion of a syllogism just in so far as a particular case is brought under a general rule. But this way of looking at the matter by no means ensures rational action or justifies the assump- tion that the intellect always calculates correctly, for incontinence has a syllogism of its own. For example, all sweet things are to be tasted, this thing before me is sweet: then, if you have the power and are not hindered, you cannot but at once put the conclusion € 2

Ixxii INTRODUCTION. I

(this is to be tasted) into practice. In this way the triumph of the irrational impulse and the sacrifice of the permanent good to the pleasure of the moment may equally be considered to bring a particular case under a general rule. In other words, although reason has a natural right and ought to prevail, experience shows that it is not always effective, even in beings endowed with reason, who look before and after, When tmpulsive action has) been distinguished from deliberative and we are dealing with the latter only, since purpose is desire following upon deliberation, if the purpose is to be all it should be, both the calculation or reasoning must be truce and the desire right, and the very same things must be assented to by the reason and pursued by the desire’.

In the foregoing sketch I have been content to let -\rtstotle speak for himself, piecing together various utterances and putting the best construction [ could on what is obscure and eniematical in them, but refraining as a rule from criticism. Obviously he studied psychology as a philosopher and was chiefly interested in it as it bore upon philosophical problems. Ife exalted the cocnitive element, while his treatment of the emotions and the will fs wholly inadequate, even if the έτος and the Afetorre be called in to redress the balance. It is now contended that the sefence οὗ psychology, which has made vast strides since these humble be- ginnings, must be based exclusively upon individual expertenee and be made independent of physiology. Whatever can be set down to the credit of Aristotle as a psychologist rests upon the Opposite assumptions. He approached his subject from the psychophysical standpoint, as it is called; he had his own repre- sentative theory of perception, his own account of the vradual ascent from sense, through memory, to science and reason Ee could not escape the errors and confusion incident to such assumip- tions, if after all they are not ultimately valid. Thus we are brought face to face with grave metaphysical problems. But this is not the place to examine Aristotle's system as a whole. and without such an examination it is impossible to do justice cither to his theory of knowledge or to the treatise on the seul,

1 hth. Nie. w39 0 2a~-26,

INTRODUCTION. II. THE TEXT.

The text of De Anima rests mainly on the authority of a single good manuscript, cod. Parisiensis 1853, better known by the symbol E, given it by Bekker. Trendelenburg’, p. xvi, describes it thus; saeculi decimi, membranaceus, eleganter et perspicue scriptus, vocibus non seiunctis sed inter se ligatis. Torstrik adds, p. viii: In co igitur codice qui sunt de Anima libri duabus manibus scripti sunt, antiquissimis, elegantissimis, simillimis, sed duabus. Book L, Book Π1|. and the fragments of a recension or paraphrase of Book 11., different from the vulgate (see pp. 164 sqq. zz/ra), are in the same hand as the /’4ysics, which cod. E also contains, and have 38 lines to the page. Book II. in a complete form and’in practically the same recension as all other manuscripts present is the work of another hand and has 48 lines to the page. Cod. E has been scrutinised by Bekker, Trendelenburg, Bussemaker, Pansch, Tors- trik, Bichl, Stapfer and Rodier. For further information respecting its peculiaritics I refer my readers to Trend.! pp. viii, xxiii—xliii, Trend. pp. vi, xiv—xviii, Torstrik pp. ii, vili—xv, Stapfer, Stadza zzz Aristotelis de anima libros collata, especially pp. 4—13. In Book ΣΤ. cod. EF is mutilated, one leaf, which should have come between fol. 200 and fol. 201, is missing: it doubtless contained upon its 76 lines the text from 430a 24 μνημονεύομεν to 431 b 16 ἐκεῖνα, or 84 of Bekker’s lines. Further, the last leaf is also wanting, which should have contained from 434a 31, the -θὲν of μηθέν, to the end, 435 b 25, or about 86 of Bekker’s lines. The loss of these two leaves is serious, but is in some measure compensated by the fact that for the whole of Book III. we have cod. L, Vaticanus 253, presenting a text which agrees more closely with that of cod. E than with that of the other extant manuscripts. Cod. L, which contains only the third book of De Anima, is described by Trend.?, p. ix, as follows: codex chartaceus, foliis quaternis minoribus, satis recens, cuius librarius interdum scripturae compendia male in- tellexit. Hauthalius codicem bombycinum perspicue et diligenter

Ixxiv INTRODUCTION. If

scriptum saeculi XIV esse litteris nobis significavit. A lectionum praestantia (saepius enim cum vetustissimo codice (I) consentit) antiquior quam recentior esse videatur.

Besides codd. E and 1. Bekker collated six other codices of later date, which he indicated by the symbols STUVWi. To these in what follows I shall give the name of the S-X group. The six have, so far as know, never been scrutinised or collated by anyone since Bekker. Torstrik consulted the manuscript materials (pre- served in the Royal Library of Berlin), which Bekker collected for his edition, and was thus enabled from Bekker's own evidence to correct a few errors in Bekker’s report of the readings of cod. 5, as of cod. E (Torstrik, p. vii sq.: ef. PAidolagus XU. 3, pp. 494— 530, XIIL 1, pp. 204——206). The conclusion which Stapfer! reached after carcful study was that without a fresh collation of these six inferior codices the question of their mutual relationship and pedigree could not be definitely settled, but that the result of such a fresh collation would not be worth the trouble expended upon it (Kvitésche Studicn su dristoteles Schrift vou der Seele, pp. 33 84.) What is certain is that, while codd. HI. go back te one common archetype, those belonging to the S-X group go back to another and a different common archetype, This result is established as follows:

(A) Cod. FE has two lacunae, each, 1 conjecture, a line of its archetype, which the other six codices supply. These lacunae are 405b 25 sq. ἄλλο, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοίως ἕν τὶ τούτων and 425 Ὁ 30 6. τότε κυἡ Kar’ ἐνέργειαν ἀκοὴ ἅμα γίνεται καὶ ὁ. Further, cod. E in 44 several places omits a single particle, an article, adjective, noun or verb, or even two (and once three) words, which are supplied by the group S-X. On the other hand, there are 22 cases where cod. Τὸ has a slightly fuller text than the S-X group, the latter having omitted most frequently a particle, sometimes ἃ noun or verb, and twice a couple of words (ὁμοίως δὲ 426 ἃ 31, ὁ νοῦς 420 Ὁ 13).

(Β) When we come to classify the readings in which ec. αὶ differs? from the S-X group, we sometimes find (1) a different word or (2) a different inflexion of the same word. The following are instances. In all cases the reading put first is the reading of cod. E, that put second is the reading of the S-X group, while

1 Tn all that follows upon the relationship of the manuscripts to each other Tam

largely indebted to Stapfer's two pamphlets. # I mean the first hand of cod. E. See below as to the corrections.

INTRODUCTION. II lxxv

the words within brackets denote variants in some of the six manuscripts of the S-X group.

(1) 4028 26 μόνον : μᾶλλον, 4038 19 σημεῖον : μηνύει, 403 Ὁ 12 ὅσα : ὁπόσα, 406 ἃ 10 δισσῶς : διχῶς, 407a 19 ἤ : καί, 409b 9 μιυ- Kpas ᾿σμικράς, 409b 11 ταύτας : αὐτάς, 410a 7 ἐνεῖναι: εἶναι, ἀτο ἃ 25 τεῖ τί, ΔΙῸ 18 πάσης : ἁπάσης, 411. ἃ 30 αὔξη : αὔξησις, 426b 2 λιπαρά: πικρά, 427 Ὁ 11 ταὐτό: τὸ αὐτό, 4284 14 ἐνεργῶς : ἐναργῶς, 428 b 3 ποδιος: ποδιαῖος, 428 Ὁ 15 αὐτῆς :αὐτη, 428 Ὁ 16 κατὰ ταύ- τὴν KAT αὐτήν, 4290a9 διότε: διὰ τί, 429 4 14 ὅτε: τι", 432 bg αὔξην Ἐ, (Trend.), αὔξειν Βὶ (Bek.) : αὔξησιν, 432 Ὁ 27 ἐκείνων : κινῶν, 4334 18 ὀρεκτόν : ὀρεκτικόν, 4348. 3 λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχονσα : λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα, 4348 14 ἐνῇ : γένηται.

(2) 4020 4 μόνον : μόνης, 402 Ὁ 6 ἑκάστην : ἕκαστον (ἕτερον), 402} ὃ κατηγορεΐται" : κατηγοροῖτο, 403 29 ὁρίσαιντο : ὁρίσαιτο, 405a ὃ ἀποφαινόμενος : ἀπτοφηνάμενος, 406a 18 ὑπάρχει : ὑπάρξει, 406 Ὁ 23 ταῦτα ταὐτά : τοῦτ᾽ αὐτό (ποτε), 407 ἃ II μορίῳ : τῶν μορίων, 407 ἃ 26 ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπόδειξις : αἱ δ᾽ ἀποδείξεις, 408 Ὁ 34 ἴδια: ἐδίᾳ, 409b 7 τοῖς σώμασι : τῷ σώματι, 410b 6 γνωρίζει : γνωριεῖ, 411 12 ἡ ψυχή: τὴν ψυχήν, 424 Ὁ 27 ἐκλυπεῖν : ἐκλείπειν, 425b 1 yorny ὅτι: ὅτι χολή, 426 Ὁ 4 ἄγεται: ἄγηται, 428 Ὁ τό ὑπάρχει: ὑπάρ- yew, 428 Ὁ 20 διαψεύσασθαι : διωψεύδεσθαι, 428 Ὁ 30 ἔχοι : ἔχει, 4308 2 γιγνομένη : γεγνομένης, 420 Ὁ 23 ἀπαθής : ἀπαθές, 4308 II ἐκεῖνο : ἐκεῖνα, 431 Ὁ 25 δυνάμεις : τὰ δυνάμει, 4328 7 αἰσθανόμενον : αἰσθανόμενος, 432 a 12 sq. φάντασμα : φαντάσματα, 4328 27 ταύτας: ταῦτα, 16. φανεῖται : φαίνεται (φαίνονται), 432 1 τό: τῷ.

(3) Where the words are the same in cod. E as in the other six codices, the order is sometimes different. The following are instances: 4048 5 τῆς ὅλης φύσεως στοιχεῖα λέγει : στουχεῖα λέγει τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, 4044 28 ψυχὴν ταὐτόν : ταὐτὸν (τὴν) ψυχήν, 406 b 32 κύκλους δύο: δύο κύκλους, 407 Ὁ 2 ἂν κινοῖτο : κινοῖτο ἄν, 4τι Ὁ 21 μὴ καὶ : καὶ μή, 4288 7 ὑπάρχοντος τούτων : τούτων ὑὕπάρ- χοντος, 4298 25 τίς γὰρ ἄν : γὰρ ἄν τις, ἐδ. ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός : θερμὸς ἢ ψυχρός, 430a 18 ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμυγής : ἀμυγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής, 4308 τῷ δ᾽ αὐτό : αὐτὸ δ᾽, 431 Ὁ 21 ἐστι. πάντα γὰρ ἤ : ἔστι πάντα. ἢ γάρ, 432 Ὁ 30 διώκειν ἡ φεύγειν : φεύγειν ἢ διώκειν, 433 8 Ο ταῦτα δύο: δύο ταῦτα, 4338. 27 κινεῖ μέν : μὲν κινεῖ, 433 Ὁ 18 κίνησις ὄρεξις : ὄρεξις κίνησις.

1 Stapfer’s statement (A7vit. Siud., p, 21) “Ero STUVWX ὅτι" will mislead no one. By a similar inadvertence he has (p. 23) interchanged the authorities for 403 a 29 ὁρίσαιντο and ὁρίσαιτο.

2 See Stapfer, Stwd., p. 5.

Ixxvi INTRODUCTION. ΜΝ

From the instances given under (A) we may at once conclude that neither any single manuscript of the group S-X nor their common archetype was copied from cod. EF, but we cannot directly infer that cod. E was not copied from the archetype of group S-X, for the omissions in cod. E, even the larger ones, are acci- dental. But the passages adduced under (B) sufficiently prove that cod. E is independent of the archetype of the group S-X. Chance might account for two or three or even a dozen variations, but not for 50. There can be no connexion between cod, EH and the archetype of the group S-X.

But had the six manuscripts of the group S-X a common archetype? Yes: not because of the common omissions, which are few and insignificant, but because of such variants as the following: 403a 19 σημεῖον : μηνύει, the transposition of 4oga 5 already noticed, 425 1 χολὴν ὅτι : ὅτε χολή, 426b 2 λιπαρὰ: πικρά, 4344 3 λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν ἔχουσα : λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα. Taken singly, the manuscripts of the group S-X are full of mistakes. There are inany cases where they diverge frem cach other in all manner of ways; but, as soon as we get a reaclings or arrangement of the words which presents a noteworthy differ- ence from that of cod. If, they all agree. In fact, it has been proposed to use a fresh symbol for the agreement of the proup S-X, as opposed to cod. FE.

But can we say how the manuscripts of the group S-X are related to each other? For example, in 403b 2 UX have εἶδος, ST VW ὁ δὲ or ὅδε. Possibly the genuine tradition of the arche- type may have come down to us in the numerical minority of the representatives of the group. It may be that four of the six represent one lost codex of equal value with the remaining twe. Let us consider, besides 403 Ὁ 2 just mentioned, where UX have εἶδος, ST V, like E, ὁ δὲ and ΚΝ ὅδε, 402a τὸ ἀπόδειξίς τίς, where τίς is omitted, not only by TU W Χ, but also by E; 403 b 26 δυοῖν TU, δυεῖν Εἰ, δνσὶ SVWX; 40o4gb 31 ἀσωμάτους XK, ἀσωμάτοις ESTUVW; 4054 If λεπτομέρειαν corr. E and T, μικρομέρειαν pr. EUVWX, pixporerrropépecav S; 408 Ὁ ὃ τὸ V, τῷ reliqui codd.; 410a 6 γένοντο TVW, ἀγένοντο ES UX; 410b 30 δὲ TWX anel corr. E, δὴ reliqui codd.; 425a2 τοῦ δι’ TW, τοῖν L,om ES UV Κα; 426 a 1 εἴπειεν T W, εἴποιεν EH L, εἴπτου y, φήσειεν SUV X; g29b 13 ἔχοντυ TW X,om. EL SUV; 429b 20 ἄλλο ἘΝ X, ἄλλῳ reliqui codd.; 431 Ὁ 27 τὸ TW, room. ELSUVX; 432a5 ἐν TWX, ἐν om.E LS UV; 433b τό sq. τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν TW X, room. EL SUV.

INTRODUCTION. II Ixxvii

Cod. T and cod. W almost universally go together in the third book.

Another circumstance confirms the conclusion that the six manuscripts of the group S-X are derived from a common arche- type. After cod. E had been copied, it was subjected to much revision and many corrections were entered, either between the lines or in the margin. A great number of these, which on palaco- graphical grounds are attributed to a second hand, agree in the main with the readings of the S-X group. Hence it may be inferred that the reviser, whether the original scribe or someone clsc!, collated cod. E with a manuscript which, whether it was or was not the archetype of the group S-X, agreed generally with the clistinctive readings of that group. In other words, corr. E agrees in the main with the manuscripts of the group S-X where they differ from the first hand? of E. Let us assume, then, that the text of Books I. and 111, has come down by two independent traclitions. The variations in Book 11. are of minor importance, whether because, as Torstrik supposed, cod. E in the second Book follows a different authority from that which it follows in the other two Books, or because the two traditions never diverged to the same extent in this Book as in the others. It cannot be claimed that cither is infallible. To begin with (A) omissions and insertions: if we examine the several instances in detail, the presumption is that the omissions are due to carelessness. The good manuscript E has this peculiarity in common with the late manuscript P? of the Politics, that it is apt to omit small words. It would be absurd to prefer a text which omitted 403a 6 δέ, 4038 18 γάρ, 407b 9 γε (cf. 407 b 32, 409 a 30), 408b 15 οὔσης, 408 Ὁ 19 οὖσα,

1 In Books 1. and wu. Stapfer distinguishes three hands E, ἘΞ, E*, admitting that ἘΞ is hardly to be distinguished from E and that Ἐδ is the same hand in which Book 11. is copied: ‘Kae igitur [correctiones] plurimae inveniuntur in primo et tertio libro, aliquot in secundo. Alterius vero manus scriptura proxime accedit ad prioris manus similitudinem. Etenim ab utrius calamo manaverit scriptura, solum cognosci potest cum ex aliarum quarundam litterarum forma, tum ex diphthongo “ει facillime concluditur..,Accedit, ut secunda manus aliquoties litteras radendo, prior nonnisi expungendo deleat. Tertiae vero manus litterarum ductus idem stint ac librarii secundi libri” (Stapfer, Szvaia, p. 4).

2 See Stapler, ἄγη Stud. p. 34: * Derselbe [der Archetypus von ST ὃν W ΧῚ gilt allgemein fiir verloren. Auch ich war dieser Ansicht, bis eingehendere Studien tiber die Korrekturen in E mich belehrien, dass die von zweiter Hand nach keiner anderen

Vorlage gemacht sein kinnen als nach diesem Archetypus. Die Griinde hieftr sind teils

palivgraphischer, teils kritischer Natur.” 3 Since ΕἾ is of the tenth century, P4 of the fifteenth, it is quite possible that the

archetype from which Demetrius Chalcondylas derived his copy may have deserved the censure which Newman passes upon it, vol. 11, Ὁ. lvii, 111. p. vil sq., Class. Kev. VII.

Ῥ- 305-

Ixxviii INTRODUCTION. Il

429b 21 dpa, 430a 4 ἡ before θεωρητική (cf. 431b 29, 432a 15, bis, Ὁ 28, 433b 4), 431 Ὁ 24 εἷς, 432b 13 Ti, 433b 31 «at: and these omissions are doubtless duc to the same haste or care- lessness which has mangled the text by curtailment in 400 ἃ 10, 428 Ὁ 7, 428 Ὁ 3 sq., 432 a 2, as well as by the longer lacunae already enumerated. Only three times does it appear that cod. FE is un- doubtedly right in its omissions; 426b 1, 429b 8, 433b 3. For my part, though I have not had the courage of my opinion, 1 think that in 428b 2 φαίνεται δέ ye καὶ ψευδῆ is an improvement?: while, if we compare 433a 9 with 433a 17, two passages which ought to be similarly worded, the balance of probability surely inclines to the supposition that in both the scribe of FE. or of its archetype is at his old trick of omitting a small word, even though in the former passage all our other sources join in the error, On the other hand, cod. IX seems redundant in 407b 24, 411 b 4. 24), 425b 3, 429b 11, 13 (zs), 16: and that this, too, is due to care- lessness is very evident in the dittography of ἁ δεὸ καὶ 425 b 3 and the impossible article in 429b 16. (133) aN comparison, again, of the variations which depend either upon a different word (ea. 403 ἃ 19 σημεῖον : μηνύει) or a different inflexion of the same word shows that, although I. is undoubtedly the best manuscript, it has no decisive superiority over the common archetype of the τὸν proup. The text printed in this edition, which differs very little from Torstrik and still less from Biehl, agrees in this respect 23 times with cod. Ie against the S-X group and 29 times with the latter against cod. Fe, On the other hand, out of 15 instances where the same words are differently arranged in cod. KE and in the S-X group, I follow my predecessors in preferring the order of cod. EF 12 times and the order of the S-X group only 3 times, viz. 411 b 21, 4334 9, 433b 18: though, as will be seen from my note on the last passage, I incline to think that there also the order given by cod. E may have been that of the original text. Bich] himself, who of all editors adhered most closely to cod. E, sometimes departed from it, and I have gone still further in this directicn, as in 4028 12, 4028 19, 403b 17, 4078 26, 27, 408 a 21, 415 ἃ £7, 418 Ὁ 22, 4208 4, 427 ἃ 14, 428b 4, 431 b 25, 26, 431 b27. On the other hand, I return to the reading of cod. E in 4o4b τος 4138 298q., 4268 27, 433 Ὁ 17.

Two other manuscripts have been collated since Bekker com- pleted his labours. The one is Parisiensis 2034, collated by

* To the lemma of Philoponus sos, 15 I attach little value for reasons given below.

LNTRODUCTION. JIT Ixxix

Trendelenburg and called by him P. Belger, however, preferred to denote it by y and has been followed by subsequent editors. It offers many peculiarities, which may sometimes be due to conjectural emendation or to the arbitrary selection of a scribe who was acquainted with the variations in older manuscripts. The other is Vaticanus 1339, from which Rabe published a collation of the second Book in 1891. Its symbol is P. Besides certain essays by Alexander of Aphrodisias! and his own treatise De Azuma, in which he follows the lines of Aristotle’s, we have two paraphrases, one by Themistius and one by Sophonias. These are not, however, entirely paraphrase: a large proportion of commentary is interspersed. We have also two commentaries, one by Simplicius, the other ostensibly by Philoponus. Hayduck, who has re-edited Philoponus, inclines to think (p. v) that the commentary on Book III. is not by the same author as that upon Books I. and I1., and attributes it conjecturally to Stephanus, the author of the extant commentary on Περὶ ἑρμηνείας. Four of these writers go back centuries beyond our oldest manuscript. Alexander lived at the end of the second century A.D., Themistius belongs to the latter half of the fourth, while Simplicius and Phi- loponus were contemporaries in the reign of Justinian in the sixth century. Of Sophonias Fabricius’ says: “Quis ille Sophonias fuerit et quando vixerit, non liquet.” But an extant manuscript of his paraphrase is of the thirteenth or fourteenth century. The writings of Alexander, including his lost commentary on De Anima, were used by all his successors, and Simplicius and Philoponus betray an acquaintance with Themistius’. So far, then, the sug- gestion of a continuous tradition among the commentators of Aristotle may be readily admitted. But with Alexander our stream of tradition stops: a gap of five centuries separates him from Aristotle and Theophrastus. It is a perfectly gratuitous assumption that these later commentators represent the unbroken tradition of the Peripatetic School‘, especially as Alexander is the

1 viz. those collected in pp. ro1—r150 of the AZazrissa (formerly known as the second book of his De Anima), also’ Amoplat καὶ λύσεις I. 2, 8, 11a, τα’ 17, 26, 11. 2, 8, 9, 10, 24, 25, 26, 27, 111. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, llept κράσεως καὶ αὐξήσεως, pp. 213 sqq., ed. Bruns.

2 As cited by Trend.%, Ὁ. xi.

8 Simpl. 151, 14, Philop. 408, 25; 409, 33 410, I. 353; 418, 25; 450, 9. 19; 508,203 514, 29. Cf. also Priscianus Lydus, Proven. Solutionun, 42, 18.

4 Rodier, vol. 1. p. ii: ““En Hsant ces commentaires, on s’apergoit bientét que ceux qui les ont dcrits possédaient, pour l’exégése d’Aristote, des traditions qui remontaient jusqu’a ses disciples immédiats,”’

Ixxx INTRODUCTION. Il

only one of them who can be reckoned as a genuine Peripatetic. For the interpretation and criticism of Aristotle in the earlicst days of the school our only authority is Priscianus Lydus, a con- temporary of Simplicius and Philoponus, who wrote Jletaphrasis iz Theophrastum. A portion of this is preserved and was edited by Bywater for the Supplementuim cl ristotelscum.

What aid, then, do these testimonia furnish to the text? From the nature of the case they must be subsidiary to ancient manu- scripts. A paraphrast may indeed be content to repeat his author without change, as Themistius frequently does. But his main object is to render the meaning clear, and the freedom with which, in the pursuance of this object, he varies either the actual words or the arrangement of the words and sentences of his author must, even under the most favourable circumstances, render him a very unsafe guide to the reconstruction of the text. If anyone thinks this a harsh judgment, let him consider what sort of an idea we should have of the text of this treatise, supypesing the manuscripts and commentaries had been lost and only Themistius and Sopho- nias preserved. The problem of determining what text or texts the paraphrast had before him is analogous to the problem) of determining the reading of. the manuscript or manuscripts used by William of Moerbeke when he made his Latin translation. We never can be sure that the paraphrast or translator confined him- self to a single manuscript. In the particular case of Sophonias, however, the difficulty of this problem is greatly diminished. The attention bestowed upon him by Trendelenbury, Torstrik, }layduek and Stapfer! has established this result, that his paraphrase agrees more nearly with cod. IX than with any other of our manuscripts. The case of Themistius, Simplicius and Philopouus is different. A. study of the critical notes in this edition will show that their evidence, such as it is, favours sometimes cod. EK and at other times the readings of the S-X group. Sometimes, as may be seen from my notes on 4208 4, the words of Themistius suggest one reading, but can be shown to be in all probability an intentional variation upon the other. The evidence to be obtained from the commentaries of Simplicius and Philoponus must in cach case be weighed independently of the prefixed lemma. I heartily endorse the judgment of Torstrik, p. vi: Philoponi ct Simplicii ῥητά nullius sunt momenti. He adds: pertinent enim ad deterioris

1 Studia, py. th—~23.

INTRODUCTION. II Ixxxt

familiae codices: licebatque eos negligere uno excepto loco Sed quum in Philoponi commentario passim natarent quaedam ῥητά antiquiora et librariorum errore cum ipsa interpretatione com- mixta, haec exscripsi...duabus de causis: primum quod habent quaedam bona: deinde ne nocerent: possunt enim facile pro iis haberi quae ipse Philoponus apud Aristotelem legerit. It is by no means certain that the lemma comes from the commentator at all: at most, he was probably content for brevity to indicate the first words and the last, with ἕως τοῦ interposed, or the first words followed by καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, a practice which may still occasion- ally be detected in Simplicius, eg. zz Phys. 50, 5; 113, 20; 114. 233 440, 18; 935, 21; 1220, 27; De Antma 71, τι sq.; 76, 13; 93,15; 99, 5; 163, 27: 192, 22; cf. Philop. 431, 30. Subsequent copyists would expand the lemma! and piously supply the missing words from the best text of Aristotle available, without paying much regard to the incications of the commentary appended. This may be illustratecl by a comparison of the Aldine editions of Simplicius and Philoponus with those recently edited by Hayduck. Trincavellus took his lemma with almost unfailing regularity from the Aldine edition of Aristotle. This fact is many times admitted by HTaycduck in the course of his critical apparatus. See, 6g., 315, 8; 374, 14; 388, 11; 394, 335 423, 25; 425,1; 441, 12; 451,29; 461,13 467,25; 473, 30; 483,17; 492, 22; 498, 12; 505, 15; 513, 21; 530, 28; 533, 14; 553,175 562, 5; 569,25; 606, 3. But the same thing is true of scores of passages where Hayduck has not pointed out the dependence of Trincavellus upon the Aldine, eg., Philop. 179, 27 καὶ om.; 181, 10 δέ; 189, 8 παραλογώτερον ; 189, 28 ὠπολαβεῖν; 76. wepl insert.; 192, 14 τῇ οτὰ.; 210, 26 ὕλη; 236, 14 καὶ ὥσπερ; 236, ι5 οὕτω Kal; 237,27 καὶ πότερον μόρια; 260, 4 δὲ τὸ; 200, 26 τὰ μέν; 263, 25 λόγον; 267, 18 τῶν ἐν τοῖς ξῶσεν ὄμγων; 273, 34 ἔστι δέ; 274, 25 ἡ ψυχή; 283, 21 ἔτι τροφή πάσχει TL; 284, 30 ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐδέ; 320, 2 ὅτε Om.; 345, 31 δὲ καί; 423, 26 ἔκδηλον; 477, 3 54. μέν, ὅταν ἄγηται, εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀμευγῆ ὄντα ὥγεται εἷς; 524, τῷ αὐτοῦ; 585, 17 post κινοῦν add. πρώτως. In all these cases the reading indicated must have come from the Aldine edition. It is not known from any manuscript of De Antma. Besides these differences, wherever the Aldine edition presents a peculiar order of words, this order is adopted by Trin- cavellus for the lemma of Philoponus. Asulanus made a similar use of the Aldine Aristotle for his edition of Simplicius, as may

1 Trincavellus certainly did this. See Hayduck’s critical notes on Philop. 211, 9; 288, 223 204, 103 461, 1,

Ixxxil INTRODUCTION. Lf

be seen from such instances as Simpl. 11, 1; 16, 31; 23, 1; 72, 17; 82,13; 271, 11. It is reasonable to infer that the same thing had been done before. For, even when the interference of the Aldine Aristotle is excluded, as it is in Hayduck’s edition, lemma and in- terpretation are not always completely in accord. See for example Philop. 247, 13; 303, 31; 461, 1, where Hayduck has adapted the lemma to suit the interpretation (as he has also done e.g. 475, 28; 534,173 574,23); 553,17. Compare also 45, 16 σώματος with 46, 5 τοῦ σώματος; 186, 22 with 186, 24; 241, 16 with 241, 21 and 261, 15; 315, 7 with 315, 10; 348, 9 with 348, 10; 377, 32 with 378, τ; 425, 1 with 425, 22; 493,15 with 493,17; 560, 23 with 560, 26. The same tendency is seen in Themistius, and the last editor, Heinze, may be within his rights in altering the words or the order of the words in the paraphrase, in spite of his manuscripts, to ensure consistency with the context as a whole. Two notable instances are Them. 116, 18, where Heinze has substituted τῶλλα for ταῦτα, and Them. 58, 9 sq., where the alteration affects the order of the words, The commentators, then, as distinct from their copyists, are only to be held responsible for those variants which they cither distinctly attest by διττὴ ἡ γραφὴ and the like or cite verdatine in the course of their interpretations. Even then caution is needed, since Philoponus is not alone in using φησὶν for a paraphrase and alteration of the Aristotclian text, much as Froude may be said to have violated the sanctity of inverted! commas when he printed between them his own abstracts of the documents he cited. AI] beyond this is matter of inference, often no doubt correct, but seldom sufficiently strong to stifle a feeling of uneasiness and uncertainty. For the rest, the readings of Simplicius and Philoponus, and indeed of Alexander and Plutarch in the few cases where we have information about them, do net seem uniformly to favour either cod. FE oor the S-N group. A few instances of bad readings are appended. In 431 a 24 Simpli- cius read ὁμογενῆ: if he had consulted Philuponus §61, 6 sq. he might have found the right reading, μὴ ὁμογενῆ. In giGh 27 Alexander and Simplicius read κω οῦν μόνον with the S-X group, while cod. KH hag the support of Themistius and Sephonias, Vhile- ponus knew both readings (288, 10 5.) Where the manuscripts leave us in the lurch, it is seldom that a commentator helps us out, as Simplicius undoubtedly does in 403 b 12 by reading 7, not 7, and in 431a23 by reading ὄν, not ὅν, It is very sivnificant that in both these cases the change required is a change of breathing, which would not be indicated in an uncial manuscript or older

INTRODUCTION. II Ixxxili

kind of papyrus. The reader of an ancient book understood as no modern can the meaning of the line νοῦς op7 καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τἄλλα κωφὰ Kai τυφλά!. On the other hand compare 431 a II, where Simplicius prefers 7 to the 7 which is presented (rightly, as I think) by Philoponus. Again, the right sense could some- times be got out of a bad reading. Thus in 431 b17 Simplicius read with most of the S-X group ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέρ- γείαν τὰ πράγματα νοῶν, but he escaped the absurdity which results from such a reading by suggesting that τὰ πράγματα should be transposed to precede ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν (Simpl. 279, 7-9). In short, the text which the commentators had before them was substantially the same as that of our manuscripts. They all found in it μαρτυρεῖ TO νῦν λεχθὲν 410a 29, τῶν αἰτίων 430b 25, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγένητον 434Ὁ 4sq. Where we are perplexed, so as a rule were they, and we look to them in vain to solve the riddle of such passages as 403 Ὁ 2,407 ἃ II, 407b 285sq., 408 a 255q., 411 b 25, 4128 17, 425 b 1, 2, 4268 27, 427 ἃ 10, 13, 14, 428 Ὁ 198q., 428 Ὁ 30—429 a 2, 430 Ὁ 148qq., 26sqq., 433 Ὁ 17, 18, 434a I2—15.

1 Epicharmus apud Plut., De Sollertia animalium, g6t A.

EXPLICANTUR SIGLA

QUIBUS IN APPARATU CRITICO USI SUMUS.

E, codex Parisiensis 1853.

L, 5 Vaticanus 253.

P, 4, Vaticanus 1339, ex ed. H. Rabe.

S, Laurentianus δι.

T, 5 Vaticanus 256.

U, , Vaticanus 260.

V, » Vaticanus 266.

W, , Vaticanus 1026,

xX, 5, «&mbrosianus H 50.

y,; 5, Paristensis 2034.

m, ,, Parisiensis 192t.

Ald., eclitio Aldina.

Basil, 4, Basileensis tertia.

Sylb., ,,. Sylburgiana.

Bek, 4, Bekkeri Academica.

Trend, 5 ‘Trendelenburp'ii,

Torst., » Torstriki.

Bus. 4 Bussemakeri (Didotiana)

Bhi, 5 Biehl.

Κι, » Rodiert.

Bon., Bontts.

Alex., Alexander Aphrodisiensis.

Them., Themistius.

Simpl., Simplicius.

Philop., Philoponus.

Soph., Sophonias.

Prisc. Lyd., Prisetanus Lydus.

vet. trans., vetusta translatio latina ex editione Juntina, Venet. 1530, et Thomae Aquinatis op. tom. XX., ed. Parmae 1866.

BJ., Jahresbericht iib. die Fortschr. ete. herausy. v. C. Bursian ete,

ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ.

1

ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ A.

Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, μᾶλ- λον δ᾽ ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ Kat ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε => a ‘ Ἢ ΝΗ καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι’ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυ- Ἂ ς , > / * 3 , θ 4 ὃ ἴω δὲ '᾿ χῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν. OOKEL OE καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἣ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλ- ‘ λεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν- ἔστι yap οἷον ἀρχὴ ~ , 2 σὰ \ A ‘ - ΄ » τῶν ζῴων. ἐπιζητοῦμεν δὲ θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνώναι τήν τε φύ- 3. AN ‘ ‘ 3 f oA ΜΨ ξ ‘ ? , σιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, εἶθ᾽ ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν᾽ ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι ἐκείνην καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν. πάντῃ δὲ πάντως ἐστὶ τῶν χαλεπωτάτων λαβεῖν τινὰ πίστιν περὶ αὐτῆς. καὶ yap ὄν- TOS κοινοῦ τοῦ ζητήματος καὶ πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι, τάχ᾽ dv τῳ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι Ed Ν / 4 Tt a o~ ᾿ > μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν ov- ν᾽ Vd Ν “ ‘ ‘ ἰδί > >) ἐ σίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, 4 lA ¥ N la ¢ ᾿ δ ,»Ὰ» f ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν ein τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην. εἶ δὲ μή ἐστι μία τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι: δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκα- ὁ ς f ‘ ἈΝ Ἀ εχ ‘4 > + ¢ , στον τίς ὁ τρόπος. ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ἢ, πότερον ἀπόδειξίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις Kai τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι πολλὰς

Codices EST ΟΝ ΚΥ Χγ: libro secundo P, libro tertio L.

I. μᾶλλον...3. εἶναι Alexander Philopono teste spuria notabat i 2. recom. Καὶ Torst., lege: runt Philop, Soph. || 3. ταῦτα om, If Torst., leg. Philop. Soph. et, ut videtur, Them. 1, 18 3 περὶ οἵα. STUWX Bek. Trend., add. Soph. Torst. {τῆς om. Vy Soph. ἢ g. καινὰ pro δι’ ἐκείνην y, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ καὶ rots ζώοις δι' ἐκείνην U, receptum textum tuenturs Ther. Soph. || ro. δὲ καὶ πάντως ST UV Wy, πάντῃ δὲ πάντως etiam Philop. | ra. καὶ om EX Bek. Trend. Biehl Rodier || 13. τὸ] τοῦ SVWKX Philop. Bek. Trencl., τὰ TU 15. ἀπόδειξιν SUWX Bek., ἡ ἀπόδειξις T, ἀπόδειξιν etiam Soph. ἢ 17. καὶ κοινή ris ὌΝ ΧΥ || τὸ] τοῦ STUWX || 19. post τρόπος virgulam Bek. | ὅταν SU W, af V,

4028

DE ANIMA. Βοοκ I.

Cognition is in our eyes a thing of beauty and worth, and this 1 is true of one cognition more than another, either because it is exact or because it relates to more important and remarkable objects. On both these grounds we may with good reason claim a high place for the enquiry concerning the soul. It would seem, too, that an acquaintance with the subject contributes greatly to the whole domain of truth and, more particularly, to the study of nature, the soul being virtually the principle of all animal life.

Our aim is to discover and ascertain the nature and

The sub- :

ject of essence of soul and, in the next place, all the accidents “we belonging to it; of which some are thought to be attributes peculiar to the soul itself, while others, it is held, belong to the animal also, but owe their existence to the soul. But every- 2 where and in every way it is extremely difficult to arrive at any trustworthy conclusion on the subject. It is the same here as in many other enquiries. What we have to investigate is the essential nature of things and the What. It might therefore be thought that there is a single procedure applicable to all the objects whose essential nature we wish to discover, as demonstration is applicable to the properties which go along with them: in that case we should have to enquire what this procedure is. If, however, there is no single procedure common to all sciences for defining the What, our task becomes still more difficult, as it will then be necessary to settle in each particular case the method to be pursued. Further, even if it be evident that it consists in demon- stration of some sort or division or some other procedure, there ἐὰν etiam Simpl. p. 10, 4 || τις post ἀπόδειξις om. pr. ET U WX, etiam Philop. Biehl (in

alt. ed.) || 20. post μέθοδος punctum Bek. || ἔτε δὲ πολλὰς TU V W Bek., δὲ om. etiam Soph.

4 DE ANIMA I CH. 1

“~ ¥ ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ πλάνας, ἐκ τίνων det ζητεῖν: ἄλλαι yap Ἂν 3 ,ὔ / 3 a \ 3 , ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμών καὶ ἐπιπέδων.

3 πρῶτον δ᾽ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί > 7 ‘ / , Ν > 4 A Ν a Ν +) , ἐστι, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε TL καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ Kat τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν 25

΄ μ ‘A on > ᾽ , , ‘ ¥ δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά Tiss διαφέρει yap ov τι

4 σμικρόν. σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἶ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον 402 Ὁ ε δὴ ha Ν mal “An 3 δὲ ‘ εξ ὃ / f ὁμοειδὴς amaca ψυχὴ ἢ οὐ" εἰ OE μὴ ὁμοειδὴς, πότερον μά Ζ x ΄ ΜᾺ Ν Ν ¢ 4 ‘ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν μὲν yap οἱ λέγοντες καὶ ζη- τοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης ἐοίκασιν ἐπι-

ra 3 ? > Ὁ \ ᾽ ? e € / ς σκοπεῖν. εὐλαβητέον δ᾽ ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὃ λό- 5 7A 3 ᾽ὔ ? ¢ A > « , Ψ - γος αὐτῆς ἐστί, καθάπερ ζῴου, ἢ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἕτερος, οἷον ¥ / 3 ’ ΤᾺ δ ‘ Ὰ Ν ‘ ¥ > ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι od- , 3 aA Ὁ ε ΄ δὲ Ἄ ¥ Ν ¥ θέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον: ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο KaTN-

6 yopotro: ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀλλὰ μόρια, πότερον δεῖ ζητεῖν πρότερον τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἢ τὰ μόρια. χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ 10 τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πότερον τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν: ὁμοίως

‘ ‘ > NS “ ¥ > ‘ ‘ ¥ ΄ a ‘ad

7 δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ay τις ἀπορήσειεν εἶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον

8 τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοῦ. ἔοικε δ᾽ οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι

~~ Ψ Pa’

τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς

/ f ‘ > fs ‘ / κι , Ν ν 3 7

μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ καμπύλον ἢ τί γραμμὴ Kal ἐπί.

πεδον πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις ὀρθαῖς αἱ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι 20 ἴσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέ- ya μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν: ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχω-

mt

5

46. μᾶλλον] μόνον Ἐὶ (Trend), μᾶλλον tuentur Them. Philop. Simpl. Soph. ἢ z+ om SVWkXy, legit Soph. {402 b, 2. dporoedds utrobique TUVWX, ὀμυειδὴς tucntur Them. Philop. Simpl. || 4. μόνον y Torst., μόνης corr. ἘΣ et reliqui, etiam Them. Philop. 36, γ Soph. || 6. ἑκάστην pr. If Torst., etiam Soph., ἕτερον V y, ἕκαστον reliqui ante Torstrikium omnes, etiam, ut videtur, Simpl. 13, 4 et Philop. in prooemio ad lib, 11. 205, 20 || 7. δὲ] γὰρ V, Alex, da. καὶ Ato. (ed. Bruns) p, 21, 15. 22, 2. 24, 4, etiam Soph. || &. κατηγορῆται Εἰ, sed ἡ in rasura (Trend.), κατηγορεῖται Torst., κατηγοροῖτο reliqui, etiam Simpl. Alex. 23, τὸ || 11. τοῦτο V {|ἀλλήλων ἕτερα X || 12, δεῖ U WX |] rs. πρότερον TUVWX Philop. Soph. Bek. Trend. || 16. vof IOV X, in textum recepit Biehl (cf. gaya, 17), γοητοῦ ἢ, νοητικοῦ reliqui et scripti et impressi, eliam Philop., pro αἰσθητικοῦ οἱ νοητικοῦ legi vult αἰσθάνεσθαι et νοεῖν Belger, Llermes, 1878, p. 302, at αὐσθητικοῦ etiam Philop. ἢ 19. kalrizvdn. SU Wy, καὶ τί κι TX |] aa. εἰδῆσαι STU W Xy, εἰδήσειν V.

CH. I 402 a 2I—402 Ὁ 22 5

is still room for much perplexity and error, when we ask from what premisses our enquiry should start, for there are different premisses for different sciences; for the science of numbers, for example, and plane geometry.

The first thing necessary is no doubt to determine under which 3 The of the summa genera soul comes and what it is ; I mean, problems. whether it is a particular thing, ie. substance, or is quality or is quantity, or falls under any other of the categories already determined. We must further ask whether it is amongst things potentially existent or is rather a sort of actuality, the distinction being all-important. Again, we must consider whether 4 it is divisible or indivisible; whether, again, all and every soul is homogencous or not; and, if not, whether the difference between the various souls is a difference of species or a difference of genus: for at present cliscussions and investigations about soul would appear to be restricted to the human soul. We must take care not 5 to overlook the question whether there is a single definition of soul τα there answering to a single definition of animal; or whether asingle there is a different definition for each separate soul, as for

horse and dog, man and god: animal, as the universal, being reyardecd either as non-existent or, if existent, as logically posterior. This is a question which might equally be raised in regard to any other common predicate. Further, on the assump- 6 tion that there are not several souls, but merely several different Questions = Parts in the same soul, it is a question whether we should of pro- begin by investigating soul as a whole or its several cedure. «oy Ὁ , . .

parts. And here again it is difficult to determine which of these parts are really distinct from one another and whether the several parts, or their functions, should be investigated first. Thus, eg. should the process of thinking come first or the mind that thinks, the process of sensation or the sensitive faculty? And so everywhere else. But, if the functions should come first, again 7 will arise the question whether we should first investigate the correlative objects. Shall we take, eg., the sensible object before the faculty of sense and the intelligible object before the intellect ?

It would seem that not only is the knowledge of a thing’s 8 A teat of essential nature useful for discovering the causes of its a good ς attributes, as, ¢.g., in mathematics the knowledge of what

‘ is meant by the terms straight or curved, line or surface, aids us in discovering to how many right angles the angles of a triangle are equal: but also, conversely, a knowledge of the attributes is a considerable aid to the knowledge of what a thing is.

6 DE ANIMA I CH. I

μεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκό- A on f των, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας Ν, 3 Ν, ἕξομέν τι λέγειν κάλλιστα: πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ 25 a ῪᾺ [4 ‘ τί ἐστιν, ὦστε καθ᾽ ὅσους τῶν ὁρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ συμ- βεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐ- 4038 a a a Ψ μαρές, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηνται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες. 3 / > »¥ Ν Ν , aa οὐ / / 3 / 9 ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι Tav- ΝᾺ oe ων »¥ Ta κοινὰ Kal τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστί τι Kal τῆς ψυχῆς ὕδιον αὖ- ~ ans 1. ἴω \ 4 ω > c # / , τῆς: τοῦτο yap λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, ov ῥᾷάδιον δέ. φαίνε- 5 Tat δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ™ Ὄ 3 , ™~ > ~ wd > / ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. ; > ὃ» ¥ N ΝᾺ 3 > 2 Ν N “~ ? μάλιστα δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν- εἶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία Ὁ . » , 3 3 ? > ἃ OS “a > Κ᾿ τις H μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ évdéyour ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἄνευ το σώματος εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστί τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ , » 3 7 5. ἃ > N ? > ‘ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι: εἰ δὲ μη- » a ΡᾺ θέν ἐστιν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ A Ὁ ~ εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον ἅπτεσθαι τῆς χαλ.- κῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γ᾽ ἅψεται οὕτω χωρι- σθὲν τὸ εὐθύ: ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀεὶ μετὰ σώματός TE 15 νός ἐστιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι με- Ν 4 / ? f ἂν / ἂν τὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι Ἃ “ χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν: ἅμα yap τούτοις πά- σχει τι τὸ σῶμα. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐν- ca 4 ἀργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φο- 20 βεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ᾽ ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ΜᾺ »ΝἬ Ψ ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται. ἔτι Ν “ a δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον φανερόν" μηθενὸς yap φοβεροῦ συμβαΐνον- τος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου. εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως ¥ Sar Ψ ‘ ‘6 λό ¥ λ , 3° τ cy ἔχει, ONAOV OTL TA TAO) λόγοι EVVAOL εἰσιν. WOTE OL OPOL 35

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25. τί λέγειν TU V, re insert. Ey Simpl. Soph. || drs κάλλιστα TV X y, τι κάλλιον ὟΝ, κάλλιστα etiam Simpl, Philop. || yap tuentur praeter onines codd. Philop. Alex. apud Philep. Simpl. || 403 a, 6. δὲ om. E || τῶν μὲν EX y Philop. Soph. Torst., μὲν om. reliqui ante Torst. omnes || dvev τοῦ σώμ. E Philop. Soph. Torst., τοῦ om. reliqui ante Torst. omnes ἢ 8. ἰδίω SWXy, Simpl. Philop. Trend. ed. pr., cov etiam E, sed ον in ras., ὦ superser. (Bhl.), ἔδιον etiam Them. Soph. || 9. ἄνευ rod σώμ. Wy et, ut videtur, Philop. 46, 5, χοῦ om. etiam Them. Simpl. Soph. || 13. ἢ εὐθεῖ W et Ey, 9 εὐθύ Ἰὼ (Stapf) Il 14. οὕτω solus E et Bonitz (Hermes VIL, 417), reliqui ante Biehlium omnes τούτου, etiam Philop, Simpl. et, ut videtur, Soph. 7, 28 |] 18. καὶ τὸ μισεῖν SW X | γὰρ et χορ. 710m. Ἐς, leg. Soph. || dua...19. σῶμα unc. inel. Torst., tuentur haec verba praeter codd, Simpl. Philop.,

CH. I 402 Ὁ 23—403 a 25 7

For when we are able to give an account of all, or at any rate most, of the attributes as they are presented to us, then we shall be in a position to define most exactly the essential nature of the thing. In fact, the starting point of every demonstration is a definition of what something is. Hence the definitions which lead to no information about attributes and do not facilitate even con- jecture respecting them have clearly been framed for dialectic and are void of content, one and all.

A further difficulty arises as to whether all attributes of theg Soul and soul are also shared by that which contains the soul or body. whether any of them are peculiar to the soul itself: a question which it is indispensable, and yet by no means easy, to decide. It would appear that in