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BENEDICT DE SPINOZA

TRACTATTJS THEOLOGTCO-POLTTieuS, TKACTATUS POLITICUS

inte.d Inj permi^'mn. of Gcunjf J><!/ ami tinn* fr<nn " BoJin's Philosophical Libra) y " fur "Sir John Lullock's Hundred Books."

Sir Sobn SLubbocfe's tunftrcD iJBoofes

BENEDICT DE SPINOZA

TRACTATUS THEOLOaiCO-POLITICUS, TRACTATUS POLITICUS

TRANSLATED FEOM THE LATIN, WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

R. H. M. ELWES

GEOROE ROUTLEDOrE AND SONS

LIMITED

p,

APR I 4

\IiK I'KI-'.SS : CHAX1.K-* VVIIITTlNCiilAM Al^ lOOKS C"UKI, LHANCKHY I.ANE, LONOON.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

INTRODUCTION "?

Original unpopularity of Spinoza's writings, their gradually increasing influence in Germany, France, Holland, and

England .......••• v

Authorities for the life of Spinoza : Colerus, &c. . . . ix

Birth, 1634, and education of Spinoza • • • x

His breach with the synagogue, 1656 . . . . , xii

Life near Amsterdam and at llhijnsburg • • . • xiii

Friendship with Simon de Vries xiv

Removal to Voorburg and the Hague xv

Correspondence with Oldenburg, Leibnitz, Tschirnhausen, and

others. Publication of Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 1670. xvi Massacre of the De Witts, 1672. Indignation and danger of

Spinoza xvii

Completion of the Ethics, 1674 xviii

Later life of Spinoza xviii

Death and burial, February, 1677 xx

Opera Posthuma published 1677 xxi

Sketch of Spinoza's philosophy xxi

Scope of the present work xxxii

TllEOLOGlCO-POLITICAL TREATISE 1

Preface 3

Origin and consequences of superstition 3

Causes that have led the author to write G

Course of his investigation 8

For what readers the treatise is designed. Submission of

author to the rulers of his country 11

Chap. I.— Of Prophecy 13

Definition of prophecy 13

Distinction between revelation to Moses and to the other

prophets 15

Between Christ and all other recipients of revelation . . 1 U

Ambiguity of the word " Spirit " 19

The different senses in which things may be referred to God. 20

Different senses of "Spirit of God" 22

Prophets perceived revelation by imagination . ... 24

CONTENTS.

PACK

Chap. II.— Of Prophets "27

A mistake' to suppose that prophecy can give knowledge of phenomena 27

Certainty of prophecy based on (1) Vividness of Imagination, (2) A 'Sign, (3) Goodness of the Prophet .... 29

Variation ot' prophecy with the temperament and opinions of the individual 30

Chap. III. — Of the Vocation of the Hebrews, and whether the

Gift of Prophecy was peculiar to them 43

Happiness of Hebrews did not consist in the inferiority of the Gentiles 43

Nor in philosophic knowledge or virtue . . . . -J.">

But in their conduct of affairs of state and escape from poli tical dangers . . . . . . . . 4fi

Even this distinction did not exist in the time of Abraham . 48

Testimony from the Old Testament itself to the share of the Gentiles in the law and favour of God .... 49

Explanation of apparent discrepancy of the Epistle to the Romans .......... 53

Answer to the arguments for the eternal election of the Jews. C4

Chap. IV.— Of the Divine Law 57

Laws either depend on natural necessity or on human decree.

The existence of the latter not inconsistent with the former

class ot laws ......... 57

Divine law a kind of law founded on human dec-roe : called

Divine from its object 0-J

Divine law (1) universal ; (2) independent of the truth of any

historical narrative 5 (3) independent of rites and ceremonies;

(4) its own reward (51

Reason does not present God as a law-giver for men . . (]-j Such a conception a proof of ignorance — in Adam — in the

Israelites — in Christians ....... 63

Testimony of the Scriptures in favour of reason and the

rational view of the Divine law ...*.. G5

Cliap. V. — Of the Cfrrnionial Law ...... 09

Ceremonial law of the Old Testament no part of the Divine

universal law, but partial and temporary. Testimony of

the prophets themselves to this 69

Testimony of the New Testament 7i>

How the ceremonial law tended to preserve the Hebrew kingdom Christian rites on a similar footing ..... What part of the Scripture narratives is one bound to believe?

Chap. VI.- -Of Miracles

Confused ideas of the vulgar on the subject ...

A miracle in the sense of a contravention of natural laws an

absurdity

In the souse of an event, whose cause is unknown, less edify-

ing than an event better understood ...

CONTENTS.

PAGR

/ God's providence identical with the course of nature 89

92

/ How Scripture miracles may be interpreted .

Chap. VII. — Of the Interpretation of Scripture . Current systems of interpretation erroneous . Only true system to interpret it by itself

98 98 100 Reasons why this system cannot now be carried out in its

entirety 108

Yet these difficulties do not interfere with our understanding

the plainest and most important passages . . . .113 Kival systems examined — that of a supernatural faculty being

necessary — refuted 114

That of Maimonides I14

Refuted . .116

Traditions of the Pharisees and the Papists rejected . .118

Chap. VIII. — Of the authorship of the Pentateuch, and the other

historical books of the Old Testament 120

The Pentateuch not written by Moses 120

His actual writings distinct 124

Traces of late authorship in the other historical books . . 127 All the historical books the work of one man . . .129

Probably Ezra 130

Who compiled first the book of Deuteronomy . 13i And then a history, distinguishing the books by the names of

their subjects 132

Chap. IX.— Other questions about these books . . . .133 That these books have not been thoroughly revised and made

to agree 133

That there are many doubtful readings 139

That the existing marginal notes are often such . . .140 The other explanations of these notes refuted . . .141 The hiatus 145

Chap. X.— An Examination of the remaining books of the Old

Testament according to the preceding method . . .146

Chronicles, Psalms, Proverbs I46

Isaiah, Jeremiah 147

Ezekiel, Hosea 148

Other prophets, Jonah, Job 1^0

Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther .150

The author declines to undertake a similar detailed examina tion of the New Testament I56

Chap. XI — An Inquiry whether the Apostles wrote their Epistles as Apostles and Prophets, or merely as Teachers, and an Ex planation of what is meant by an Apostle . . • !•>?

The epistles not in the prophetic style 157

The Apostles not commanded to write nor to preach in parti cular places 1 59

Different methods of teaching adopted by the Apostles . . 1M

CONTENTS.

Chap. XI [.— Of the true Original of the Divine Law, and where fore Scripture is called Sacred, and the Word of God. How that, in so far as it contains the Word of God, it has come down to us uncorrupted 155

Chap. XIII.— It is shown, that Scripture teaches only very Simple

Doctrines, such as suffice for right conduct . . . . 175 Error in speculative doctrine not impious — nor knowledge

pious. Piety consists in obedience .... ISO

Chap. XIV.— Definitions of Faith, the True Faith, and the Foundations of Faith, which is once for all separated from Philosophy .... jo-;

Danger resulting from the vulgar idea of faith '. .' * 182 The only test of faith obedience and good works . . . Ib4 As different men are disposed to obedience by different opinions, universal faith can contain only the simplest doctrines ..... icg

Fundamental distinction between faith* and 'philosophy— the

key-stone of the present treatise jgg

Chap. XV.—Theolopi/ is shown- not to be subservient to Season, nor Reason to theology : a Definition of the reason which enables us to accept the Authority of the Bible . . .190 Theory that Scripture must be accommodated to Reason- maintained by Maimonides— already refuted in Chapter

'••••••. 190

Theory that Reason must l»e accommodated to* Scripture —maintained by A Ipakhar— examined 191

And refuted ' ' jj*

Scripture and Reason independent of one another '

Certainty of fundamental faith not mathematical but moral ." 196

breat utility of Revelation jg8

Chap. \\l Of the Found,! thus of a State; of the, Sahtral and Civil lixjhts of Individuals; and of the Kinhts of the

Sovereign Power ....'. ' 2()0

In Nature right co-extensive with power . ' »>u()

This principle applies to mankind in the state of Nature ' 20]

low a transition from this state to a civil state is possible 20'J

Subjects not slaves ... ' oOG

Definition of private civil right— and wrong .' ' ,~0-

Of alliance ....

Uftrvuson ' 2°8

In what sense sovereigns are 'bourn! hv Divine law ' 2i0

^»vu government not inconsistent with reliion . . ~>

PA- /• \~ I8 "'"' <haf no one can or "ecd transfer all hu liyhtg to th> Sovereign Power. Of the Hc'n-ew It, nuhlic a* it wo* during the l(f,tiine of Moses, and after his death Ml the foundation of the Monar.-hy ; and of its Kxc, Hence

wku*\ OJl'A 2n U'hj tJ'r Ucocratic Snvblie fell, and why * could hardly have continued without Di*scn*ivn

'issension . 214

CONTENTS.

PAGE

The absolute theory of Sovereignty ideal — No one can iu fact transfer all his rights to the Sovereign power. Evi dence of this ,214

The greatest danger in all States from within, not without . 216

Original independence of the Jews after the Exodus . . 218

Changed first to a pure democratic Theocracy . . . 21'J

Then to subjection to Moses. . . 220 Then to a Theocracy with the power divided between the high priest and the captains . . . . . ,221

The tribes confederate States .... 224

Restraints on the civil power 2%;>6

Restraints on the people ..... . 228

Causes of decay involved in the constitution of the Levitical*

priesthood 232

Chap. XVIir.— From the Commonwealth of the Hebrews and their

History certain Lessons are deduced '. . . . .237

The Hebrew constitution no longer possible or desirable, yet lessons may be derived from its history . . . . 237

As the danger of entrusting any authority in polities to ecclesiastics — the danger of identifying religion with dogma 241

Ihe necessity of keeping all judicial power with the sovereign — the danger of changes in the form of a State . . . 24?

This last danger illustrated from the history of England of

Rome 243

And of Holland j 244

Chap. XIX. It is shown that the Eicjht over Matters Spirit iial lies wholly with the Sovereign, and that the Outward Farms of Religion should be in accordance with Public Peace, if we

would worship God aright 245

Difference between external and inward religion . . . 245 Positive law established only by agreement .... 246 Piety furthered by peace and obedience .... 24!)

Position of the Apostles exceptional 250

Why Christian States, unlike the Hebrew, suffer from dis putes between the civil and ecclesiastical powers . . 254 Absolute power in things spiritual of modern rulers . . 256

Chap. XX. That in a Free State every man may Think what

he Likes, and Say what he Thinks 257

The mind not subject to State authority . . . ,257 Therefore in general language should not be . . . . 258 A man who disapproving of a law, submits his adverse opinion to the judgment of the authorities, while acting in accor dance with the law, deserves well of the State . . . 259 That liberty of opinion is beneficial, shown from the history

of Amsterdam 264

Danger to the State of withholding it. — Submission of the Author to the judgment of his country's rulers . . 265

CONTENTS.

PAGE

AUTHOR'S NOTES TO THE TREATISE 267

A. POLITICAL TREATISE 279

Extract from the Preface to Opera Posthunia . . .281

Contents 283

Chap. I. Introduction 287

II. Of Natural Right 291

III. Of the Kight of Supreme Authorities . . . .301

IV. Of the Functions of Supreme Autlnrit « s . , . 309 V. Of the Best State of a Dominion , .... 313

VI. Of Monarchy 316

VII. Of Monarchy. Continuation 327

VIl'I. Of Aristocracy 345

IX. Of Aristocracy. Continuation 370

X. Of Aristocracy. Conclusion ..... 378 XI. Of Democracy . 385

INTRODUCTION.

" Konstatiert ist es, das der Lebenswandel des Spinoza frei von allem Tadel war,und rein und makellos wie das Leben seines gb'ttlichen Vetters, Jesu Christi. Auch wie Dieser litt er fiir seine Lehre wie Dieser trug er die Dornenkrone. Ueberall, wo ein grosser Geist seine Gedenken aus- spricht, ist Golgotha." — HEINE.

A VERY few years ago the writings of Spinoza were almost unknown in this country. The only authorities to which the English reader could be referred were the brilliant essays of Mr. Froude1 and Mr. Matthew Arnold,2 the graphic but somewhat misleading sketch in Lewes' s " History of Philosophy," and the unsatisfactory volume of Dr. E. Willis.3 But in 1880 Mr. Pollock brought out his most valuable " Spinoza, his Life and Philosophy," 4 likely long to remain the standard work on the subject; Dr. Martineau has followed with a sympathetic and gracefully written " Study of Spinoza ; " Professor Knight has edited a volume of Spinozistic Essays by Continental Philoso-

1 " Short Studies in Great Subjects," first series, art. " Spinoza."

2 " Essays in Criticism," art. " Spinoza and the Bible."

8 "Benedict de Spinoza 5 his Life, Correspondence, and Ethics." 1870.

* I take this early opportunity of recording my deep obligations to Mr. Pollock's book. I have made free use of it, together with Dr. Martineau's, in compiling this introduction. In the passages which Mr. Pollock has incidentally translated, I have been glad to be able to refer to the versions of so distinguished a scholar.

Yl INTRODUCTION.

pliers ; Auerbach's biographical novel1 has been translated, and many writers have made contributions to the subject in magazines and reviews.

At first sight this stir of tardy recognition may seem less surprising than the preceding apathy, for history can show few figures more remarkable than the solitary thinker of Amsterdam. But the causes wlu'ch kept Spinoza in com parative obscurity are not very far to seek. Personally he shrank with almost womanly sensitiveness from anything like notoriety : his chief work was withheld till after his death, and then published anonymously ; his treatise on Keligion was also put forth in secret, and he disclaims with evident sincerity all desire to found a school, or give his name to a sect.

Again, the form in which his principal work is cast is such us to repel those dilettante readers, whose suffrage is necessary for a widely-extended reputation ; none but genuine students would care to grapple with the serried array of definitions, axioms, and propositions, of which the Ethics is composed, while the display of geometric accuracy flatters the careless into supposing, that the whole struc ture is interdependent, and that, when a single breach has been effected, the entire fabric has been demolished.

The matter, no less than the manner, of Spinoza's writ ings was such as to preclude popularity. He genuinely shocked his contemporaries. Advances in thought are tolerated in proportion as they respond to and, as it were, kindle into flame ideas which are already smouldering ob scurely in many minds. A teacher may deepen, modify, transfigure what he finds, but he must not attempt radical reconstruction. In the seventeenth century all men's deepest convictions were inseparably bound up with anthro pomorphic notions of the Deity ; Spinoza, in attacking these latter and endeavouring to substitute the conception

: eiu lAuUcrlcbeu." Ibjj.

INTRODUCTION. Vll

of eternal and necessary law, seemed to be striking at the very roots of moral order : hence with curious irony his works, which few read and still fewer understood, became associated with notions of monstrous impiety, and their author, who loved virtue with single-hearted and saintly devotion, was branded as a railer against God and a sub- verter of morality, whom it was a shame even to speak of. Those from whom juster views might have been expected swelled the popular cry. The Cartesians sought to confirm their own precarious reputation for orthodoxy by emphatic disavowals of their more daring associate. Leibnitz, who had known Spinoza personally, speaks of him, whether from jealousy or some more avowable motive, in tones of consistent depreciation.

The torrent of abuse, which poured forth from the theologians and their allies, served to overwhelm the ethical and metaphysical aspect of Spinoza's teaching. The philosopher was hidden behind the arch-heretic. Through- out almost the whole of the century following his death, he is spoken of in terms displaying complete misappre hension of his importance and scope. The grossly inaccu rate account given by Bayle in the " Dictionnaire Philoso- phique" was accepted as sufficient. The only symptom of a following is found in the religious sect of Hattemists, which based some of its doctrines on an imperfect understanding of the so-called mystic passages in the Ethics. The first real recognition came from Lessing, who found in Spinoza a strength and solace he sought in vain elsewhere, though he never accepted the system as a whole. His conversa tion with Jacobi (1780), a diligent though hostile student of the Ethics, may be said to mark the beginning of a new epoch in the history of Spinozism. Attention once at tracted was never again withdrawn, and received a powerful impulse from Goethe, who more than once confessed his indebtedness to the Ethics, which indeed is abundantly

INTRODUCTION.

evident throughout his writings. Schleiermacher paid an eloquent tribute to "the holy, the rejected Spinoza." Novalis celebrated him as "the man intoxicated with Deity" (der Gottvertrunkcne Mann), and Heine for once forgot to sneer, as he recounted his life. The brilliant novelist, Auerbach, has not only translated his complete works, but has also made his history the subject of a biographical romance. Among German philosophers Kant is, perhaps, the last, who shows no traces of Spinozism. Hegel has declared, that " to be a philosopher one must first be a Spinozist." In recent years a new impulse has been given to the study of the Ethics by their curious harmony with the last results of physiological research.

In France Spinoza has till lately been viewed as a dis ciple and perverter of Descartes. M. Emile Saisset pre fixed to his translation of the philosopher's chief works a critical introduction written from this standpoint. Since the scientific study of philosophic systems has begun among the French, M. Paul Janet has written on Spinoza as a link in the chain of the history of thought ; a new translation of his complete works has been started, and M. Kenan has delivered a discourse on him at the bicen tenary of his death celebrated at the Hague.

In Holland there has also been a revival of interest in the illustrious Dutch thinker. Professors Van Vloten and Land were mainly instrumental in procuring the erection of a statue to his memory, and are now engaged in a fino edition of his works, of which the first volume has appeared.1 In England, as before said, the interest in Spinoza has till recently been slight. The controversialists of the eighteenth century, with the exception of Toland, passed him by as unworthy of serious study. The first recognition of his true character came probably from Germany through Coleridge, who in his desultory way expressed enthusiastic admiration, 1 " B. de Spinoza, Opera. LM The Hague, 1882.

INTRODUCTION. «

and recorded his opinion (in a pencil note to a passage in Schelling), that the Ethics, the Novum Organum, and the Critique of Pure Reason were the three greatest works written since the introduction of Christianity. The in fluence of Spinoza has been traced by Mr. Pollock in Wordsworth, and it is on record that Shelley not only contemplated but began a translation of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, to be published with a preface by Lord Byron, but the project was cut short by his death. It is said that George Eliot left behind her at her decease a MS. translation of the Ethics.

It may strike those who are strangers to Spinoza as curious, that, notwithstanding the severely abstract nature of his method, so many poets and imaginative writers should be found among his adherents. Lessing, G-oethe, Heine, Auerbach, Coleridge, Shelley, George Eliot ; most of these not only admired him, but studied him deeply. On closer approach the apparent anomaly vanishes. There is about Spinoza a power and a charm, which appeals strongly to the poetic sense. He seems to dwell among heights, which most men see only in far off, momentary glimpses. The world of men is spread out before him, the workings of the human heart lie bared to his gaze, but he does not fall to weeping, or to laughter, or to reviling : his thoughts are ever with the eternal, and something of the beauty and calm of eternal things has passed into his teaching. If we may, as he himself was wont to do, in terpret spiritually a Bible legend, we may say of him that, like Moses returning from Sinai, he bears in his presence the witness that he has held communion with the Most High.

The main authority for the facts of Spinoza's life is a

short biography by Johannes Colerus1 (Kohler), Lutheran

1 Originally written in Dutch (1706). Translated the same year into

INTRODUCTION.

pastor at the Hague, who occupied the lodgings formerly tenanted by the philosopher. The orthodox Christian felt a genuine abhorrence for the doctrines, which he regarded as atheistic, but was honest enough to recognize the stainless purity of their author's character. He sets forth what he has to say with a quaint directness in admirable keeping with the outward simplicity of the life he depicts.

Further authentic information is obtainable from passing notices in the works of Leibnitz, and from Spinoza's pub lished correspondence, though the editors of the latter have suppressed all that appeared to them of merely personal interest. There is also a biography attributed to Lucas, physician at the Hague (1712), but this is merely a -con fused panegyric, and is often at variance with more trust worthy records. Additional details may be gleaned from Bayle's hostile and inaccurate article in the " Dictionnaire Philosophique;" from S. Kortholt's preface to the second edition (1700) of his father's l*>ok " De tribus impostoribus magnis:" and, lastly, from the recollections of Colonel Stoupe (1673), an officer in the Swiss service, who had met the philosopher at Utrecht, but does not contribute much to our knowledge.

Baruch de Spinoza was born in Amsterdam Nov. 24, 1634. His parents were Portuguese, or possibly Spanish Jews, who had sought a refuge in the Netherlands from the rigours of the Inquisition in the Peninsula. Though nothing positive is known of them, they appear to have been in easy circumstances, and certainly bestowed on their only son— their other two children being girls— a thorough education according to the notions of their time and sect. At the Jewish High School, under the guidance of Mor- teira, a learned Talmudist, and possibly of the brilliant

Krrnrh and Finish, nn-1 afr.-nvards (1723) into German. Tho English \eruion it* reprinted in Mr. Toll.)* k's book as an appendix.

INTRODUCTION. XI

Manasseh Ben Israel, who afterwards (1655) was employed to petition from Cromwell the re-admission of the Jews to England, the young Spinoza was instructed in the learn ing of the Hebrews, the mysteries of the Talmud and the Cabbala, the text of the Old Testament, and the commen taries of Ibn Ezra and Maimonides. Eeaders of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus will be able to appreciate the use made of this early training. Besides such severer studies, Spinoza was, in obedience to Rabbinical tradition, made acquainted with a manual trade, that of lens polish ing, and gained a knowledge of French, Italian, and Ger man ; Spanish, Portuguese, and Hebrew were almost his native tongues, but curiously enough, as we learn from one of his lately discovered letters,1 he wrote Dutch with difficulty. Latin was not included in the Jewish curricu lum, being tainted with the suspicion of heterodoxy, but Spinoza, feeling probably that it was the key to much of the world's best knowledge, set himself to learn it ; 2 first, with the aid of a Q-erman master, afterwards at the house of Francis Van den Ende, a physician. It is probably from the latter that he gained the sound knowledge of physical science, which so largely leavened his philosophy ; and, no doubt, he at this time began the study of Descartes, whose reputation towered above the learned world of the period.

Colerus relates that Van den Ende had a daughter, Clara Maria, who instructed her father's pupils in Latin and music during his absence. " She was none of the

1 Letter XXXII. See vol. ii.

* A translator has special opportunities for observing the extent of Spinoza's knowledge of Latin. His sentences are grammatical and his meaning almost always clear. But his vocabulary is restricted; his style is wanting in flexibility, and seldom idiomatic; in fact, the niceties of scholarship are wanting. He reminds one of a clever workman who accomplishes much with simple tools.

IXTIKMMVTION.

most beautiful, but she had a great deal of wit," and as the story runs displayed her sagacity l»y rejecting the proffered love of Spinoza for the sake of his fellow-pupil Kerkering, who was a"ble to enhance his attractions l»y the gift of a costly pearl necklace. It is certain that Van den Ende's daughter and Kerkering were married in 1671, but the tradition of the previous love affair accords ill with ascer tained dates. Clara Maria was only seven years old when Spinoza left her father's house, and sixteen when he left the neighbourhood.

Meanwhile the brilliant Jewish student was overtaken by

that mental crisis, which has come over so many lesser men

before and since. The creed of his fathers was found un

equal to the strain of his own wider knowledge and changed

spiritual needs. The Hebrew faith with its immemorial

antiquity, its unbroken traditions, its myriads of martyrs,

could appeal to an authority which no other religion has

equalled, and Spinoza, as we know from a passage in one

of his letters,* felt the claim to the full. We may be sure

that the gentle and reserved youth was in no haste to

obtrude his altered views, but the time arrived when they

could no longer be with honesty concealed. The Jewish

doctors were exasperated at the defection of their most

promising pupil, and endeavoured to retain him in their

communion by the offer of a yearly pension of 1,000

florins. Such overtures were of course rejected. Sterner

measures were then resorted to. It is even related, on ex

cellent authority, that Spinoza's life was attempted as he

was coming out of the Portuguese synagogue. Be this as

it may, he fled from Amsterdam, and was (1656) formally

excommunicated and anathematized according to the rites

of the Jewish church.

Tims isolated from his kindred, he sought more con- •niul society unions Ihe dissenting community of Colle-

1 U-tlt-r LXX1V.

INTRODUCTION. Xlll

giants, a body of men who without priests or set forms of worship carried out the precepts of simple piety. He passed some time in the house of one of that "body, not far from Amsterdam, on the Ouwerkerk road, and in 1660 or the following year removed with his friend to the head quarters of the sect at Ehijnsburg, near Ley den, where the memory of his sojourn is still preserved in the name "Spinoza Lane." His separation from Judaism was marked by his substituting for his name Baruch the Latin equivalent Benedict, but he never received baptism or for mally joined any Christian sect. Only once again does his family come into the record of his life. On the death of his father, his sisters endeavoured to deprive him of his share of the inheritance on the ground that he was an out cast and heretic. Spinoza resisted their claim by law, but on gaining his suit yielded up to them all they had de manded except one bed.

Skill in polishing lenses gave him sufficient money for his scanty needs, and he acquired a reputation as an opti cian before he became known as a philosopher. It was in this capacity that he was consulted by Leibnitz.1 His only contribution to the science was a short treatise on the rainbow, printed posthumously in 1687. This was long regarded as lost, but has, in our own time, been recovered and reprinted by Dr. Van Yloten.

Spinoza also drew, for amusement, portraits of his friends with ink or charcoal. Colerus possessed " a whole book of such draughts, amongst which there were some heads of several considerable persons, who were known to him, or had occasion to visit him," and also a portrait of the phi losopher himself in the costume of Masaniello.

So remarkable a man could hardly remain obscure, and we have no reason to suppose that Spinoza shrank from social intercourse. Though in the last years of his life his 1 Letters LI., Lil.

XIV INTRODUCTION.

habits were somewhat solitary, this may be set down to failing health, poverty, and the pressure of uncompleted work. He was never a professed ascetic, and probably, in the earlier years of his separation from Judaism, was the centre of an admiring and affectionate circle of friends. In his letters he frequently states that visitors leave him no time for correspondence, and the tone, in which he was ad dressed by comparative strangers, shows that he enjoyed considerable reputation and respect. Before the appearance of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, he had published nothing which could shock the susceptibilities of Christians, and he was known to be a complete master of Cartesianism, then regarded as the consummation and crown of learning. It is recorded that a society of young men used to hold meetings in Amsterdam for the discussion of philosophical problems, and that Spinoza contributed papers as material for their debates.1 Possibly the MS. treatise " On God, Man, and his Blessedness," which has been re-discovered fn two Dutch co j lies during our own time, may be referred to this period. It is of no philosophic value compared with the Ethics, but is interesting historically as throwing light on the growth of Spinoza's mind and his early rela tions to Cartesianism.

Oblivion has long since settled down over this little band of questioners, but a touching record has been preserved of one of their number, Simon do Vries, who figures in Spinoza's correspondence. He had often, we are told, wished to bestow gifts of money on his friend and master, but those had always been declined. During the illness which preceded his early death, he expressed a desire tu make the philosopher his heir. This again was declined, and he was prevailed on by Spinoza to reduce the bequest to a small annuity, and to leave the bulk of his property

1 Letters XXVI., XXVII., according to the corrected text «>!' Dr. Van Vloten, herein adopted.

INTRODUCTION. IT

to his family. When he had passed away his brother fixed the pension at 500 florins, but Spinoza declared the sum excessive, and refused to accept more than 300 florins, which were punctually paid him till his death.

Besides this instruction by correspondence, for which he seems to have demanded no payment (" mischief," as one of his biographers puts it, "could be had from him for nothing "), Spinoza at least in one instance received into his house a private pupil,1 generally identified with one Albert Burgh, who became a convert to Eome in 1675, and took that occasion to admonish his ex-tutor in a strain of contemptuous pity.2 Probably to this youth were dictated " The principles of Cartesianism geometrically demon strated," which Spinoza was induced by his friends to publish, with the addition of some metaphysical reflections in 1663.3 Lewis Meyer, a physician of Amsterdam, and one of Spinoza's intimates, saw the book through the press, and supplied a preface. Its author does not appear to have attached any importance to the treatise, which he regarded merely as likely to pave the way for the reception of more original work. It is interesting as an example of the method afterwards employed in the Ethics, used to support propositions not accepted by their expounder. It also shows that Spinoza thoroughly understood the system he rejected.

In the same year the philosopher removed from Ehijns- burg to Voorburg, a suburb of the Hague, and in 1670 to the Hague itself, where he lived till his death in 1677, lodging first in the house (afterwards tenanted by Colerus) of the widow Van Velden, and subsequently with Van der

1 Letters XXVI., XXVII. * j^^. LXXIII.

3 The full title is, " Kenati des Cartes Principiorum partes I. et II. more geometrico demonstrate per Benedictum de Spinoza Amsteloda- mensein. Accesserunt ejusdem cogitata metaphysica. Amsterdam, 1663."

XVI INTRODUCTION.

Spijk, a painter. He was very likely led to leave Rhijns- burg by his increasing reputation and a desire for educated society. By this time he was well known in Holland, and counted among his friends, John de Witt, who is said to have consulted him 011 affairs of state. Nor was his fame confined to his native country. Henry Oldenburg, the first secretary of the newly-established Eoyal Society of Eng land, had visited him at Ehijnsburg, introduced possibly by Huyghens, and had invited him to carry on a corre spondence,1 in terms of affectionate intimacy. Oldenburg was rather active-minded than able, never really understood or sympathized with Spinoza's standpoint, and was thoroughly shocked2 at the appearance of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, but he was the intimate friend of Robert Boyle, and kept his correspondent acquainted with the progress of science in England. Later on (1671), Leibnitz consulted Spinoza on a question of practical optics,3 and in 1676, Ludwig von Tschirnhausen, a Bohemian nobleman, known in the history of mathematical science, contributed some pertinent criticisms on the Ethics, then circulated in MS.*

Amusing testimonies to Spinoza's reputation are afforded by the volunteered effusions of Blyenbergh,6 and the artless questionings of the believer in ghosts.8

In 1670, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus was pub lished anonymously, with the name of a fictitious printer at Hamburg. It naturally produced a storm of angry contro versy. It was, in 1674, formally prohibited by the States- General, and, as a matter of course, was placed on the Index by the Romish Church. Perhaps few books have been

1 Letter I., sqq.

3 But Tschirnhausen seems to have brought Oldenburg and Boyle to a better mind. Letter LXV.

3 Letter LI. « I.,. I in- L\\. ,,/(J.

1 Le.ter XXXI. .-v/. • Letter LV. >.

INTRODUCTION. XVll

more often "refuted," or less seriously damaged by the ordeal. Its author displayed his disinclination to disturb the faith of the unlearned by preventing during his lifetime the appearance of the book in the vernacular.

In 1672, men's thoughts were for a time diverted from theological controversy by the French invasion of the Netherlands, and the consequent outbreak of domestic faction. The shameful massacre of the brothers De Witt by an infatuated mob brought Spinoza into close and pain ful contact with the passions seething round him. For once his philosophic calm was broken: he was only by force prevented from rushing forth into the streets at the peril of his life, and proclaiming his abhorrence of the crime.

Shortly afterwards, when the head-quarters of the French army were at Utrecht, Spinoza was sent for by the Prince de Coxide, who wished to make his acquaintance. On his arrival at the camp, however, he found that the Prince was absent; and, after waiting a few days, returned home without having seen him. The philosopher's French enter tainers held out hopes of a pension from Louis XTV., if a book were dedicated to that monarch ; but these overtures were declined.

On his arrival at the Hague, Spinoza was exposed to considerable danger from the excited populace, who sus pected him of being a spy. The calm, which had failed him on the murder of his friend, remained unruffled by the peril threatening himself. He told his landlord, who was in dread of the house being sacked, that, if the mob showed any signs of violence, he would go out and speak to them in person, though they should serve him as they had served the unhappy De Witts. " I am a good republican," he added, " and have never had any aim but the welfare and good of the State."

In 1673, Spinoza was offered by the Elector Palatine,

b

xviii INTRODUCTION.

Charles Lewis,1 a professorship of philosophy at Heidelberg, but declined it,a on the plea that teaching would interfere with his original work, and that doctrinal restrictions, however slight, would prove irksome.

In the following year, the Ethics were finished and cir culated in MS. among their author's friends. Spinoza made a journey to Amsterdam for the purpose of publish ing them, but changed his intention on learning that they would probably meet with a stormy reception. Perhaps failing health strengthened his natural desire for peace, and considerations of personal renown never had any weight with him.

To this closing period belong the details as to Spinoza's manner of life collected by Colerus. They are best given in the biographer's simple words, as rendered in the con temporary English version: "It is scarce credible how sober and frugal he was. Not that he was reduced to so great a poverty, as not to be able to spend more, if he had been willing. He had friends enough, who offered him their purses, and all manner of assistance ; but he was naturally very sober, and would be satisfied with little." His food apparently cost him but a few pence a day, and he drank hardly any wine. " He was often invited to eat with his friends, but chose rather to live upon what he liiul at home, though it were never so little, than to sit down to a good table at the expense of another man. . . . He was very careful to cast up his accounts every quarter ; which he did, that he might spend neither more nor less than what he could spend every year. And he would say some times to the people of the house, that he was like the ser pent, who forms a circle with his tail in his mouth, to denote that he had nothing left at the year's end. He added, that he designed to lay up no more money than what would be necessary for him to have a decent burying. . . . 1 Letter LIU. • Letter LIV.

INTRODUCTION. XIX

He was of a middle size ; he had good features in his face, the skin somewhat black; black curled hair; long eye brows, and of the same colour, so that one might easily know by his looks that he was descended from Portuguese Jews. ... If he was very frugal in his way of living, his conversation was also very sweet and easy. He knew ad mirably well how to be master of his passions : he was never seen very melancholy, nor very merry. ... He was besides very courteous and obliging. He would very often discourse with his landlady, especially when she lay in, and with the people of the house, when they happened to be sick or afflicted: he never failed, then, to comfort them, and exhort them to bear with patience those evils which God assigned to them as a lot. He put the children in nihid of going often to church, and taught them to be obedient and dutiful to their parents. When the people of the house came from church, he would often ask them what they had learned, and what they remembered of the sermon. He had a great esteem for Dr. Cordes, my pre decessor, who was a learned and good-natured man, and of an exemplary life, which gave occasion to Spinoza to praise him very often : nay, he went sometimes to- hear him preach. ... It happened one day that his landlady asked him whether he believed she could be saved in the religion she professed. He answered : Your religion is a very good one ; you need not look for another, nor doubt that you may be saved in it, provided, whilst you apply yourself to piety, you live at the same time a peaceable and quiet life."

His amusements were very simple : talking on ordinary matters with the people of the house ; smoking now and again a pipe of tobacco ; watching the habits and quarrels of insects ; making observations with a microscope — such were his pastimes in the hours which he could spare from his philosophy. But the greater part of his day was taken up with severe mental work in his own room. Sometimes

X± INTRODUCTION.

lie would become so absorbed, that lie would remain alone for two or three days together, his meals being carried up to him.

Spinoza had never been robust, and had for more than twenty years been suffering from phthisis, a malady which, at any rate in those days, never allowed its victims to escape. The end came quite suddenly and quietly, in February, 1677. On Saturday, the 20th, after the landlord and his wife had returned from church, Spinoza spent some time with them in conversation, and smoked a pipe of tobacco, but wont to bed early. Apparently, he had previously sent for his friend and physician, Lewis Meyer, who arrived on Sunday morning. On the 21st, Spinoza came down as usual, and partook of some food at the mid day meal. In the afternoon, the physician stayed alone with his patient, the rest going to church. But when the landlord and his wife returned, they were startled with the news that the philosopher had expired about three o'clock. Lewis Meyer returned to Amsterdam that same evening.

Thus passed away all that was mortal of Spinoza. If we have read his character aright, his last hours were com forted with the thought, not so much that he had raised for himself an imperishable monument, as that he had pointed out to mankind a sure path to happiness and peace. Perhaps, with this glorious vision, there mingled the more tender feeling, that, among the simple folk with whom he lived, his memory would for a few brief years be cherished with reverence and love.

The funeral took place on the 25th February, " being attended by many illustrious persons, and followed by six coaches." The estate left behind him by the philosopher was very scanty. Rebekah de Spinoza, sister of the deceased, put in a claim as his heir ; but abandoned it on finding that, after the payment of expenses, little or nothing would remain.

INTRODUCTION. 1X1

The MSS., which were found in Spinoza's desk, were, in accordance with his wishes, forwarded to John Bieuwertz, a publisher of Amsterdam, and were that same year brought out by Lewis Meyer, and another of the philosopher's friends, under the title, " B. D. S. Opera Posthuma." They consisted of the Ethics, a selection of letters, a compendium of Hebrew grammar, and two uncompleted treatises, one on politics, the other (styled " An Essay on the Improve ment of the Understanding") on logical method. The last-named had been begun several years previously, but had apparently been added to from time to time. It develops some of the doctrines indicated in the Ethics, and serves in some sort as an introduction to the larger work.

In considering Spinoza's system of philosophy, it must not be forgotten that the problem of the universe seemed much simpler in his day, than it does in our own. Men had not then recognized, that knowledge is " a world whose margin fades for ever and for ever as we move." They believed that truth was something definite, which might be grasped by the aid of a clear head, diligence, and a sound method. Hence a tone of confidence breathed through their inquiries, which has since died away, and a completeness was aimed at, which is now seen to be un attainable. But the products of human thought are often valuable in ways undreamt of by those who fashioned them, and long after their original use has become obso lete. A system, obviously inadequate and defective as a whole, may yet enshrine ideas which the world is the richer for possessing.

This distinction between the framework and the central thoughts is especially necessary in the study of Spinoza ; for the form in which his work is cast would seem to lay stress on their interdependence. It has often been said, that the geometrical method was adopted, because it was

XX11 INTRODUCTION.

believed to insure absolute freedom from error. But exami nation shows this to be a misconception. Spinoza, who had purged his mind of so many illusions, can hardly have succumbed to the notion, that his Ethics was a flawless mass of irrefragable truth. He adopted his method be cause he believed, that he thus reduced argument to its simplest terms, and laid himself least open to the seduc tions of rhetoric or passion. "It is the part of a wise man," he says, " not to bewail nor to deride, but to under stand." Human nature obeys fixed laws no less than do the figures of geometry. " I will, therefore, write about human beings, as though I were concerned with lines, and planes, and solids."

As no system is entirely true, so also no system is en tirely original. Each must in great measure be the recom bination of elements supplied by its predecessors. Spinozism forms no exception to this rule ; many of its leading con ceptions may be traced in the writings of Jewish Eabbis and of Descartes.

The biography of the philosopher supplies us in some sort with the genesis of his system. His youth had been passed in the study of Hebrew learning, of metaphysical speculations on the nature of the Deity. He was then confronted with the scientific aspect of the world as re vealed by Descartes. At first the two visions seemed antagonistic, but, as he gazed, their outlines blended and commingled, he found himself in the presence not of two, but of one; the universe unfolded itself to him as the necessary result of the Perfect and Eternal God.

Other influences, no doubt, played a part in shaping his convictions ; we know, for instance, that he was a student of Bacon and of Hobbes, and almost certainly of Giordano Bruno, but these two elements, the Jewish and the Carte sian, aro the main sources of his system, though it cannot properly be called the mere development of either. From

INTRODUCTION. XX111

Descartes, as Mr. Pollock points out, he derived his notions of physical science and his doctrine of the conservation of motion.

In the fragment on the Improvement of the Under standing, Spinoza sets forth the causes which prompted him to turn to philosophy.1 It is worthy of note that they are not speculative but practical. He did not seek, like Descartes, " to walk with certainty," but to find a happi ness beyond the reach of change for himself and his fellow- men. With a fervour that reminds one of Christian flee ing from the City of Destruction, he dilates on the vanity of men's ordinary ambitions, riches, fame, and the plea sures of sense, and on the necessity of looking for some more worthy object for their desires. Such an object he finds in the knowledge of truth, as obtainable through clear and distinct ideas, bearing in themselves the evidence of their own veracity.

Spinoza conceived as a vast unity all existence actual and possible ; indeed, between actual and possible he re cognizes no distinction, for, if a thing does not exist, there must be some cause which prevents its existing, or in other words renders it impossible. This unity he terms indiffe rently Substance or God, and the first part of the Ethics is devoted to expounding its nature.

Being the sum of existence, it is necessarily infinite (for there is nothing external to itself to make it finite), and it can be the cause of an infinite number of results. It must necessarily operate in absolute freedom, for there is nothing by which it can be controlled ; but none the less neces sarily it must operate in accordance with eternal and im mutable laws, fulfilling the perfection of its own nature.

Substance consists in, or rather displays itself through an infinite number of Attributes, but of these only two,

1 These observations are not offered as a complete exposition of Spinozism, but merely as an indication of its general drift.

XXIV INTRODUCTION.

Extension and Thought, are knowable by us ; therefore, the rest may be left out of account in our inquiries. These Attributes are not different thing ;, but different aspects of the same thing (Spinoza does not make it clear, whether the difference is intrinsic or due to the percipient) ; thus Exten sion and Thought are not parallel and interacting, but identical, and both acting in one order and connection. Hence all questions of the dependence of mind on body, or body on mind, are done away with at a stroke. Every manifestation of either is but a manifestation of the other, seen under a different aspect.

Attributes are again subdivided, or rather display them selves through an infinite number of Modes ; some eternal and universal in respect of each Attribute (such as motion and the sum of all psychical facts) ; others having no eternal and necessary existence, but acting and reacting on one another in ceaseless flux, according to fixed and defi nite laws. These latter have been compared in relation to their Attributes to waves in relation to the sea : or a^ain

O

they may be likened to the myriad hues which play over the iridescent surface of a bubble ; each is the necessary result of that which went before, and is the necessary pre cursor of that which will come after ; all are modifications of the underlying film. The phenomenal world is made up of an infinite number of these Modes. It is manifest that the Modes of one Attribute cannot be acted upon by the Modes of another Attribute, for each may be expressed in terms of the other ; within the limits of each Attribute the variation in the Modes follows an absolutely necessary order. When the first is given, the rest follow as inevit ably, as from the nature of a triangle it follows, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Nature is uniform, and no infringement of her laws is conceivable without a reduction to chaos.

Hence it follows, that a thing can only be called cunt in-

INTRODUCTION. XXV

gent in relation to our knowledge. To an infinite intelli gence such a term would be unmeaning.

Hence also it follows, that the world cannot have been created for any purpose other than that which it fulfils by being what it is. To say that it has been created for the good of man, or for any similar end, is to indulge in gro tesque anthropomorphism.

Among the Modes of thought may be reckoned the human mind, among the Modes of extension may be reckoned the human body ; taken together they constitute the Mode man.

The nature of mind forms the subject of the second part of the Ethics. Man's mind is the idea of man's body, the consciousness of bodily states. Now bodily states are the result, not only of the body itself, but also of all tilings affecting the body ; hence the human mind takes cognizance, not only of the human body, but also of the external world, in so far as it affects the human body. Its capacity for varied perceptions is in proportion to the body's capacity for receiving impressions.

The succession of ideas of bodily states cannot be arbi trarily controlled by the mind taken as a power apart, though the mind, as the aggregate of past states, may be a more or less important factor in the direction of its course. We can, in popular phrase, direct our thoughts at will, but the will, which we speak of as spontaneous, is really deter mined by laws as fixed and necessary, as those which regu late the properties of a triangle or a circle. The illusion of freedom, in the sense of uncaused volition, results from the fact, that men are conscious of their actions, but un conscious of the causes whereby those actions have been determined. The chain of causes becomes, so to speak, in candescent at a particular point, and men assume that only at that point does it start into existence. They ignore the links which still remain in obscurity.

XXVI INTRODUCTION.

If mind be simply the mirror of bodily states, how can we account for memory ? When the mind has been affected by two things in close conjunction, the recurrence of one re-awakens into life the idea of the other. To take an illus tration, mind is like a traveller revisiting his former home, for whom each feature of the landscape recalls associations of the past. From the interplay of associations are woven memory and imagination.

Ideas may be either adequate or inadequate, in other words either distinct or confused ; both kinds are subject to the law of causation. Falsity is merely a negative concep tion. All adequate ideas are necessarily true, and bear in themselves the evidence of their own veracity. The mind accurately reflects existence, and if an idea be due to the mental association of two different factors, the joining, so to speak, may, with due care, be discerned. General notions and abstract terms arise from the incapacity of the mind to retain in completeness more than a certain number of mental images ; it therefore groups together points of re semblance, and considers the abstractions thus formed as units.

There are three kinds of knowledge : opinion, rational knowledge, and intuitive knowledge. The first alone is the cause of error ; the second consists in adequate ideas of particular properties of things, and in general notions ; the third proceeds from an adequate idea of some attribute of God to the adequate knowledge of particular things.

The reason does not regard things as contingent, but as necessary, considering them under the form of eternity, as part of the nature of God. The will has no existence apart from particular acts of volition, and since acts of volition are ideas, the will is identical with the understanding.

The third part of the Ethics is devoted to the considera tion of the emotions.

In so far as it has adequate ideas, i.e., is purely rational,

INTRODUCTION. XXVli

the mind may be said to be active ; in so far as it lias inade quate ideas, it is passive, and therefore subject to emotions.

Nothing can be destroyed from within, for all change must come from without. In other words, everything endeavours to persist in its own being. This endeavour must not be associated with the " struggle for existence " familiar to students of evolutionary theories, though the suggestion is tempting ; it is simply the result of a thing being what it is. When it is spoken of in reference to the human mind only, it is equivalent to the will; in reference to the whole man, it may be called appetite. Appetite is thus identified with life ; desire is defined as appetite, with con sciousness thereof. All objects of our desire owe their choiceworthiness simply to the fact that we desire them : we do not desire a thing, because it is intrinsically good, but we deem a thing good, because we desire it. Every thing which adds to the bodily or mental powers of activity is pleasure ; everything which detracts from them is pain.

From these three fundamentals — desire, pleasure, pain —Spinoza deduces the entire list of human emotions. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause ; hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an ex ternal cause. Pleasure or pain may be excited by anything, incidentally, if not directly. There is no need to proceed further with the working out of the theory, but we may remark, in passing, the extraordinary fineness of percep tion and sureness of touch, with which it is accomplished ; here, if nowhere else, Spinoza remains unsurpassed.1 Almost

1 It may be worth while to cite the often-quoted testimony of the distinguished physiologist, Johannes Muller: — "With regard to the relations of the passions to one another apart from their physiological conditions, it is impossible to give any better account than that which Spino/a has laid down with unsurpassed mastery." — Physiologic des Mmachen, ii. 543. He follows up this praise by quoting the propo- sitions in question in extenso.

IXV111 INTRODUCTION.

all the emotions arise from the passive condition of the mind, but there is also a pleasure arising from the mind's contemplation of its own power. This is the source of virtue, and is purely active.

In the fourth part of the Ethics, Spinoza treats of man , in so far as he is subject to the emotions, prefixing a few remarks on the meaning of the terms perfect and imperfect, good and evil. A thing can only be called perfect in re ference to the known intention of its author. We style " good" that which we know with certainty to be useful to us : we style " evil " that which we know will hinder us in the attainment of good. By "useful," we mean that which will aid us to approach gradually the ideal we have set before ourselves. Man, being a part only of nature, must be subject to emotions, because he must encounter circum stances of which he is not the sole and sufficient cause. Emotion can only be conquered by another emotion stronger than itself, hence knowledge will only lift us above the sway of passions, in so far as it is itself " touched with emotion." Every man necessarily, and therefore rightly, seeks his own interest, which is thus identical with virtue ; but his own interest does not lie in selfishness, for man is always in need of external help, and nothing is more useful to him than his fellow-men ; hence individual well-being is best promoted by harmonious social effort. The reasonable man will desire nothing for himself, which he does not desire for other men; therefore he will be just, faithful, and honourable.

The code of morals worked out on these lines bears many resemblances to Stoicism, though it is improbable that Spinoza was consciously imitating. The doctrine that rational emotion, rather than pure reason, is necessary for subduing the evil passions, is entirely his own.

The means whereby man may gain mastery over his passions, are set forth in the first portion of the fifth part

INTRODUCTION.

of the Ethics. They depend on the definition of passion as a confused idea. As soon as we form a clear and dis tinct idea of a passion, it changes its character, and ceases to be a passion. Now it is possible, with due care, to form a distinct idea of every bodily state ; hence a true know ledge of the passions is the best remedy against them. While we contemplate the world as a necessary result of the perfect nature of God, a feeling of joy will arise in our hearts, accompanied by the idea of God as its cause. This is the intellectual love of God, which is the highest happi ness man can know. It seeks for no special love from God in return, for such would imply a change in the nature of the Deity. It rises above all fear of change through envy or jealousy, and increases in proportion as it is seen to be participated in by our fellow-men.

The concluding propositions of the Ethics have given rise to more controversy than any other part of the sys tem. Some critics have maintained that Spinoza is in dulging in vague generalities without -any definite mean ing, others have supposed that the language is inten tionally obscure. Others, again, see in them a doctrine of personal immortality, and, taking them in conjunction with the somewhat transcendental form of the expressions con cerning the love of God, have claimed the author of the Ethics as a Mystic. All these suggestions are reductions to the absurd, the last not least so. Spinoza may have been not unwilling to show that his creed could be expressed in exalted language as well as the current theology, but his "intellectual love " has no more in common with the ecstatic enthusiasm of cloistered saints, than his " God " has in common with the Divinity of Eomanist peasants, or his " eternity " with the paradise of Mahomet. But to return to the doctrine in dispute.1 "The human mind," says Spinoza, " cannot be wholly destroyed with the body, but 1 The explanation here indicated is based on that given by Mr.

XXX INTRODUCTION.

somewhat of it remains, which, is eternal." The eternity thus predicated cannot mean indefinite persistence in time, for eternity is not commensurable with time. It must mean some special kind of existence ; it is, in fact, denned as a mode of thinking. Now, the mind consists of ade quate and inadequate ideas ; in so far as it is composed of the former, it is part of the infinite mind of God, which broods, as it were, over the extended universe as its ex pression in terms of thought. As such, it is necessarily eternal, and, since knowledge implies self-consciousness, it knows that it is so. Inadequate ideas will pass away with the body, because they are the result of conditions, which are merely temporary, and inseparably connected with the body, but adequate ideas will not pass away, inasmuch as they are part of the mind of the Eternal. Knowledge of the third or intuitive kind is the source of our highest per fection and blessedness ; even as it forms part of the infi nite mind of God, so also does the joy with which it is accompanied — the intellectual love of God — form part of the infinite intellectual love, wherewith God regards Himself.

Spinoza concludes with the admonition, that morality rests on a basis quite independent of the acceptance of the mind's Eternity. Virtue is its own reward, and needs no other. This doctrine, which appears, as it were, per functorily in so many systems of morals, is by Spinoxa insisted on with almost passionate earnestness ; few tilings seem to have moved him to more scornful denial than tin- popular creed, that supernatural rewards and punishments are necessary as incentives to virtue. " I see in what mud this man sticks," he exclaims in answer to some such state ment. " He is one of those who would follow after his own lusts, if he were not restrained by the fear of hell. He ab-

Pollock, " Spinoza," &c., ch. ix., to which the reader is referred for a masterly exposition of the question.

INTRODUCTION1. XXXI

stains from evil actions and fulfils God's commands like a slave against his will, and for his bondage he expects to be rewarded by God with gifts far more to his taste than Divine love, and great in proportion to his original dislike of virtue." l Again, at the close of the Ethics, he draws an ironical picture of the pious coming before God at the Judgment, and looking to be endowed with incalculable blessings in recompense for the grievous burden of their piety. For him, who is truly wise, Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. " And though the way thereto be steep, yet it may be found— all things excellent are as difficult, as they are rare."

Such, in rough outline, is the philosophy of Spinoza ; few systems have been more variously interpreted. Its author has been reviled or exalted as Atheist, Pantheist, Mono- theist, Materialist, Mystic, in fact, under almost every name in the philosophic vocabulary. But such off-hand classifi cation is based on hasty reading of isolated passages, rather than on sound knowledge of the whole. We shall act more wisely, and more in the spirit of the master, if, as Professor Land advises, " we call him simply Spinoza, and endeavour to learn from himself what he sought and what he found."

The two remaining works, translated in these volumes, may be yet more briefly considered. They present no special difficulties, and are easily read in their entirety.

The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is an eloquent plea for religious liberty. True religion is shown to consist in the practice of simple piety, and to be quite independent of philosophical speculations. The elaborate systems of dog mas framed by theologians are based on superstition, result ing from fear.

The Bible is examined by a method, which anticipates m great measure the procedure of modern rationalists, and 1 Letter XLIX.

INTRODUCTION.

the theory of its verbal inspiration is shown to be un tenable. The Hebrew prophets were distinguished not by superior wisdom, but by superior virtue, and they set forth their higher moral ideals in language, which they thought would best commend it to the multitude whom they ad dressed. For anthropomorphic notions of the Deity as a heavenly King and Judge, who displays His power by miraculous interventions, is substituted the conception set forth in the Ethics of an Infinite Being, fulfilling in the uniformity of natural law the perfection of His own Nature. Men's thoughts cannot really be constrained by commands ; therefore, it is wisest, so long as their actions conform to morality, to allow them absolute liberty to think what they like, and say what they think.

The Political Treatise was the latest work of Spinoza's life, and remains unfinished. Though it bears abundant evidence of the influence of Hobbes, it differs from him in several important points. The theory of sovereignty is the same in both writers, but Spinoza introduces considerable qualifications. Supreme power is ideally absolute, but its rights must, in practice, be limited by the endurance of its subjects. Thus governments are founded on the common consent, and for the convenience of the governed, who are, in the last resort, the arbiters of their continuance.

Spinoza, like Hobbes, peremptorily sets aside all claims of religious organizations to act independently of, or as superior to the civil power. Both reject as outside the sphere of practical politics the case of a special revelation to an individual. In all matters affecting conduct the State must be supreme.

It remains to say a few words about the present version. I alone am responsible for the contents of these volumes, with the exception of the Political Treatise, which has been translated for me by my friend Mr. A. H. Gosset,

INTRODUCTION. XXX111

Fellow of Now College, Oxford, who lias also, in my absence from England, kindly seen the work through the press. I have throughout followed Bruder's text,1 correcting a few obvious misprints. The additional letters given in Pro fessor Van Yloten's Supplement,2 have been inserted in their due order.

This may claim to be the first version3 of Spinoza's works offered to the English reader ; for, though Dr. K. Willis has gone over most of the ground before, he laboured under the disadvantages of a very imperfect acquaintance with Latin, and very loose notions of accuracy. The Trac- tatus Theologico-Politicus had been previously translated in 1689. Mr. Pollock describes this early version as " pretty accurate, but of no great literary merit."

Whatever my own shortcomings, I have never con sciously eluded a difficulty by a paraphrase. Clearness has throughout been aimed at in preference to elegance. Though the precise meaning of some of the philosophical terms (e.g. idea) varies in different passages, I have, as far as possible, given a uniform rendering, not venturing to attempt greater subtlety than I found. I have abstained from notes ; for, if given on an adequate scale, they would have unduly swelled the bulk of the work. Moreover, excellent commentaries are readily accessible.

R. H. M. ELWES.

1 " B. de Spinosa Opera quse Supersunt Omnia," ed. C. H. Bruder. Leipzig (Tauclmitz\ 1843.

2 "Ad B. D. S. Opera qiue Supersunt Omnia Supplementum." Amsterdam, 1862.

3 While these volumes were passing through the press, a translation of the Ethics appeared by Mr. Hale White (Triibner and Co.). The Tractatus Politicus was translated in 1854 by W. Maccall, but the book lias become so rare as to be practically inaccessible.

A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE

CONTAINING CEETAIN DISCUSSIONS

WHEREIN IS SET FORTH THAT FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH NOT ONLY MAY, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PIETY AND THE PUBLIC PEACE, BE GRANTED | BUT ALSO MAY NOT, WITHOUT DANGER TO PIETY AND THE PUBLIC PEACE, BE WITH HELD.

Hereby know we tbut we dwell in Him, and He in ns, because lie hath given it of His Spirit." — 1 JOHN iv. 13.

PREFACE.

]\/T EN would never be superstitious, if they could govern L all their circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favoured by fortune : but being frequently driven into straits where rules are useless, and being often kept fluc- tuating^pitiably between hope and fear by the uncertainty of fortune's greedily coveted favours, they are consequently, for the most part, very prone to credulity. The human mind is readily swayed this way or that in times of doubt, especially when hope and fear are struggling for the mastery, though usually it is boastful, over- confident, and vain.

This as a general fact I suppose everyone knows, though few, I believe, know their own nature ; no one can have lived in the world without observing that most people, when in prosperity, are so over-brimming with wisdom (however inexperienced they may be), that they take every offer of advice as a personal insult, whereas in adversity they know not where to turn, but beg and pray for counsel from every passer-by. No plan is then too futile, too absurd, or too fatuous for their adoption ; the most frivo lous causes will raise them to hope, or plunge them into de spair—if anything happens during their fright which reminds them of some past good or ill, they think it por tends a happy or unhappy issue, and therefore (though it may have proved abortive a hundred times before) style it a lucky or unlucky omen. Anything which excites their astonishment they believe to be a portent signifying the anger of the gods or of the Supreme Being, and, mis taking superstition for religion, account it impious not to avert the evil with prayer and sacrifice. Signs and wonders

4 A THEOLOOICO-POLITICAL TREATISE.

of this sort they conjure up perpetually, till one might think Nature as mad as themselves, they interpret her so fantastically.

Thus it is brought prominently before us, that super stition's chief victims are those persons who greedily covet temporal advantages ; they it is, who (especially when they are in danger, and cannot help themselves) are wont with prayers and womanish tears to implore help from God : upbraiding Reason as blind, because she cannot show a sure path to the shadows they pursue, and rejecting human wisdom as vain ; but believing the phantoms of imagination, dreams, and other childish absurdities, to be the very oracles of Heaven. As though God had turned away from the wise, and written His decrees, not in the mind of man but in the entrails of beasts, or left them to be proclaimed by the inspiration and instinct of fools, madmen, and birds. Such is the unreason to which terror can drive mankind !

Superstition, then, is engendered, preserved, and fostered by fear. If anyone desire an example, let him take Alex ander, who only began superstition sly to seek guidance from seers, when he first learnt to fear fortune in the passes of Sysis (Curtius, v. 4) ; whereas after he had conquered Darius he consulted prophets no more, till a second time frightened by reverses. When the Scythians were pro voking a battle, the Bactriaiis had deserted, and he him self was lying sick of his wounds, " he once more turned to superstition, the mockery of human wisdom, and bade Aristander, to whom he confided his credulity, inquire the issue of affairs with sacrificed victims." Very numerous examples of a like nature might be cited, clearly showing the fact, that only while under the dominion of fear do men fall a prey to superstition ; that all the portents ever invested with the reverence of misguided religion are mere phantoms of dejected and fearful minds ; and lastly, that prophets have most power among the people, and are most formidable to rulers, precisely at those times when the state is in most peril. I think this is sufficiently plain to all, and will therefore say no more on the subject.

The origin of superstition above given affords us a cVir reason for the fact, that it comes to all men naturally, though some refer its rise to a dim notion of Oo^ uni

tHE PREFACE. 9

versal to mankind, and also tends to show, that it is no less inconsistent and variable than other mental hallucinations and emotional impulses, and further that it can only be maintained by hope, hatred, anger, and deceit; since it springs, not from reason, but solely from the more powerful phases of emotion. Furthermore, we may readily under stand how difficult it is, to maintain in the same course men prone to every form of credulity. For, as the mass of mankind remains always at about the same pitch of misery, it never assents long to any one remedy, but is always best pleased by a novelty which has not yet proved illusive.

This element of inconsistency has been the cause of many terrible wars and revolutions ; for, as Curtius well says (lib. iv. chap. 10) : " The mob has no ruler more i potent than superstition," and is easily led, on the plea of religion, at one moment to adore its kings as gods, and anon to execrate and abjure them as humanity's common bane. Immense pains have therefore been taken to counter act this evil by investing religion, whether true ov false, with such pomp and ceremony, that it may rise superior to every shock, and be always observed with studious reve rence by the whole people — a system which has been brought to great perfection by the Turks, for they consider even controversy impious, and so clog men's minds with dogmatic formulas, that they leave no room for sound reason, not even enough to doubt with.

But if, in despotic statecraft, the supreme and essential mystery be to hoodwink the subjects, and to mask the fear, which keeps them down, with the specious garb of religion, so that men may fight as bravely for slavery as for safety, auJ count it not shame but highest honour to risk their blood and their lives for the vainglory of a tyrant ; yet in a free state no more mischievous expedient could be planned or attempted. Wholly repugnant to the general freedom are such devices as enthralling men's minds with preju dices, forcing their judgment, or employing any of the weapons of quasi-religious sedition ; indeed, such seditions only spring up, when law enters the domain of speculative thought, and opinions are put on trial and condemned on the same footing as crimes, while those who defend and follow them are sacrificed, not to public safety, but to their

6 A. THEOLOQICO-POLITICAL TREATISE.

opponents' hatred and cruelty. If deeds only could be made the grounds of criminal charges, and words were always allowed to pass free, such seditions would be divested of every semblance of justification, and would be separated from mere controversies by a hard and fast line.

Now, seeing that we have the rare happiness of living in a republic, where everyone's judgment is free and unshackled, where each may worship God as his conscience dictates, and where freedom is esteemed before all things dear and precious, I have believed that I should be undertaking no ungrateful or unprofitable task, in demonstrating that not only can such freedom be granted without prejudice to the public peace, but also, that without sue1! freedom, piety cannot flourish nor the public peace be secure.

Such is the chief conclusion I seek to establish in this treatise ; but, in order to reach it, I must first point out the misconceptions which, like scars of our former bondage, still disfigure our notion of religion, and must expose the false views about the civil authority which many have most impudently advocated, endeavouring to turn the mind of the people, still prone to heathen superstition, away from its legitimate rulers, and so bring us again into slavery. As to the order of my treatise I will speak presently, but first I will recount the causes which led me to write.

I have often wondered, that persons who make a boast of professing the Christian religion, namely, love, joy, peace, temperance, and charity to all men, should quarrel with such rancorous animosity, and display daily towards one another such bitter hatred, that this, rather than the vir tues they claim, is the readiest criterion of their faith. Matters have long since come to such a pass, that one can only pronounce a man Christian, Turk, Jew, or Heathen, l>y his general appearance and attire, by his frequenting Ihfs or that place of worship, or employing the phraseology of a particular sect — as for manner of life, it is in all eases the same. Inquiry into the cause of this anomaly leads me unhesitatingly to ascribe it to the fact, that the minis tries of the Church are regarded by the masses merely as dig nities, her offices as posts of emolument — in short, popular religion may be summed up as respect for ecclesiastics. The spread of this misconception inflamed every worthless

THE PREFACE- 7

i?ellow with an intense desire to enter holy orders, and thus the love of diffusing God's religion degenerated into sordid avarice and ambition. Every church became a theatre, where orators, instead of church teachers, harangued, caring not to instruct the people, but striving to attract admiration, to bring opponents to public scorn, and to preach only novelties and paradoxes, such as would tickle the ears of their congregation. This state of things neces sarily stirred up an amount of controversy, envy, and hatred, which no lapse of time could appease ; so that we can scarcely wonder that of the old religion nothing survives but its outward forms (even these, in the mouth of the multitude, seem rather adulation than adoration of the Deity), and that faith has become a mere compound of credulity and prejudices — aye, prejudices too, which de grade man from rational being to beast, which completely stifle the power of judgment between true and false, which seem, in fact, carefully fostered for the purpose of extin guishing the last spark of reason ! Piety, great God ! and religion are become a tissue of ridiculous mysteries ; men, who flatly despise reason, who reject and turn away from understanding as naturally corrupt, these, I say, these of all men, are thought, 0 lie most horrible ! to possess light from on High. Verily, if they had but one spark of light from on High, they would not insolently rave, but would learn to worship God more wisely, and would be as marked among their fellows for mercy as they now are for malice; if they were concerned for their opponents' souls, instead of for their own reputations, they would no longer fiercely persecute, but rather be filled with pity and compassion.

Furthermore, if any Divine light were in them, it would appear from their doctrine. I grant that they are never tired of professing their wonder at the profound mysteries of Holy Writ; still I cannot discover that they teach anything but speculations of Platonists and Aristotelians, to which (in order to save their credit for Christianity) they have made Holy Writ conform; not content to rave with the Greeks themselves, they want to make the pro phets rave also ; showing conclusively, that never even in sleep have they caught a glimpse of Scripture's Divine

A THKOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE.

nature. The veiy vehemence of their admiration for the mysteries plainly attests, that their belief in the Bible is a formal assent rather than a living faith : and the fact is made still more apparent by their laying down beforehand, s a foundation for the study and true interpretation of bcnpture, the principle that it is in every passage true and divine. Such a doctrine should be reached only after strict scrutiny and thorough comprehension of the Sacred Books (which would teach it much better, for they stand in need of no human fictions), and not be set up on the threshold as it were, of inquiry.

As I pondered over the facts that the light of reason is not only despised, but by many even execrated as a source of impiety, that human commentaries are accepted as divine records, and that credulity is extolled as faith ; as I marked the fierce controversies of philosophers raging in Chuivh and State, the source of bitter hatred and dissension the ready instruments of sedition and other ills innumerable, I determined to examine the Bible afresh in a careful, im partial, and unfettered spirit, making no assumptions con cerning it, and attributing to it no doctrines, which I do not find clearly therein set down. With these precautions I constructed a method of Scriptural interpretation, and thus equipped proceeded to inquire — What is prophecy? in what sense did God reveal Himself to the prophets, and why were these particular men chosen by Him ? Was it on account of the sublimity of their thoughts about the Deity and nature, or was it solely on account of their piety ? These questions being answered, I was easily able to con clude, that the authority of the prophets has weight only in matters of morality, and that their speculative doctrines aft'ect us little.

Next I inquired, why the Hebrews were called God's chosen people, and discovering that it was only because G-od had chosen for them a certain strip of territory, where they might live peaceably and at ease, I learnt that the Law revealed by God to Moses was merely the law of the indi vidual Hebrew state, therefore that it was binding on none but Hebrews, and not even on Hebrews after the downfall of their nation. Further, in order to ascertain, whether it could be concluded from Scripture, that the human under-

THE PREFACE. 9

standing is naturally corrupt, I inquired whether the Uni versal Religion, the Divine Law revealed through the Pro phets and Apostles to the whole human race, differs from that which is taught by the light of natural reason, whethei miracles can take place in violation of the laws of nature, and if so, whether they imply the existence of God more surely and clearly than events, which we understand plainly and distinctly through their immediate natural causes.

Now, as in the whole course of my investigation I found nothing taught expressly by Scripture, which does not agree with our understanding, or which is repugnant thereto, and as I saw that the prophets taught nothing, which is not very simple and easily to be grasped by all, and further, that they clothed their teaching in the style, and confirmed it with the reasons, which would most deeply move the mind of the masses to devotion towards God, I became thoroughly convinced, that the Bible leaves reason absolutely free, that it has nothing in common with philo sophy, in fact, that Revelation and Philosophy stand or totally different footings. In order to set this forth categori cally and exhaust the whole question, I point out the way in which the Bible should be interpreted, and show that all knowledge of spiritual questions should be sought from it alone, and not from the objects of ordinary knowledge. Thence I pass on to indicate the false notions, which have arisen from the fact that the multitude — ever prone to superstition, and caring more for the shreds of antiquity than for eternal truths — pays homage to the Books of the Bible, rather than to the Word of God. I show that the Word of God has not been revealed as a certain number of books, but was displayed to the prophets as a simple idea of the Divine mind, namely, obedience to God in singleness of heart, and in the practice of justice and charity; and I further point out, that this doctrine is set forth in Scrip ture in accordance with the opinions and understandings of those, among whom the Apostles and Prophets preached, to the end that men might receive it willingly, and with their whole heart.

Having thus laid bare the bases of belief, I draw the conclusion that Eevelation has obedience for its sole object, and therefore, in purpose no less than in foundation and

A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE.

method, stands entirely aloof from ordinary knowledge • each has its separate province, neither can be called the 3 handmaid of the other.

Furthermore, as men's habits of mind differ so that some more readily embrace one form of faith, some another r what moves one to pray may move another only to scoff i conclude m accordance with what has gone before, that everyone should be free to choose for himself the founda tions of his creed, and that faith should be judged only by its fruits ; each would then obey God freely with his whole heart, while nothing would be publicly honoured save justice and charity.

Having thus drawn attention to the liberty conceded to everyone by the revealed law of God, I pass on to another part of my subject, and prove that this same liberty can and should be accorded with safety to the state and the magis terial authority— in fact, that it cannot be withheld without great danger to peace and detriment to the community

in order to establish my point, I start from the natural rights of the individual, which are co-extensive with his desires and power, and from the fact that no one is bound to live as another pleases, but is the guardian of his own liberty. I show that these rights can only be transferred to those whom we depute to defend us, who acquire with the duties of defence the power of ordering our lives, and thence infer that rulers possess rights only limited by fheir power, that they are the sole guardians of justice and liberty and that their subjects should act in all thin-s as they dictate: nevertheless, since no one can so utterly abdicate his own power of self-defence as to cease to be a man I conclude that no one can be deprived of his natural rights absolutely, but that subjects, either by tacit a<-ree- ment, or by social contract, retain a certain number, which cannot be taken from them without great danger to the state J; rom these considerations I pass on to the Hebrew State which I describe at some length, in order to trace the' manner in which Jteligion acquired the force of law and touch on other noteworthy points. I then prove, that the holders of sovereign power are the depositaries and interpreters of religious no less than of civil ordinances and that they alone have tlio right to decide what is just or

THE PREFACE. 11

unjust, pious or impious ; lastly, I conclude by showing, that they best retain this right and secure safety to their state by allowing every man to think what he likes, and say what he thinks.

Such, Philosophical Eeader, are the questions I submit to your notice, counting on your approval, for the subject matter of the whole book and of the several chapters is im portant and profitable. I would say more, but I do not want my preface to extend to a volume, especially as I know that its leading propositions are to Philosophers but common places. To the rest of mankind I care not to commend my treatise, for I cannot expect that it contains anything to please them : I know how deeply rooted are the prejudices embraced under the name of religion ; I am aware that in the mind of the masses superstition is no less deeply rooted than fear ; I recognize that their constancy is mere obsti nacy, and that they are led to praise or blame by impulse rather than reason. Therefore the multitude, and those of like passions with the multitude, I ask not to read my book; nay, I would rather that they should utterly neglect it, than that they should misinterpret it after then- wont. They would gain no good themselves, and might prove a stumbling-block to others, whose philosophy is hampered by the belief that Eeason is a mere handmaid to Theology, and whom I seek in this work especially to benefit. But as there will be many who have neither the leisure, nor, perhaps, the inclination to read through all I have^ written, I feel bound here, as at the end of my treatise, to declare that I have written nothing, which I do not most willingly submit to the examination and judgment of ^my country's rulers, and that I am ready to retract any thing, which they shall decide to be repugnant to the laws or prejudicial to the public good. I know that I am a man and, as a man, liable to error, but against error T have taken scrupulous care, and striven to keep in entire accordance with the laws of my country, with loyalty, and with morality.

THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE

CHAPTER I.

OF PROPHECY.

TjBOPHECY, or revelation, is sure knowledge revealed A >y God to man. A prophet is one who interprets the revelations of God to those who are unable to attain to sure knowledge of the matters revealed, and therefore can only apprehend them by simple faith.

The Hebrew word for prophet is " nabi," l i.e. speaker or interpreter, but in Scripture its meaning is restricted to in terpreter of God, as we may learn from Exodus vii. 1, where God says to Moses, " See, I have made thee a god to Pha raoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet ; " im plying that, since in interpreting Moses' words to Pharaoh, Aaron acted the part of a prophet, Moses would be to Pharaoh as a god, or in the attitude of a god.

Prophets I will treat of in the next chapter, and at pre sent consider prophecy.

Now it is evident, from the definition above given, that prophecy really includes ordinary knowledge ; for the know ledge which we acquire by our natural faculties depends on our knowledge of God and His eternal laws ; but ordinary knowledge is common to all men as men, and rests on foun dations which all share, whereas the multitude always strains after rarities and exceptions, and thinks little of the gifts of nature ; so that, when prophecy is talked of, ordi nary knowledge is not supposed to be included. Neverthe- 1 See Notes, p. 209, Note 1.

14 A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE. [CHAP. I,

less it has as much right as any other to be called Divine, for God's nature, in so far as we share therein, and God's laws, dictate it to us ; nor does it suffer from that to which we give the pre-eminence, except in so far as the latter trans cends its limits and cannot be accounted for by natural laws taken in themselves. In respect to the certainty it involves, and the source from which it is derived, i.e. God, ordinary knowledge is no whit inferior to prophetic, unless indeed we believe, or rather dream, that the prophets had human bodies but superhuman minds, and therefore that their sensations and consciousness were entirely different from our own.

But, although ordinary knowledge is Divine, its professors cannot be called prophets,1 for they teach what the rest of mankind could perceive and apprehend, not merely by simple faith, but as surely and honourably as themselves.

Seeing then that our mind subjectively contains in itself and partakes of the nature of God, and solely from this cause is enabled to form notions explaining natural pheno mena and inculcating morality, it follows that we may rightly assert the nature of the human mind (in so far as it is thus conceived) to be a primary cause of Divine reve lation. All that we clearly and distinctly understand is dictated to us, as I have just pointed out, by the idea and nature of God ; not indeed through words, but in a way far more excellent and agreeing perfectly with the nature of the mind, as all who have enjoyed intellectual certainty will doubtless attest. Here, however, my chief purpose is to speak of matters having reference to Scripture, so these few words on the light of reason will suffice.

I will now pass on to, and treat more fully, the other ways and means by which God makes revelations to man kind, both of that which transcends ordinary knowledge, and of that within its scope ; for there is no reason why God should not employ other means to communicate what we know already by the power of reason.

Our conclusions on the subject must be drawn solely from Scripture ; for what can we affirm about matters transcending our knowledge except what is told us by the words or writings of prophets? And since there are, so far as I know, no prophets now alive, we have no alternative but

1 Sec- Note 2.

CHAP. I.] OF PROPHECY. 15

to read the books of prophets departed, taking care the while not to reason from metaphor or to ascribe anything to our authors which they do not themselves distinctly state. I must further premise that the Jews never make any men- tion^ or account of secondary, or particular causes, but in a spirit of religion^ piety, and what is commonly called godli ness, refer all things directly to the Deity. For instance, if they make money by a transaction, they say God gave it to them ; if they desire anything, they say God has disposed 1 heir hearts towards it ; if they think anything, they say God told them. Hence we must not suppose that every thing is prophecy or revelation which is described in Scripture as told by God to anyone, but only such things as are expressly announced as prophecy or revelation, or are plainly pointed to as such by the context.

A perusal of the sacred books will show us that all God's revelations to the prophets were made through words or appearances, or a combination of the two. These words and appearances were of two kinds ; (1) real when external^ to the mind of the prophet who heard or saw them, (2) imaginary when the imagination of the prophet was in a state which led him distinctly to suppose that he heard or saw them.

With a real voice God revealed to Moses the laws which He wished to be transmitted to the Hebrews, as we may see from Exodus xxv. 22, where God says, " And there I will meet with thee and I will commune with thee from the mercy seat which is between the Cherubim." Some sort of real voice must necessarily have been employed, for Moses found God ready to commune with him at any time. This, as I shall shortly show, is the only instance of a real voice! We might, perhaps, suppose that the voice with which God called Samuel was real, for in 1 Sam. iii. 21, we read, "And the Lord appeared again in Shiloh, for the Lord re-' vealed^ Himself to Samuel in Shiloh by the word of the Lord ; " implying that the appearance of the Lord consisted in His making Himself known to Samuel through a voice ; in other words, that Samuel heard the Lord speaking. But we are compelled to distinguish between the prophecies of M"oses and those of other prophets, and therefore must de cide that this voice was imaginary, a conclusion further

16 A TTTKOLOrUfO-rOLTTIOAL TRKATTSK. [cifAP. I.

supported by the voice's resemblance to the voice of Eli, which Samuel was in the habit of hearing, and therefore might easily imagine ; when thrice called by the Lord, Samuel supposed it to have been Eli.

The voice which Abimelech heard was imaginary, for it is written, Gen. xx. 6, " And God said unto him in a dream." So that the will of God was manifest to him, not in waking, but only in sleep, that is, when the imagination is most active and uncontrolled. Some of the Jews believe that the actual words of the Decalogue were not spoken by God, but that the Israelites heard a noise only, without any distinct words, and during its continuance apprehended the Ten Commandments by pure intuition ; to this opinion I myself once inclined, seeing that the words of the Decalogue in Exodus are different from the words of the Decalogue in Deuteronomy, for the discrepancy seemed to imply (since God only spoke once) that the Ten Commandments were not intended to convey the actual words of the Lord, but only His meaning. However, unless we would do violence to Scripture, we must certainly admit that the Israelites heard a real voice, for Scripture expressly says, Deut. v. 4, " God spake with you face to face," i.e. as two men ordinarily interchange ideas through the instrumentality of their two bodies ; and therefore it seems more consonant with Holy Writ to suppose that God really did create a voice of some kind with which the Decalogue was revealed. The discre pancy of the two versions is treated of in Chap. V1JJ.

Yet not even thus is all difficulty removed, for it seems scarcely reasonable to affirm that a created thing, depend ing on God in the same manner as other created things, would be al >le to express or explain the nature of God either verbally or really by means of its individual organism : for instance, by declaring in the first person, "I am the Lord your God."

Certainly when anyone says with his mouth, " I under- st and," we do not attribute the understanding to the mouth, hut to the mind of the speaker; yet this is because the mouth is the natural organ of a man speaking, and the hearer, knowing what understanding is, easily comprehends, by a comparison with himself, that the speaker's mind is meant ; but if we knew nothing of God l>eyond the mere

CHAP. I.] OF PROPHECY. 17

name and wished to commune with Him, and be assured of His existence, I fail to see how our wish would be satisfied by the declaration of a created thing (depending on God neither more nor less than ourselves), " I am the Lord." If God contorted the lips of Moses, or, I will not say Moses, but some beast, till they pronounced the words, " I am the Lord," should we apprehend the Lord's existence therefrom?

Scripture seems clearly to point to the belief that God spoke Himself, having descended from heaven to Mount Sinai for the purpose — and not only that the Israelites heard Him speaking, but that their chief men beheld Him (Ex. xxiv.) Further the law of Moses, which might neither be added to nor curtailed, and which was set up as a national standard of right, nowhere prescribed the belief that God is without body, or even without form or figure, but only ordained that the Jews should believe in His existence and worship Him alone : it forbade them to invent or fashion any likeness of the Deity, but this was to insure purity of service ; because, never having seen God, they could not by means of images recall the likeness of God, but only the likeness of some created thing which might thus gradually take the place of God as the object of their adoration. Nevertheless, the Bible clearly implies that God has a form, and that Moses when he heard God speaking was permitted to behold it, or at least its hinder parts.

Doubtless some mystery lurks in this question which we will discuss more fully below. For the present I will call attention to the passages in Scripture indicating the means by which God has revealed His laws to man.

Revelation may be through figures only, as in 1 Chron. xxii., where God displays his anger to David by means of an angel bearing a sword, and also in the story of Balaam.

Maimonides and others do indeed maintain that these and every other instance of angelic apparitions (e.g. to Manoah and to Abraham offering up Isaac) occurred during sleep, for that no one with his eyes open ever could see an angel, but this is mere nonsense. The sole object of such com mentators seems to be to extort from Scripture confirmations of Aristotelian quibbles and their own inventions, a pro ceeding which I regard as the acme of absurdity.

In figures, not real but existing only in the prophet's c

A THKOLOfllCO-POLITlCAL TRKATISF.. [< 'HAP. I.

imagination, God revealed to Joseph his future lordship, and in words and figures He revealed to Joshua that He would fight for the Hebrews, causing to appear an angel, as it were the Captain of the Lord's host, bearing a sword, and by this means communicating verbally. The forsaking of Israel by Providence was portrayed to Isaiah by a vision of the Lord, the thrice Holy, sitting on a very lofty throne, and the Hebrews, stained with the mire of their sins, sunk as it were in vmcleanness, and thus as far as possible dis tant from God. The wretchedness of the people at the time was thus revealed, while future calamities were foretold in words. I could cite from Holy AVrit many similar examples, but I think they are sufficiently well known already.

However, we get a still more clear confirmation of our position in Num. xii. 6, 7, as follows : " If there be any prophet among you, I the Lord will make myself known unto him in a vision" (i.e. by appearances and signs, for God says of the prophecy of Moses that it was a vision without signs), " and will speak unto him in a dream " (i.e. not with actual words and an actual voice). " My servant Moses is not so; with him will I speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in dark speeches, and the similitude oi' the Lord he shall behold," i.f. looking on me as a friend and not afraid, he speaks with me (cf. Ex. xxxiii. 17)

This makes it indisputable that the other prophets did not hear a real voice, and we gather as much from Dent, xxiv. 10 r "And there arose not a prophet since in Israel like unto Moses whom the Lord knew face to face," which must mean that the Lord spoke with none other ; for not even Moses saw the Lord's face. These are the only media of communication between God and man which I find mentioned in Scripture, and therefore the only ones which may be supposed or invented. We may be able quite to comprehend that God can communicate immediately with man, for without the intervention of bodily means He_ com municates to our minds His essence; still, a man who can by pure intuition comprehend ideas which are neither contained in nor deducible from the foundations of our natural know- ledge, must necessarily possess a niind far superior to those of his fellow men, nor do I believe that any have been so i'ii lowed save Christ. To Him the ordinances of God lead-

f'HAf. OF r-ftOMlECY. 19

ing men to salvation were revealed directly without words or visions, so that God manifested Himself to the Apostles through the mind of Christ as He formerly did to Moses through the supernatural voice. In this sense the voice of Christ, like the voice which Moses heard, may be called the voice of God, and it may be said that the wisdom of God (i.e. wisdom more than human) took upon itself in Christ human nature, and that Christ was the way of salvation. I must at this juncture declare that those doctrines which certain churches put forward concerning Christ, I neither affirm nor deny, for I freely confess that I do not under stand them. What I have just stated I gather from Scrip ture, where I never read that God appeared to Christ, or spoke to Christ, but that God was revealed to the Apostles through Christ ; that Christ was the Way of Life, and that the old law was given through an angel, and not imme diately by God ; whence it follows that if Moses spoke with God face to face as a man speaks with his friend (i.e. by means of their two bodies) Christ communed with God 'mind to mind..

Thus we may conclude that no one except Christ re ceived the revelations of God without the aid of imagina tion, whether in words or vision. Therefore the power of prophecy implies not a peculiarly perfect mind, but a peculiarly vivid imagination, as I will show more clearly in the next chapter. We will now inquire what is meant in the Bible by the Spirit of God breathed into the pro phets, or by the prophets speaking with the Spirit of God ; to that end we must determine the exact signification of the Hebrew word ruagh, commonly translated spirit.

The word ruagh literally means a wind, e.g. the south wind, but it is frequently employed in other derivative significations. It is used as equivalent to,

(1.) Breath: "Neither is there any spirit in his mouth," Ps. cxxxv. 17.

(2.) Life, or breathing: " And his spirit returned to him," 1 Sam. xxx. 12 ; i.e. he breathed again.

(3.) Courage and strength: "Neither did there remain any more spirit in any man," Josh. ii. 11 ; "And the spirit entered into me, and made me stand on my feet," Ezek. ii. 2.

(4.) Virtue and fitness : " Days should speak, and multi-

<20 A THKOUXilCO-rOUTlCAL TREATISE. [cHAP. I.

s of years should teach wisdom ; but there is a spirit an," Job xxxii. 7 ; i.e. wisdom is not always found among

tudes

in m

old men, for I now discover that it depends on individual

virtue and capacity. So, "A man in whom is the Spirit,"

Numbers xxvii. 18.

(5.) Habit of mind : " Because he had another spirit with him," Numbers xiv. 24 ; i.e. another habit of mind. " Be hold I will pour out My Spirit unto you," Prov. i. 23.

(6.) Will, purpose, desire, impulse : " Whither the spirit was to go, they went," Ezek. i. 12 ; " That cover with a covering, but not of My Spirit," Is. xxx. 1 ; " For^the Lord hath poured out on you the spirit of deep sleep," Is. xxix. 10 ; "Then was their spirit softened," Judges viii. 3 ; " He that ruleth his spirit, is better than he that taketh a ^ity," Prov. xvi. 32 ; " He that hath no rule over his own spirit," Prov. xxv. 28 ; " Your spirit as fire shall devour you," Isaiah xxxiii. 1.

From the meaning of disposition we get—

(7.) Passions and "faculties. A lofty spirit means pride, a lowly spirit humility, an evil spirit hatred and melan choly. So, too, the expressions spirits of jealousy, fornica- tion, wisdom, counsel, bravery, stand for a jealous, lasci vious, wise, prudent, or brave mind (for we Hebrews use substantives in preference to adjectives), or these various qualities.

(8.) The mind itself, or the life : " Yea, they have all one spirit," Eccles. iii. 19 ; "The spirit shall return to God Who gave it."

(9.) The quarters of the world (from the winds which blow thence), or even the side of anything turned towards a particular quarter- -Ezek. xxxvii. 9; xlii. 16, 17, IK,

19, &c.

I have already alluded to the way in which things are referred to God, and said to be of God.

(1.) As belonging to His nature, and being, as it were, part of Him ; e.y. the power of God, the eyes of God.

(2.) As under His dominion, and depending on His pleasure; thus the heavens are called the heavens of tin- Lord, as being His chariot and habitation. So Nebuchad nezzar is called the servant of God, Assyria the scourge of God, &c.

CHAP. I.] OF PROPHECY. 21

(3.) As dedicated to Him, e.g. the Temple of God, a Nazarene of God, the Bread of God.

(4.) As revealed through the prophets and not through our natural faculties. In this sense the Mosaic law is called the law of God.

(5.) As being in the superlative degree. Very high moun tains are styled the mountains of God, a very deep sleep, the sleep of God, &c. In this sense we must explain Amos iv. 11 : "I have overthrown you as the overthrow of the Lord came upon Sodom and Gomorrah," i.e. that me morable overthrow, for since God Himself is the Speaker, the passage cannot well be taken otherwise. The wisdom of Solomon is called the wisdom of God, or extraordinary. The size of the cedars of Lebanon is alluded to in the Psalmist's expression, " the cedars of the Lord."

Similarly, if the Jews were at a loss to understand any phenomenon, or were ignorant of its cause, they referred it to God. Thus a storm was termed the chiding of God, thunder and lightning the arrows of God, for it was thought that God kept the winds confined in caves, His treasuries; thus differing merely in name from the Greek wind-god Eolus. In like manner miracles were called works of God, as being especially marvellous ; though in reality, of course, ' all natural events are the works of God, and take place solely by His power. The Psalmist calls the miracles in Egypt the works of God, because the Hebrews found in them a way of safety which they had not looked for, and therefore especially marvelled at.

As, then, unusual natural phenomena are called works of God, and trees of unusual size are called trees of God, we cannot wonder that very strong and tall men, though impious robbers and whoremongers, are in Genesis called sons of God.

This reference of things wonderful to God was not peculiar to the Jews. Pharaoh, on hearing the interpreta tion of his dream, exclaimed that the mind of the gods was in Joseph. Nebuchadnezzar told Daniel that he possessed the mind of the holy gods ; so also in Latin anything well \madc is often said to be wrought with Divine hands, which is equivalent to the Hebrew phrase, wrought with the hand bf God.

A THEOLOGICO-POLTTTOAL TREATISE. [>TTAr. I.

We can now very easily understand and explain those passages of Scripture which speak of the Spirit of God. In some places the expression merely moans a very strong, dry, and deadly wind, as in Isaiah xl. 7, "The grass withereth, the flower fad eth, because the Spirit of the Lord bloweth upon it." Similarly in Gen. i. 2 : " The Spirit of the Lord moved over the face of the waters." At other times it is used as equivalent to a high courage, thus the spirit of Gideon and of Samson is called the Spirit of the Lord, as being i ery bold, and prepared for any emergency. Any unusual virtue or power is called the Spirit or Virtue of the Lord, Ex. xxxi. 3: "I will fill him (Bezaleel) with the Spirit of the Lord," i.e., as the Bible itself explains, with talent above man's usual endowment. So Isa. xi. 2 : " And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him," is explained afterwards in the text to mean the spirit of wisdom and understanding, of counsel and might.

The melancholy of Saul is called the melancholy of the Lord, or a very deep melancholy, the persons who applied the term showing that they understood by it nothing super natural, in that they sent for a musician to assuage it by jharp-playing. Again, the " Spirit of the Lord "is used a's [equivalent to the mind of man, for instance, Job xxvii. 3 : "And the Spirit of the Lord in my nostrils," the allusion being to Gen. ii. 7 : " And God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life." Ezekiel also, prophesying to the dead, says (xxvii. 14), " And I will give to you My Spirit, and ye shall live ;" i.e. I will restore you to life. In Job xxxiv. 14, we read : " If He gather unto Himself His Spirit and breath ;" in Gen. vi. 3 : " My Spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh," i.e. since man acts on the dictates of his body, and not the spirit which I gave him to discern the good, I will let hi.Ti alone. So, too, Ps. li. 12 : "Create in me a clean heart, 0 God, and renew a right spirit within me ; cast me not awaj from Thy presence, and take not I Thy Holy Spirit from me." It was supposed that sin origi- / iiitteil only from the body, and that good impulses come • from the mind ; therefore the Psalmist invokes the aid of God against the bodily appetites, but prays that the spirit which the Lord, the Holy One, had given him might be re newed. Again, inasmuch as the Bible, in concession i.o

CHAP. I.] OF PROPHECY. 23

popular ignorance, describes God as having a mind, a heart, emotions — nay, even a body and breath — the expression Spirit of the Lord is used for God's mind, disposition, emotion, strength, or breath. Thus, Isa. xl. 13: "Who hath disposed the Spirit of the Lord? " i.e. who, save Him self, hath caused the mind of the Lord to will anything ? and Isa. Ixiii. 10 : " But they rebelled, and vexed the Holy Spirit."

The phrase comes to be used of the law of Moses, which in a sense expounds God's will, Is. Ixiii. 11, " Where is He that put His Holy Spirit within him?" meaning, as we clearly gather from the context, the law of Moses. Nehe- miah, speaking of the giving of the law, says, i. 20, " Thou gavest also thy good Spirit to instruct them." This is referred to in Deut. iv. 6, "This is your wisdom and understanding," and in Ps. cxliii. 10, "Thy good Spirit will lead me into the land of uprightness." The Spirit of the Lord may mean the breath of the Lord, for breath, no less than a mind, a heart, and a body are attributed to God in Scripture, as in Ps. xxxiii. 6. Hence it gets to mean the power, strength, or faculty of God, as in Job xxxiii. 4, " The Spirit of the Lord made me," i.e. the power, or, if you prefer, the decree of the Lord. So the Psalmist in poetic language declares, xxxiii. 6, " By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of His mouth," i.e. by a mandate issued, as it were, in one breath. Also Ps. cxxxix. 7, " Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee from Thy pre sence?" i.e. whither shall I go so as to be beyond Thy power and Thy presence ?

Lastly, the Spirit of the Lord is used in Scripture to express the emotions of God, e.g. His kindness and mercy, Micah ii. 7, " Is the Spirit [i.e. the mercy] of the Lord straitened ? Are these cruelties His doings ? " Zech. iv. 6, "Not by might or by power, but My Spirit [i.e. mercy], saith the Lord of hosts." The twelfth verse of the seventh chapter of the same prophet must, I think, be interpreted in like manner : " Yea, they made their hearts as an adamant stone, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of hosts hath sent in His Spirit [i.e. in His mercy] by the former prophets." So also

4

A ^HEOLOGICO-rOLITICAL TREATISE. [CHAP. I.

Haggai ii. 5 : "So My Spirit remaineth amoug you : fear ye not."

The passage in Isaiah xlviii. 16, "And now the Lord God and His Spirit hath sent me," may be taken to refer either to God's mercy or His revealed law ; for the prophet says, " From the beginning " (i.e. from the time when I first came to you, to preach God's anger and His sentence gone forth against you) " I spoke not in secret ; from the time that it was, there am I," and now I am sent by the mercy of God as a joyful messenger to preach your resto ration. Or we may understand him to mean by the re vealed law that he had before come to warn them by the command of the law (Levit. xix. 17) in the same manner and under the same conditions as Moses had warned them, and that now, like Moses, he ends by preaching their resto ration. But the first explanation seems to me the best.

Returning, then, to the main object of our discussion, we find that the Scriptural phrases, " The Spirit of the Lord was upon a prophet," " The Lord breathed His Spirit into men," "Men were filled with the Spirit of God, with the Holy Spirit," &c., are quite clear to us, and mean that the prophets were endowed with a peculiar and extraordi nary power, and devoted themselves to piety with especial constancy;1 that thus they perceived the mind or the thought of God, for we have shown that God's Spirit, signifies in Hebrew God's mind or thought, and that the law which shows His mind and thought is called His Spirit ; hence that the imagination of the prophets, inas much as through it were revealed the decrees of God, may equally be called the mind of God, and the prophets be said to have possessed the mind of God. On our minds also the mind of God and His eternal thoughts are im pressed ; but this being the same for all men is less taken into account, especially by the Hebrews, who claimed a pre-eminence, and despised other men and other men's knowledge.

Lastly, the prophets were said to possess the Spirit ol God because men knew not the cause of prophetic know ledge, and in their wonder referred it with other marvels directly to the Deity, styling it Divine knowledge.

We need no longer scruple to affirm that the prophets 1 See Note 3.

CHAP. I.] OF PROPHECY. 25

?only perceived God's revelation by the aid of imagination, . that is, by words and figures either real or imaginary. We find no other means mentioned in Scripture, and therefore must not invent any. As to the particular law of Nature by which the communications took place, I confess my ignorance. I might, indeed, say as others do, that they took place by the power of God ; but this would be mere 1 trifling, and no better than explaining some unique speci- : men by a transcendental term. Everything takes place by the power of God. Nature herself is the power of God under another name, and our ignorance of the power of God is co-extensive with our ignorance of Nature. It is absolute folly, therefore, to ascribe an event to the power of God when we know not its natural cause, which is the power of God.

However, we are not now inquiring into the causes of prophetic knowledge. We are only attempting, as I have said, to examine the Scriptural documents, and to draw our conclusions from them as from ultimate natural facts ; the causes of the documents do not concern us.

As the prophets perceived the revelations of God by the aid of imagination, they could indisputably perceive much that is beyond the boundary of the intellect, for many more ideas can be constructed from words and figures than from the principles and notions on which the whole fabric of reasoned knowledge is reared.

Thus we have a clue to the fact that the prophets per ceived nearly everything in parables and allegories, and clothed spiritual truths in bodily forms, for such is the usual method of imagination. We need no longer wonder that Scripture and the prophets speak so strangely and obscurely of God's Spirit or Mind (cf. Numbers xi. 17, 1 Kings xxii. 21, &c.), that the Lord was seen by Micah as sitting, by Daniel as an old man clothed in white, by Ezekiel as a fire, that the Holy Spirit appeared to those with Christ as a descending dove, to the apostles as fierv tongues, to Paul on his conversion as a great light. All these expressions are plainly in harmony with the current ideas of God and spirits.

Inasmuch as imagination is fleeting and inconstant, we find that the power of prophecy did not remain with a

20 A TTTF.OLOOTrO-rOUTICAL TRFATTSE. [Y'TIAP. I.

prophet for long, nor manifest itself frequently, but was very rare; manifesting itself only in a few men, and in them not often.

We must necessarily inquire how the prophets became assured of the truth of what they perceived by imagina tion, and not by sure mental laws ; but our investigation must be confined to Scripture, for the subject is one on which we cannot acquire certain knowledge, and which we cannot explain by the immediate causes. Scripture teach ing about the assurance of prophets I will treat of in the next chapter.

THAP. IT.] OF PROPHETS. 27

I

CHAPTER II.

OP PROPHETS.

T follows from the last chapter that, as I have said, the prophets were endowed with unusually vivid imagina tions, and not with unusually perfect minds. This conclu sion is amply sustained by Scripture, for we are told that Solomon was the wisest of men, but had no special faculty of prophecy. Heman, Calcol, and Dara, though men of great talent, were not prophets, whereas uneducated countrymen, nay, even women, such as Hagar, Abraham's handmaid, were thus gifted. Nor is this contrary to ordi nary experience and reason. Men of great imaginative )• power are less fitted for abstract reasoning, whereas those 1 who excel in intellect and its use keep their imagination more restrained and controlled, holding it in subjection, so to speak, lest it should usurp the place of reason.

Thus to suppose that knowledge of natural and spiritual

phenomena can be gained from the prophetic books, is an

utter mistake, which I shall endeavour to expose, as I think

philosophy, the age, and the question itself demand. I

care not for the girdings of superstition, for superstition is

the bitter enemy of all true knowledge and true morality.

Yes ; it has come to this ! Men who openly confess that

• they can form no idea of God, and only know Him through

!' created things, of which they know not the causes, can

' imblushingly accuse philosophers of Atheism.

Treating the question methodically, I will show that pro phecies varied, not only according to the imagination and physical temperament of the prophet, but also according to his particular opinions ; and further that prophecy never rendered the prophet wiser than he was before. But I will first discuss the assurance of truth which the prophets re ceived, for this is akin to the subject-matter of the chapter, a.ud will serve to elucidate somewhat our present point.

28 A THKOT.O.Jir-O-POLITICAL TBKATIHK. [CHAP. II.

Imagination does not, in its own nature, involve any cer tainty of truth, such as is implied in every clear ami distinct idea, but requires some extrinsic reason to assure us of its objective reality : hence prophecy cannot afford certainty, and the prophets were assured of God's revela tion by some sign, and not by the fact of revelation, as we may see from Abraham, who, when he had heard the pro mise of God, demanded a sign, not because he did not believe in God, but because he wished to be sure that it was God Who made the promise. The fact is still more evident in the case of Gideon : " Show me," he says to God, " show me a sign, that I may know that it is Thou that talkest with me." God also says to Moses : " And let this be a sign that I have sent thee." Hezekiah, though he had long known Isaiah to be a prophet, none the less demanded a sign of the cure which he predicted. It is thus quite evident that the prophets always received some sign to certify ^hem of their prophetic imaginings; and for this reasor Moses bids the Jews (Dent, xviii.) ask of the pro phets a sign, namely, the prediction of some coming event. In this respect, prophetic knowledge is inferior to natural knowledge, which needs no sign, and in itself implies certi tude. Moreover, Scripture warrants the statement that the certitude of the prophets was not mathematical, but moral. Moses lays down the punishment of death for the prophet who preaches new gods, even though he confirm his doctrine by signs and wonders (Dent, xiii.); "For," he says, " the Lord also worketh signs and wonders to try His people." And Jesus Christ warns His disciples of the same thing (Matt. xxiv. 24). Furthermore, Ezekiel (xiv. 9) plainly states that God sometimes deceives men with false revelations; and Micaiah bears like witness in the case of the prophets of Ahab.

Although these instances go to prove that revelation is open to doubt, it nevertheless contains, as we have said, a considerable element of certainty, for God never deceives the good, nor His chosen, but (according to the ancient proverb, and as appears in the history of Abigail and her speech), God uses the good as instruments of goodness, and the wicked as means to execute His wrath. This may be scon from the case of Micaiah above quoted ; for although

OIIAP. II.] OF PROPHETS. 29

£rod had determined to deceive Aliab, through prophets, He made use of lying prophets ; to the good prophet He revealed the truth, and did not forbid his proclaiming it.

Still the certitude of prophecy remains, as I have said, merely moral; for no one can justify himself before God, nor boast that he is an instrument for God's goodness. Scripture itself teaches and shows that God led away David to number the people, though it bears ample witness to David's piety.

The whole question of the certitude of prophecy was based on these three considerations : — •

1. That the things revealed were imagined very vividly, affecting the prophets in the same way as things seen when awake ;

2. The presence of a sign ;

3. Lastly and chiefly, that the mind of the prophet was given wholly to what was right and good.

Although Scripture does not always make mention of a sign, we must nevertheless suppose that a sign was always vouchsafed; for Scripture does not always relate every condition and circumstance (as many have remarked), but rather takes them for granted. We in ly, however, admit that no sign was needed when the prophecy declared nothing that was not already contained in the law of Moses, because it was confirmed by that law. For instance, Jeremiah's prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem was confirmed by the prophecies of other y rophets, and by the threats in the law, and, therefore, )t needed no sign; whereas Hananiah, who, contrary to a1! the prophets, fore told the speedy restoration of the stai e, stood in need of a sign, or he would have been in doubt as to the truth of his prophecy, until it was confirmed by 1 facts. "The prophet which prophesieth of peace, when th 3 word of the prophet shall come to pass, then shall the ) >rophet be known that the Lord hath truly sent him."

As, then, the certitude afforded to 1 he prophet by signs was not mathematical (i.e. did not necess* rily follow from the per ception of the thing perceived or se^n), but only moral, and as the signs were only given to c mvince the prophet, it follows that such signs were given a> '.cording to the opinions and capacity of each prophet, so that a sign which would

30 A THEOLCKJICO-POL1TICAL TREATISE. [CHAP. II.

Convince one prophet would fall far short of convincing another who was imbued with different opinions. There fore the signs varied according to the individual prophet.

So also did the revelation vary, as we have stated, according to individual disposition and temperament, and according to the opinions previously held.

It varied according to disposition, in this way : if a prophet was cheerful, victories, peace, and events which make men glad, were revealed to him; in that he was naturally more likely to imagine such things. If, on the contrary, he was melancholy, wars, massacres, and calami ties were revealed ; and so, according as a prophet was merciful, gentle, quick to anger, or severe, he was more fitted for one kind of revelation than another. It varied according to the temper of imagination in this way: if a prophet was cultivated he perceived the mind of God in a cultivated way, if he was confused he perceived it con fusedly. And so with revelations perceived through visions. If a prophet was a country man he saw visions of oxen, cows, and the like; if he was a soldier, he saw generals and armies ; if a courtier, a royal throne, and so on.

Lastly, prophecy varied according to the opinions held 1 >y the prophets ; for instance, to the Magi, who believed in the follies of astrology, the birth of Christ was revealed through the vision of a star in the East. To the augurs of Nebuchadnezzar the destruction of Jerusalem was revealed through entrails, whereas the king himself inferred it from oracles and the direction of arrows which he shot into the air. To prophets who believed that man acts from free choice and by his own power, God was revealed as standing apart from and ignorant of future human actions. All of which we will illustrate from Scripture.

The first point is proved from the case of Elislia, who, in order to prophecy to Jehoram, asked for a harp, and was unable to perceive the Divine purpose till he had been re created by its music; then, indeed, he prophesied to Jeho ram and to his allies glad tidings, which previously he had been unable to attain to because he was angry with the king, and those who are angry with anyone can imagine evil of him, but not good. The theory that God does not reveal Himself to the angry or the sad, is a mere dream:

CHAP. II.] OF PROPHETS. 31

for God revealed to Moses while angry, the tern bit1 slaughter of the firstborn, and did so without the interven tion of a harp. To Cain in his rage, God was revealed, and to Ezekiel, impatient with anger, was revealed the contumacy and wretchedness of the Jews. Jeremiah, miserable and weary of life, prophesied the disasters of the Hebrews, so that Josiah would not consult him, but inquired of a woman, inasmuch as it was more in accordance with womanly nature that God should reveal His mercy thereto. So, Micaiah never prophesied good to Ahab, though other true prophets had done so, but invariably evil. Thus we see that individual prophets were by temperament more fitted for one sort of revelation than another.

The style of the prophecy also varied according to the eloquence of the individual prophet. The prophecies of Ezekiel and Amos are not written in a cultivated style like those of Isaiah and Nahum, but more rudely. Any Hebrew scholar who wishes to inquire into this point more closely, and compares chapters of the diiferent prophets treating of the same subject, will find great dissimilarity of style. Compare, for instance, chap. i. of the courtly Isaiah, verse 11 to verse 20, with chap. v. of the countryman Amos, verses 21-24. Compare also the order and reasoning of the prophecies of Jeremiah, written in Idumsea (chap, xlix.) with the order and reasoning of Obadiah. Compare, lastly,' Isa. xl. 19, 20, and xliv. 8, with Hosea viii. 6, and xiii. 2! And so on.

A due consideration of these passage will clearly show riTi that God has no particular style in speaking, but, accord ing to the learning and capacity of the prophet, is cultivated, ^compressed, severe, untutored, prolix, or obscure.

There was, moreover, a certain variation in the visions vouchsafed to the prophets, and in the symbols by which they expressed them, for Isaiah saw the glory of the Lord departing from the Temple in a different form from that presented to Ezekiel. The Eabbis, indeed, maintain that both visions were really the same, but that Ezekiel, beim-- a countryman, was above measure impressed by it, anil therefore set it forth in full detail; but unless there is a trustworthy tradition on the subject, which I do not for a moment believe, this theory is plainly an invention. Isaiah

32 A TIIKOLOOICO-POMTICAL TKKATlSfc. [CHAP. II.

saw seraphim with six wings, Ezekiel beasts with four wings ; Isaiah saw God clothed and sitting on a royal throne, Ezekiel saw Him in the likeness of a fire; each doubtless saw God under the form in which he usually imagined Him.

Further, the visions varied in clearness as well as in de tails; for the revelations of Zechariah were too obscure to lie understood by the prophet without explanation, as ap pears from his narration of them ; the visions of Daniel could not be understood by him even after they had been explained, and this obscurity did not arise from the diffi culty of the matter revealed (for being merely human atYairs, these only transcended human capacity in being future), but solely in the fact that Daniel's imagination was not so capable for prophecy while he was awake as while he was asleep ; and this is further evident from the fact that at the very beginning of the vision he was so terrified that he almost despaired of his strength. Thus, on account of the inadequacy of his imagination and his strength, the things revealed were so obscure to him that he could not understand them even after they had been explained. Here we may note that the words heard by Daniel, were, as we have shown above, simply imaginary, so that it is hardly wonderful that in his frightened state he imagined them so confusedly and obscurely that afterwards he could make nothing of them. Those who say that God did not wish to make a clear revelation, do not seem to have read the words of the angel, who expreosly says that he came to make the prophet understand what should befall his people in the latter days (Dan. x. 14).

The revelation remained obscure because no one was found, at Ihat time, with imagination sufficiently strong to conceive it more clearly.

Lastly, the prophets, to whom it was revealed that God wrmld take away Elijah, wished to persuade Elisha that he had been taken somewhere where they would find him ; showing sufficiently clearly that they had not understood God's revelation aright.

There is no need to set this out more amply, for nothing 18 more plain in the ISiMe than that God endowed some prophets with far greater gifts of prophecy than others.

CHAP. II. J OF PROPHETS. 88

But I will show in greater detail and length, for I consider the point more important, that the prophecies varied accord ing to the opinions previously embraced by the prophets, and that the prophets held diverse and even contrary opin ions and prejudices. (I speak, be it understood, solely of matters speculative, for in regard to uprightness and mora lity the case is widely different.) From thence I shall con clude that prophecy never rendered the prophets more learned, but left them with their former opinions, and that we ^ are, therefore, not at all bound to trust them in matters of intellect.

Everyone has been strangely hasty in affirming that the prophets knew everything within the scope of human intel lect ; and, although certain passages of Scripture plainly affirm that the prophets were in certain respects ignorant, such persons would rather say that they do not understand the passages than admit that there was anything which the prophets did not know ; or .else they try to wrest the Scrip tural words away from their evident meaning.

If either of these proceedings is allowable we may as well shut our Bibles, for vainly shall we attempt to prove any thing from them if their plainest passages may be classed among obscure and impenetrable mysteries, or if we may put any interpretation on them which we fancy. For instance, nothing is more clear in the Bible than that Joshua, and perhaps also the author who wrote his history, thought that the sun revolves round the earth, and that the earth is fixed, and further that the sun for a certain period remained still. Many, who will not admit any movement in the heavenly bodies, explain away the passage till it seems to mean something quite different ; others, who have learned to philosophize ^ more correctly, and understand that the earth moves while the sun is still, or at any rate does not revolve round the earth, try with all their might to wrest tliis meaning from Scripture, though plainly nothing of the sort is intended. Such quibblers excite my wonder ! Are we, forsooth, bound to believe that Joshua the soldier was a learned astronomer? or that a miracle could not be re vealed to him, or that the light of the sun could not remain longer than usual above the horizon, without his knowing the cause ? To me "both alternatives appear ridiculous, and

p

34 A THEOLOOICO-POLITICAL TREATISE. [CHAP. II.

therefore I would rather say that Joshua was ignorant of the true cause of the lengthened day, and that he and the whole host with him thought that the sun moved round the earth every day, and that on that particular occasion it stood still for a time, thus causing the light to remain longer ; and I would say that they did not conjecture that, from the amount of snow in the air (see Josh. x. 11), the refraction may have been greater than usual, or that there may have been some other cause which we will not now in quire into.

So also the sign of the shadow going back was revealed to Isaiah according to his understanding ; that is, as pro ceeding from a going backwards of the sun ; for he, too, thought that the sun moves and that the earth is still ; of parhelia he perhaps never even dreamed. We may arrive at this conclusion without any scruple, for the sign could really have come to pass, and have been predicted by Isaiah to the king, without the prophet being aware of the real cause.

With regard to the building of the Temple by Solomon, if it was really dictated by GTod we must maintain the same doctrine : namely, that all the measurements were revealed according to the opinions and understanding of the king ; for as we are not bound to believe that Solomon was a mathematician, we may affirm that he was ignorant of the true ratio between the circumference and the diameter of a circle, and that, like the generality of workmen, he thought that it was as three to one. But if it is allowable to declare that we do not understand the passage, in good sooth I know nothing in the Bible that we can understand ; for the process of building is there narrated simply and as a mere matter of history. If, again, it is permitted to pretend that the passage has another meaning, and was written as it is from some reason unknown to us, tlu's is no less than a complete subversal of the Bible ; for every absurd and evil invention of human perversity could thus, without detriment to Scriptural authority, be defended and fostered. Our conclusion is in no wise impious, for though Solomon, Isaiah, Joshua, <fec. were prophets, they were none the less men, and as such not exempt from human shortcomings.

According to the understanding of Noah it was revealed

CHAP. II.] OF PROPHETS. 35

to him that God was about to destroy the whole human race, for Noah thought that beyond the limits of Palestine the world was not inhabited.

Not only in matters of this kind, but in others more important, the prophets could be, and in fact were, igno rant; for they taught nothing special about the Divine attributes, but held quite ordinary notions about God, and to these notions their revelations were adapted, as I will demonstrate by ample Scriptural testimony ; from all which one may easily see that they were praised and commended, not so much for the sublimity and eminence of their intel lect as for their piety and faithfulness.

Adam, the first man to whom God was revealed, did not know that He is omnipotent and omniscient; for he hid himself from Him, and attempted to make excuses for his fault before God, as though he had had to do with a man ; therefore to him also was God revealed according to his under standing— that is, as being unaware of his situation or his sin, for Adam heard, or seemed to hear, the Lord walking in the garden, calling him and asking him where he was ; and then, on seeing his shamefacedness, asking him whether he had eaten of the forbidden fruit. Adam evidently only knew the Deity as the Creator of all things. To Cain also God was revealed, according to his understanding, as igno rant of human affairs, nor was a higher conception of the Deity required for repentance of his sin.

To Laban the Lord revealed Himself as the God of Abraham, because Laban believed that each nation had its own special divinity (see Gen. xxxi. 29). Abraham also knew not that God is omnipresent, and has foreknowledge of all things ; for when he heard the sentence against the in habitants of Sodom, he prayed that the Lord should not execute it till He had ascertained whether they all merited such punishment ; for he said (see Gen. xviii. 24), " Pcrad- venture there be fifty righteous within the city/' and in accordance with this belief God was revealed to him ; as Abraham imagined, He spake thus : "I will go down now, and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it which ^is come unto Me ; and, if not, I will know." Further, the Divine testimony concerning Abraham asserts nothing but that he was obedient, and that he " commanded

36 A THEOLOGICO-rOLITICAt, TREATISE. [CHAP. II.

his household after him that they should keep the way of the Lord " (Gen. xviii. 19) ; it dot's not state that he held sul.)liinc conceptions of the Deity.

Moses, also, was not sufficiently aware that God is om niscient, and directs human actions by His sole decree, for although God Himself says that the Israelites should hearken to Him, Moses still considered the matter doubtful and repeated, " But if they will not believe me, nor hearken unto my voice." To him in like manner God was revealed as taking no part in, and as being ignorant of, future human actions : the Lord gave him two signs and said, " And it shall come to pass that if they will not believe thee, neither hearken to the voice of the first sign, that they will believe the voice of the latter sign ; but if not, thou shalt take of the water of the river," &c. Indeed, if any one considers without prejudice the recorded opinions of Moses, he will plainly see that Moses conceived the Deity as a Being Who has always existed, does exist, and always will exist, and for this cause he calls Him by the name Jehovah, wlu'ch in Hebrew signifies these three phases of existence : as to His nature, Moses only taught that He is merciful, gracious, and exceeding jealous, as appears from many passages in the Pentateuch. Lastly, he believed and taught that this Being was so different from all other beings, that He could not be expressed by the image of any visible thing ; also, that He could not be looked upon, and that not so much from inherent impossibility as from human infirmity ; further, that by reason of His power He was without equal and unique. Moses admitted, indeed, that there were beings (doubtless by the plan and command of the Lord) who acted as God's vicegerents — that is, beings to whom God had given the right, authority, and power to direct nations, and to provide and care for them ; but he taught that this Being Whom they were bound to obey was the highest and Supreme God, or (to use the Hebrew phrase) God of gods, and thus in the song (Exod. xv. 11) he ex claims, " Who is like unto Thee, O Lord, among the gods r" and Jethro says (Exod. xviii. 11), " Now I know that the Lord is greater than all gods." That is to say, " I am at length compelled to admit to Moses that Jehovah is greater t ban all crods, and that His power is unrivalled." We must

CHAP. II.] OF PROPHETS. 87

remain in doubt whether Moses thought that these beings who acted as God's vicegerents were created by Him, for he has stated nothing, so far as we know, about their creation and origin. He further taught that this Being had brought the visible world into order from Chaos, and had given Nature her germs, and therefore that He possesses supreme right and power over all things ; further, that by reason of this supreme right and power He had chosen for Himself alone the Hebrew nation and a certain strip of territory, and had handed over to the care of other gods substituted by Him self the rest of the nations and territories, and that therefore He was called the God of Israel and the God of Jerusalem, whereas the other gods were called the gods of the Gentiles. For this reason the Jews believed that the strip of territory which God had chosen for Himself, demanded a Divine worship quite apart and different from the worship which obtained elsewhere, and that the Lord would not suffer the worship of other gods adapted to other countries. Thus they thought that the people whom the king of Assyria had brought into Judaea were torn in pieces by lions because they knew not the worship of the National Divinity (2 Kings xvii. 25).

Jacob, according to Aben Ezra's opinion, therefore ad monished his sons when he wished them to seek out a new country, that they should prepare themselves for a new worship, and lay aside the worship of strange gods— that is, of the gods of the land where they were (Gen. xxxv. 2, 3).

David, in telling Saul that he was compelled by the king's persecution to live away from his country, said that he was driven out from the heritage of the Lord, and sent to worship other gods (1 Sam.xxvi. 19). Lastly, he believed that this Being or Deity had His habitation in the heavens (Dent, xxxiii. 27), an opinion very common among the Gentiles.

If we now examine the revelations to Moses, we shall find that they were accommodated to these opinions ; as he believed that the Divine Nature was subject to the con ditions of mercy, graciousness, &c., so God was revealed to him in accordance with his idea and under these attri butes (see Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7, and the second command ment). Further it is related (Ex. xxxiii. 18) that Moses asked of God that he might behold Him, but as Moses (as

38 JL THEOLOGtCO-POLITICAL TREATISE. [cHAP. II.

we have said) had formed no mental image of God, and God (as I have shown) only revealed Himself to the pro phets in accordance with the disposition of their imagi nation, He did not reveal Himself in any form. This, I repeat, was because the imagination of Moses was unsuit able, for other prophets bear witness that they saw the Lord ; for instance, Isaiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, £c. For this reason God answered Moses, " Thou canst not see My face;" and inasmuch as Moses believed that God can be looked upon — that is, that no contradiction of the Divine nature is therein involved (for otherwise he would never have preferred his request) — it is added, " For no one shall look on Me and live," thus giving a reason in accordance with Moses' idea, for it is not stated that a contradiction of the Divine nature would be involved, as was really the case, but that the thing would not come to pass because of human infirmity.

When God would reveal to Moses that the Israelites, because they worshipped the calf, were to be placed in the same category as other nations, He said (ch. YYYIIJ. 2, 3), that He would send an angel (that is, a being who should have charge of the Israelites, instead of the Supreme Being), and that He Himself would no longer remain among them ; thus leaving Moses no ground for supposing that the Israelites were more beloved by God than the other nations whose guardianship He had entrusted to other beings or angels (vide verse 16).

Lastly, as Moses believed that God dwelt in the heavens, God was revealed to him as coming down from heaven on to a mountain, and in order to talk with the Lord Moses went up the mountain, which he certainly need not have done if he could have conceived of God as omni present.

The Israelites knew scarcely anything of God, although He was revealed to them ; and this is abundantly evident from their transferring, a few days afterwards, the honour ;md worship due to Him to a calf, which they believed to !><• the £od who had brought them out of Egypt. In truth, it is hardly likely that men accustomed to the super- stitionn of Egypt, uncultivated and sunk in most abject slavery, should have held any sound notions about tho

CHAP. II.] OF PROPHETS. 39

Deity, or that Moses should have taught them anything beyond a rule of right living; inculcating it not like a philosopher, as the result of freedom, but like a lawgiver compelling them to be moral by legal authority. Thus the rule of right living, the worship and love of God, was to them rather a bondage than the true liberty, the gift and grace of the Deity. Moses bid them love God and keep His law, because they had in the past received benefits from Him (such as the deliverance from slavery in Egypt), and further terrified them with threats if they transgressed His commands, holding out many promises of good if they should observe them ; thus treating them as parents treat irrational children. It is, therefore, certain that they knew not the excellence of virtue and the true happiness.

Jonah thought that he was fleeing from the sight of God, which seems to show that he too held that God had entrusted the care of the nations outside Judsea to other substituted powers. No one in the whole of the Old Testa ment speaks more rationally of God than Solomon, who in fact surpassed all the men of his time in natural ability. Yet he considered himself above the law (esteeming it only to have been given for men without reasonable and intel lectual grounds for their actions), and made small account of the laws concerning kings, which are mainly three : nay, he openly violated them (in this he did wrong, and acted in a manner unworthy of a philosopher, by indulging in sen sual pleasure), and taught that all Fortune's favours to mankind are vanity, that humanity has no nobler gift than wisdom, and no greater punishment than folly. See Pro verbs xvi. 22, 23.

But let us return to the prophets whose conflicting opinions we have undertaken to note.

The expressed ideas of Ezekiel seemed so diverse from those of Moses to the Rabbis who have left us the extant prophetic books (as is told in the treatise of Sabbathus, i. 13, 2), that they had serious thoughts of omitting his pro phecy from the canon, and would doubtless have thus excluded it if a certain Hananiah had not undertaken to explain it; a task which (as is there narrated) he with great zeal and labour accomplished. How he did so does not sufficiently appear, whether it was by writing a com-

40 A THEOLOOtCO-POLITICAL TREATISE. [CHAP. H.

mentaiy which has now perished, or by altering Ezekiel's words and audaciously striking out phrases according to his fancy. However this may be, chapter xviii. certainly does not seem to agree with Exodus xxxiv. 7, Jeremiah xxxii. 18, &c.

Samuel believed that the Lord never repented of any thing He had decreed (1 Sam. xv. 29), for when Saul was sorry for his sin, and wished to worship God and ask for forgiveness, Samuel said that the Lord would not go back from his decree.

To Jeremiah, on the other hand, it was revealed that, "If that nation against whom I (the Lord) have pro nounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them. If it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then I will repent of the good where with I said I would benefit them" (Jer. xviii. 8-10). Joel (ii. 13) taught that the Lord repented Him only of evil. Lastly, it is clear from Gen. iv. 7 that a man can over come the temptations of sin, and act righteously ; for this doctrine is told to Cain, though, as we learn from Josephus and the Scriptures, he never did so overcome them. And this agrees with the chapter of Jeremiah just cited, for it is there said that the Lord repents of the good or the evil pronounced, if the men in question change their ways and manner of life. But, on the other hand, Paul (Eom. ix. 10) teaches as plainly as possible that men have no control over the temptations of the flesh save by the special voca tion and grace of God. And when (Eom. iii. 5 and vi. 19) he attributes righteousness to man, he corrects himself as speaking merely humanly and through the infirmity of the flesh.

We have now more than sufficiently proved our point, that God adapted revelations to the understanding and opinions of the prophets, and that in matters of theory without bearing on charity or morality the prophets could be, and, in fact, were, ignorant, and held conflicting opinions. It therefore follows that we must by no means go to the prophets for knowledge, either of natural or of spiritual phenomena.

We have determined, then, that we are only bound to belie vo in the prophetic writings, the object and substance

CHAP. II.] OF PROPHETS. 41

of the revelation ; with regard to the details, every one may believe or not, as he likes.

For instance, the revelation to Cain only teaches us that G-od admonished him to lead the true life, for such alone is the object and substance of the revelation, not doctrines concerning free will and philosophy. Hence, though the freedom of the will is clearly implied in the words of the admonition, we are at liberty to hold a contrary opinion, since the words and reasons were adapted to the under standing of Cain.

So, too, the revelation to Micaiah would only teach that God revealed to him the true issue of the battle between Ahab and Aram ; and this is all we are bound to believe. Whatever else is contained in the revelation concerning the true and the false Spirit of G-od, the army of heaven stand ing on the right hand and on the left, and all the other details, does not affect us at all. Every one may believe as much of it as his reason allows.

The reasonings by which the Lord displayed His power to Job (if they really were a revelation, and the author of the history is narrating, and not merely, as some suppose, rhetorically adorning his own conceptions), would come under the same category — that is, they were adapted to Job's understanding, for the purpose of convincing him, and are not universal, or for the convincing of all men.

We can come to no different conclusion with respect to the reasonings of Christ, by which He convicted the Phari sees of pride and ignorance, and exhorted His disciples to lead the true life. He adapted them to each man's opinions and principles. For instance, when He said to the Phari sees (Matt. xii. 26), "And if Satan cast out devils, his house^is divided against itself, how then shall his kingdom stand? "He only wished to convince the Pharisees according to their own principles, not to teach that there are devils, or any kingdom of devils. So, too, when He said to His disciples (Matt. viii. 10), " See that ye despise not one of these little ones, for I say unto you that their angels," &c., He merely desired to warn them against pride and despising any of their fellows, not to insist on the actual reason given, which was simply adopted in order to persuade them more easily.

42 A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE. [clIAP. IL

Lastly, we should say exactly the same of the apostolic signs and reasonings, but there is no need to go further into the subject. If I were to enumerate all the passages of Scripture addressed only to individuals, or to a particular man's understanding, and which cannot, without great danger to philosophy, be defended as Divine doctrines, I should go far beyond the brevity at which I aim. Let it suffice, then, to have indicated a few instances of general application, and let the curious reader consider others by himself. Although the points we have just raised concern ing prophets and prophecy are the only ones which have any direct bearing on the end in view, namely, the separa tion of Philosophy from Theology, still, as I have touched on the general question, I may here inquire whether the gift of prophecy was peculiar to the Hebrews, or whether it was common to all nations. I must then come to a conclu sion about the vocation of the Hebrews, all of which I shall do in the ensuing chapter.

CHJLP. III.] OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS. 43

CHAPTEE m.

OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS, AND WHETHER THE GIFT OF PROPHECY WAS PECULIAR TO THEM.

man's true happiness and blessedness consist J--' solely in the enjoyment of what is good, not in the pride that he alone is enjoying it, to the exclusion of others. He who thinks himself the more blessed because he is en joying benefits which others are not, or because he is more blessed or more fortunate than his fellows, is ignorant of true happiness and blessedness, and the joy which he feels is either childish or envious and malicious. For instance, a man's true happiness consists only in wisdom, and the knowledge of the truth, not at all in the fact that he is wiser than others, or that others lack such knowledge : such considerations do not increase his wisdom or true happiness.

Whoever, therefore, rejoices for such reasons, rejoices in another's misfortune, and is, so far, malicious and bad, knowing neither true happiness nor the peace of the true life.

When Scripture, therefore, in exhorting the Hebrews to }bey the law, says that the Lord has chosen them for Him self before other nations (Deut. x. 15) ; that He is neai them, but not near others (Deut. iv. 7) ; that to them alone He has given just laws (Deut. iv. 8) ; and, lastly, that He has marked them out before others (Deut. iv. 32) ; it speaks only according to the understanding of its hearers, who, as we have shown in the last chapter, and as Moses also testifies (Deut. ix. 6, 7), knew not true blessedness. For in good sooth they would have been no less blessed if God had called all men equally to salvation, nor would God have been less present to them for being equally pre sent to others ; their laws would have been no less just if they had been ordained for all, and they themselves would have been no less wise. The miracles would have shown

44 A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TKEATISE. [CHAP. III.

God's power no less by being wrought for other nations also ; lastly, the Hebrews would have been just as much bound to worship God if He had bestowed all these gifts equally on all men.

When God tells Solomon (1 Kings iii. 12) that no one shall be as wise as he in time to come, it seems to be only a manner of expressing surpassing wisdom ; it is little to be believed that God would have promised Solomon, for his greater happiness, that He would never endow anyone with so much wisdom in time to come ; this would in no wise have increased Solomon's intellect, and the wise king would have given equal thanks to the Lord if everyone had been gifted with the same faculties.

Still, though we assert that Moses, in the passages of the Pentateuch just cited, spoke only according to the under standing of the Hebrews, we have no wish to deny that God ordained the Mosaic law for them alone, nor that He spoke to them alone, nor that they witnessed marvels beyond those which happened to any other nation ; but we wish to emphasize that Moses desired to admonish the Hebrews in such a manner, and with such reasonings as would appeal most forcibly to their childish understanding, and constrain them to worship the Deity. Further, we wished to show that the Hebrews did not surpass other nations in knowledge, or in piety, but evidently in some attribute different from these ; or (to speak like the Scrip tures, according to their understanding), that the Hebrews were not chosen by God before others for the sake of the true life and sublime ideas, though they were often thereto admonished, but with some other object. What that object was, I will duly show.

But before I begin, I wish in a few words to explain what I mean by the guidance of God, by the help of God, external and inward, and, lastly, what I understand by fortune.

By the help of God, I mean the fixed and unchangeable order of nature or the chain of natural events : for I have said before and shown elsewhere that the universal laws of nature, according to which all things exist and are deter mined, are only another name for the eternal decrees of God, which always involve eternal truth and necessity,

CHAP. III.] OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS. 45

So that to say that everything happens according to natural laws, and to say that everything is ordained by the decree and ordinance of God, is the same thing. Now since the power in nature is identical with the power of God, by which alone all things happen and are determined, it follows that whatsoever man, as a part of nature, provides himself with to aid and preserve his existence, or whatsoever nature affords him without his help, is given to him solely by the Divine power, acting either through human nature or through external circumstance. So whatever human nature can furnish itself with by its own efforts to preserve its existence, may be fitly called the inward aid of God, whereas whatever else accrues to man's profit from outward causes may be called the external aid of God.

We can now easily understand what is meant by the election of God. For since no one can do anything save by the predetermined order of nature, that is by God's eternal ordinance and decree, it follows that no one can choose a plan of life for himself, or accomplish any work save by God's vocation choosing him for the work or the plan of life in question, rather than any other. Lastly, by fortune, I mean the ordinance of God in so far as it directs human life through external and unexpected means. With these preliminaries I return to my purpose of discovering the reason why the Hebrews were said to be elected by God before other nations, and with the demonstration I thus proceed.

All objects of legitimate desire fall, generally speaking, under one of these three categories : —

1. The knowledge of things through their primary causes.

2. The government of the passions, or the acquirement of the habit of virtue.

3. Secure and healthy life.

The means which most directly conduce towards the first two of these ends, and which may be considered their proximate and efficient causes are contained in human nature itself, so that their acquisition hinges only on our own power, and on the laws of human nature. It may be concluded that these gifts are not peculiar to any nation, but have always been shared by the whole human race, unless, indeed, we would indulge the dream that nature formerly

46 A THEOLOGICO-POLTTTCAL TREATISE. [CHAP. III.

created men of different kinds. But the means which conduce to security and health are chiefly in external circumstance, and are called the gifts of fortune because they depend chiefly on objective causes of which we are ignorant ; for a fool may be almost as liable to happiness or unhappiness as a wise man. Nevertheless, human management and watchfulness can greatly assist towards living in security and warding off the injuries of our fellow-men, and even of beasts. Reason and experience show no more certain means of attaining this object than the formation of a society with fixed laws, the occupation of a strip of territory, and the concentration of all forces, as it were, into one body, that is the social body. Now for forming and preserving a society, no ordinary ability and care is required : that society will be most secure, most stable, and least liable to reverses, which is founded and directed by far-seeing and careful men ; while, on the other hand, a society constituted by men without trained skill, depends in a great measure on fortune, and is less constant. If, in spite of all, such a society lasts a long time, it is owing to some other directing influence than its own ; if it overcomes great perils and its affairs prosper, it will perforce marvel at and adore the guiding Spirit of God (in so far, that is, as God works through hidden means, and not through the nature and mind of man), for everything happens to it unexpectedly and contrary to anticipation, it may even be said and thought to be by miracle. Nations, then, are distinguished from one another in respect to the social organization and the laws under which they live and are governed ; the He brew nation was not chosen by God in respect to its wisdom nor its tranquillity of mind, but in respect to its social or ganization and the good fortune with which it obtained supremacy and kept it so many years. This is abundantly clear from Scripture. Even a cursory perusal will show us that the only respects in which the Hebrews surpassed other nations, are in their successful conduct of matters re lating to government, and in their surmounting great perils solely by God's external aid; in other ways they were on a par with their fellows, and God was equally gracious to all. For in respect to intellect (as we have shown in the last chapter) they held very ordinary ideas about God aua

CHAP. III.] OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS. 47

nature, so that they cannot have been God's chosen in this respect ; nor were they so chosen in respect of virtue and the true life, for here again they, with the exception of a very few elect, were on an equality with other nations : therefore their choice and vocation consisted only in the temporal happiness and advantages of independent rule. In fact, we do not see that God promised anything beyond this to the patriarchs1 or their successors ; in the law no other reward is offered for obedience than the continual happiness of an independent commonwealth and other o-oods of this life ; while, on the other hand, against contu macy and the breaking of the covenant is threatened the downfall of the commonwealth and great hardships. Nor is this to be wondered at; for the ends of every social or ganization and commonwealth are (as appears from what we have said, and as we will explain more at length here after) security and comfort ; a commonwealth can only exist by the laws being binding on all. If all the members of a state wish to disregard the law, by that very fact they dis solve the state and destroy the commonwealth. Thus, the only reward which could be promised to the Hebrews for continued obedience to the law was security2 and its atten dant advantages, while no surer punishment could be threatened for disobedience, than the ruin of the state and the evils which generally follow therefrom, in addition to such further consequences as might accrue to the Jews in particular from the ruin of their especial state. But there is no need here to go into this point at more length. I will only add that the laws of the Old Testament were revealed and ordained to the Jews only, for as God chose them in respect to the special constitution of their society and go vernment, they must, of course, have had special laws. Whether God ordained special laws for other nations also, and revealed Himself to their lawgivers prophetically, that is, under the attributes by which the latter were accustomed to imagine Him, I cannot sufficiently determine. It is evi dent from Scripture itself that other nations acquired supremacy and particular laws by the external aid of God ; witness only the two following passages : —

In Genesis xiv. 18, 19, 20, it is related that Melchisedek was king of Jerusalem and priest of the Most High God, 1 See Note 4. 2 gee Note 5.

48 A THEOLOOICO-POLITICAL TREATISE. [CHAP. III.

that in exercise of his priestly functions he blessed Abra- ham, and that Abraham the beloved of the Lord gave to this priest of God a tithe of all his spoils. This sufficiently shows that before He founded the Israelitish nation God constituted kings and priests in Jerusalem, and ordained for them rites and laws. Whether He did so prophetically is, as I have said, not sufficiently clear ; but I am sure of this, that Abraham, whilst he sojourned in the city, lived scrupulously according to these laws, for Abraham had re ceived no special rites from God ; and yet it is stated (Gen. xxvi. 5), that he observed the worship, the precepts, the statutes, and the laws of God, which must be interpreted to mean the worship, the statutes, the precepts, and the laws of king Melchisedek. Malachi chides the Jews as follows (i. 10-11.) : — " Who is there among you that will shut the doors ? [of the Temple] ; neither do ye kindle fire on mine altar for nought. I have no pleasure in you, saith the Lord of Hosts. For from the rising of the sun, even until the going down of the same My Name shall be great among the Gentiles ; and in every place incense shall be offered in My Name, and a pure offering ; for My Name is great among the heathen, saith the Lord of Hosts." These words, which, unless we do violence to them, could only refer to the current period, abundantly testify that the Jews of that time were not more beloved by God than other nations, that God then favoured other nations with more miracles than He vouchsafed to the Jews, who had then partly recovered their empire without miraculous aid ; and, lastly, that the Gentiles possessed rites and ceremonies acceptable to God. But I pass over these points lightly : it is enougli for my purpose to have shown that the election of the Jews had regard to nothing but temporal physical happiness and freedom, in other words, autonomous govern ment, and to the manner and means by which they obtained it ; consequently to the laws in so far as they were neces sary to the preservation of that special government ; and, lastly, to the manner in which they were revealed. In re gard to other matters, wherein man's true happiness con sists, they were on a par with the rest of the nations.

When, therefore, it is said in Scripture (Deut. iv. 7) that the Lord is not so nigh to amy other nation as He is to the

CHAP. III.] OF THE VOCATION OF THE HESEFWS. 49

Jews, reference is only made to their government, and to the period when so many miracles happened to them, for in respect of intellect and virtue — that is, in respect of blessed ness — God was, as we have said already, and are now de monstrating, equally gracious to all. Scripture itself bears testimony to this fact, for the Psalmist says (cxlv. 18), " The Lord is near unto all them that call upon Him, to all that call upon Him in truth." So in the same Psalm, verse 9, " The Lord is good to all, and His tender mercies are over all His works." In Ps. xxxiii. 15, it is clearly stated that God has granted to all men the same intellect, in these words, " He fe.-shioneth their hearts alike." The heart was considered by the Hebrews, as I suppose every one knows, to be the seat of the soul and the intellect.

Lastly, from Job xxxviii. 28, it is plain that God had or dained for the whole human race the law to reverence God, to keep from evil doing, or to do well, and that Job, although a Gentile, was of all men most acceptable to God, because he excelled all in piety and religion. Lastly, from Jonah iv. 2, it is very evident that, not only to the Jews but to all men, God was gracious, merciful, long-suffering, and of great goodness, and repented Him of the evil, for Jonah says : " Therefore I determined to flee before unto Tarshish, for I know that Thou art a gracious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness," &c., and that, therefore, God would pardon the Niuevites. We conclude, therefore (inasmuch as God is to all men equally gracious, and the Hebrews were only chosen by Him m re spect to their social organization and government), that the individual Jew, taken apart from his social organization and government, possessed no gift of God above other men, and that there was no difference between Jew and Gentile. As it is a fact that God is equally gracious, merciful, and the rest, to all men ; and as the function of the prophet was to teach men not so much the laws of their country, as true virtue, and to exhort them thereto, it is not to be doubted that all nations possessed prophets, and that the prophetic gift was not peculiar to the Jews. Indeed, his tory, both profane and sacred, bears witness to the fact. Although, from the sacred histories of the Old Testament, it is not evident that the other nations had as many pro-

50 A TnEOLOGlCO-POLITICAL TREATISE. fcHAP. III.

phets as the Hebrews, or that any Gentile prophet was ex pressly sent "by God to the nations, this does not affect the question, for the Hebrews were careful to record their own affairs, not those of other nations. It suffices, then, that we find in the Old Testament Gentiles, and uncircumcised, as Noah, Enoch, Abimelech, Balaam, &c., exercising pro phetic gifts ; further, that Hebrew prophets were sent by God, not only to their own nation but to many others also. Ezekiel prophesied to all the nations then known ; Obadiah to none, that we are aware of, save the Idumeans; and Jonah was chiefly the prophet to the Ninevites. Isaiah bewails and predicts the calamities, and hails the restora tion not only of the Jews but also of other nations, for he says (chap. xvi. 9), "Therefore I will bewail Jazer with weeping ;" and in chap. xix. he foretells first the calamities and then the restoration of the Egyptians (see verses 19, 20, 21, 25), saying that God shall send them a Saviour to free them, that the Lord shall be known in Egypt, and, further, that the Egyptians shall worship God with sacri fice and oblation; and, at last, he calls that nation the blessed Egyptian people of God ; all of which particulars are specially noteworthy.

Jeremiah is called, not the prophet of the Hebrew nation, but simply the prophet of the nations (see Jer. i. 5). He also mournfully foretells the calamities of the nations, and predicts their restoration, for he says (xlviii. 31) of the Moabites, " Therefore will I howl for Moab, and I will cry out for all Moab" (verse 36), "and therefore mine heart shall sound for Moab like pipes ;" in the end he prophesies their restoration, as also the restoration of the Egyptians, Am monites, and Elainites. Wherefore it is beyond doubt that other nations also, like the Jews, had their prophets, who prophesied to them.

Although Scripture only makes mention of one man, Balaam, to whom the future of the Jews and the other nations was revealed, we must not suppose that Balaam prophesied only that once, for from the narrative itself it is abundantly clear that he had long previously been famous for prophecy and other Divine gifts. For when Balak bade him come to him, he said (Num. xxii. 6), " For I wot that he whom thou blessest is blessed, and he whom thou cursest

CHAP. III.] OF THE VOCATION OF THE HEBREWS. M

is cursed." Thus we see that he possessed the gift which God had bestowed on Abraham. Further, as accustomed to prophesy, Balaam bade the messengers wait for him till the will of the Lord was revealed to him. When he pro phesied, that is, when he interpreted the true mind of God, he was wont to say this of himself : " He hath said, which heard the words of God and knew the knowledge of the Most High, which saw the vision of the Almighty falling into a trance, but having his eyes open." Further, after he had blessed the Hebrews by the command of God, he began (as was his custom) to prophesy to other nations, and to predict their future ; all of which abundantly shows that he had always been a prophet, or had often prophesied, and (as we may also remark here) possessed that which afforded the chief certainty to prophets of the truth of their prophecy, namely, a mind turned wholly to what is right and good, for he did not bless those whom he wished to bless, nor curse those whom he wished to curse, as Balak supposed, but only those whom God wished to be blessed or cursed. Thus he answered Balak: "If Balak should give me his house full of silver and gold, I cannot go beyond the commandment of the Lord to do either good or bad of my own mind ; but what the Lord saith, that will I speak." As for God being angry with him in the way, the same happened to Moses when he set out to Egypt by the command of the Lord ; and as to his receiving money for prophesying, Samuel did the same (1 Sam. ix. 7,8); if in anv way he sinned, " there is not a just man upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not," Eccles. vii. 20. (Vide 2 Epist. Peter ii. 15, 16, and Jude 5, 11.)

His speeches must certainly have had much weight with God, and His power for cursing must assuredly have been very great from the number of times that we find stated in Scripture, in proof of God's great mercy to the Jews, that God would not hear Balaam, and that He changed the cursing to blessing (see Deut. xxiii. 6, Josh. xxiv. io, Neh. xiii. 2). Wherefore he was without doubt most acceptable to God, for the speeches and cursings of the wicked move God not at all. As then he was a true prophet, and never theless Joshua calls him a soothsayer or augur, it is certain that this title had an honourable signification, and that

52 A. TllEOLOGlCO-VOLlTlCAL TREATISE. [CHAP. III.

those whom the Gentiles called augurs and soothsayers were true prophets, while those whom Scripture often accuses and condemns were false soothsayers, who deceived the Gentiles as false prophets deceived the Jews; indeed, this is made evident from other passages in the Bible, whence we conclude that the gift of prophecy was not peculiar to the Jews, but common to all nations. The Pharisees, however, vehemently contend that this Divine gift was peculiar to their nation, and that the other nations foretold the future (what will superstition invent next?) by some unexplained diabolical faculty. The principal pas sage of Scripture which they cite, by way of confirming their theory with its authority, is Exodus xxxiii. 16, where Moses says to God, " For wherein shall it be known here that I and Thy people have found grace in Thy sight ? is it not in that Thou goest with us ? so shall we be separated, I and Thy people, from all the people that are upon the face of the earth." From this they would infer that Moses asked of God that He should be present to the Jews, and should reveal Himself to them prophetically ; further, that, He should grant this favour to no other nation. It is surely absurd that Moses should have been jealous of ( rod's presence among the Gentiles, or that he should have dared to ask any such thing. The fact is, as Moses knew t hat the disposition and spirit of his nation was rebellious, he clearly saw that they could not carry out what they had 1 >egun without very great miracles and special external aid from God ; nay, that without such aid they must necessarily perish : as it was evident that God wished them to be pre served, He asked for this special external aid. Thus he says (Ex. xxxiv. 9), " If now I have found grace in Thy sight, O Lord, let my Lord, I pray Thee, go among us ; for it is a stiffnecked people." The reason, therefore, for his seeking special external aid from God was the stiffnecked- ness of the people, and it is made still more plain, that he asked for nothing beyond this special external aid by God's answer — for God answered at once (verse 10 of the same chaj >ter) — " Behold, I make a covenant : before all Thy people I will do marvels, such as have not been done in all the earth, nor in any nation." Therefore Moses had in view nothing beyond the special ek'ction of the Jews, as I have

CHAP. III.] OF THE VOCATION OP THE HEBREWS. 53

explained it, and made no other request to God. I confess that in Paul's Epistle to the Eomans, I find another text which carries more weight, namely, where Paul seems to teach a different doctrine from that here set down, for he there says (Eom. iii. 1) : " What advantage then ha.th the Jew ? or what profit is there of circumcision ? Much every way : chiefly, because that unto them were committed the oracles of God."

But if we look to the doctrine which Paul especially desired to teach, we shall find nothing repugnant to our present contention; on the contrary, his doctrine is the same as ours, for he says (Eom. iii. 29) " that God is the God of the Jews and of the Gentiles, and" (ch. ii. 25, 26) " But, if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is made uncircumcision. Therefore if the uncircumcision keep the righteousness of the law, shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision ? " Further, in chap. iv. verse 9, he says that all alike, Jew and Gentile, were under sin, and that without commandment and law there is no sin! Wherefore it is most evident that to all men absolutely was revealed the law under which all lived— namely, the law which has regard only to true virtue, not the law established in respect to, and in the formation of, a par ticular state and adapted to the disposition of a particular people. Lastly, Paul concludes that since God is the God of all nations, that is, is equally gracious to all, and since all men equally live under the law and under sin, so also to all nations did God send His Christ, to free all men equally from the bondage of the law, that they should no more do right by the command of the law, but by the con stant determination of their hearts. So that Paul teaches exactly the same as ourselves. When, therefore, he says, "To the Jews only were entrusted the oracles of God," we must either understand that to them only were the laws entrusted in writing, while they were given to other nations merely in revelation and conception, or else (as none but Jews would object to the doctrine he desired to advance) that Paul was answering only in accordance with the understanding and current ideas of the Jews, for in respect to teaching things which he had partly seen, partly heard, he was to the Greeks a Greek, and to the Jews a Jew.

54 A TTTEOLOOTOO-FOLITICAL TREATISE. [rn\r. ITT.

It, now only remains to us to answer the arguments of those who would persuade themselves that the election of the Jews was not temporal, and merely in respect of their commonwealth, hut eternal ; for, they say, we see the Jews after the loss of their commonwealth, and after being scat tered so many years and separated from all other nations, still surviving, which is without parallel among other peoples, and further the Scriptures seem to teach that God has chosen for Himself the Jews for ever, so that though they have lost their commonwealth, they still nevertheless remain God's elect.

The passages which they think teach most clearly this eternal election, are chiefly : —

(1.) Jer. xxxi. 36, where the prophet testifies that the seed of Israel shall for ever remain the nation of God, com paring them with the stability of the heavens and nature ;

(2.) Ezek. xx. 32, where the prophet seems to intend that though the Jews wanted after the help afforded them to turn their backs on the worship of the Lord, that God would nevertheless gather them together again from all the lands in which they were dispersed, and lead them to the wilderness of the peoples — as He had led their fathers to the wilderness of the land of Egypt — and would at length, after purging out from among them the rebels and trans gressors, bring them thence to his Holy mountain, where the whole house of Israel should worship Him. Other passages are also cited, especially by the Pharisees, but I think I shall satisfy everyone if I answer these two, and this I shall easily accomplish after showing from Scripture itself that God chose not the Hebrews for ever, but only on the con dition under which He had formerly chosen the Canaanites, for these last, as we have shown, had priests who religiously worsliipped God, and whom God at length rejected because of their luxury, pride, and corrupt worship.

Moses (Lev. xviii. 27) warned the Israelites that they be not polluted with whoredoms, lest the land spue them out as it had spued out the nations who had dwelt there be fore, and in Deut. viii. 19, 20, in the plainest terms fie threatens their total ruin, for He says, "I testify against you that ye shall surely perish. As the nations which the Lord de- Btroyeth before your face, so shall ye perish." In like

CHAP. III.] OF THE VOCATION OF TTTE HEBREWS. 55

manner many other passages are found in the law which expressly show that God chose the Hebrews neither abso lutely nor for ever. If, then, the prophets foretold for them a new covenant of the knowledge of God, love, and grace, such a promise is easily proved to be only made to the elect, for Ezekiel in the chapter which we have just quoted expressly says that God will separate from them the rebel lious and transgressors, and Zephaniah (iii. 12, 13), says that "God will take away the proud from the midst of them, and leave the poor." Now, inasmuch as their election has regard to true virtue, it is not to be thought that it was promised to the Jews alone to the exclusion of others, but we must evidently believe i^hat the true Gentile pro phets (and every nation, as we have shown, possessed such) promised the same to the faithful of their own people, who were thereby comforted. Wherefore this eternal covenant of the knowledge of God and love is universal, as is clear, moreover, from Zeph. iii. 10, 11 : no difference in this re spect can be admitted between Jew and Gentile, nor did the former en joy any special election beyond that which we have pointed out.

When the prophets, in speaking of this election which re gards only true virtue, mixed up much concerning sacri fices and ceremonies, and the rebuilding of the temple and city, they wished by such figurative expressions, after the manner and nature of prophecy, to expound matters spiri tual, so as at the same time to show to the Jews, whose prophets they were, the true restoration of the state and of the temple to be expected about the time of Cyrus.

At the present time, therefore, there is absolutely nothing which the Jews can arrogate to themselves beyond other people.

As to their continuance so long after dispersion and the loss of empire, there is nothing marvellous in it, for they so separated themselves from every other nation as to draw down upon themselves universal hate, not only by their outward rites, rites conflicting with those of other nations, but also by the sign of circumcision which they most scrupu lously observe.

That they have been preserved in great measure by Gentile hatred, experience demonstrates. When the king

66 A TTTEOLOCITCO-POLTTICAL TREATTSF. [dlAP. TTT.

of Spain formerly compelled the Jews to embrace the State religion or to go into exile, a large number of Jews accepted Catholicism. Now, as these renegades were admitted to all the native privileges of Spaniards, and deemed worthy of filling all honourable offices, it came to pass that they straightway became so intermingled with the Spaniards as to leave of themselves no relic or remembrance. But, exactly the opposite happened to those whom the king of Portugal compelled to become Christians, for they always, though converted, lived apart, inasmuch as they were con sidered unworthy of any civic honours.

The sign of circumcision is, as I think, so important, that I could persuade myself that it alone would preserve the nation for ever. Nay, I would go so far as 1<> believe that if the foundations of their religion have not emascu lated their minds they may even, if occasion offers, so changeable are human affairs, raise up their empire afresh, and that God may a second time elect them.

Of such a possibility we have a very famous example in the Chinese. They, too, have some distinctive mark on their heads which they most scrupulously observe, and by which they keep themselves apart from everyone else, and have thus kept themselves during so many thousand years that they far surpass all other nations in antiquity. They have not always retained empire, but they have recovered it when lost, and doubtless will do so again after the spirit of the Tartars becomes relaxed through the luxury of riches and pride.

Lastly, if any one wishes to maintain that the Jews, from this or from any other cause, have been chosen by God for ever, I will not gainsay him if he will admit that this choice, whether temporary or eternal, has no regard, in so far as it is peculiar to the Jews, to aught but dominion and physical advantages (for by such alone can one nation be distin guished from another), whereas in regard to intellect and true virtue, every nation is on a par with the rest, and God lias not in these respects chosen one people rather than another.

OHAP. IV.] OF THE DIVINE LAW. 57

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE DIVINE LAW.

HP HE word law, taken in the abstract, means that by •*- which an individual, or all things, or as many things as belong to a particular species, act in one and the same fixed and definite manner, which manner depends either on natural necessity or on human decree. A law which depends on natural necessity is one which necessarily follows from the nature, or from the definition of the thing in question; a law which depends on human decree, and which is more correctly called an ordinance, is one which men have laid down for themselves and others in order to live more safely or conveniently, or from some similar reason.

For example, the law that all bodies impinging on lesser bodies, lose as much of their own motion as they commu nicate to the latter is a universal law of all bodies, and de pends on natural necessity. So, too, the law that a man in remembering one thing, straightway remembers another either like it, or which he had perceived simultaneously with it, is a law which necessarily follows from the nature of man. But the law that men must yield, or be compelled to yield, somewhat of their natural right, and that they bind themselves to live in a certain way, depends on human decree. Now, though I freely admit that all things are

] predetermined by universal natural laws to exist and operate in a given, fixed, and definite manner, I still assert that the laws I have just mentioned depend on human decree. (1.) Because man, in so far as he is apart of nature, con-

/ statutes a part of the power of nature. Whatever, therefore, follows necessarily from the necessity of human nature (that is, from nature herself, in so far as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows, even though it be neces sarily, from human power. Hence the sanction of such laws may very well be said to depend on man's decree, for it principally depends on the power of the human mind ; so

58 A TTTEOLOnTCO-POTJTTOAL TREATISE. [CHAP. IV.

that the Imman mind in respect to its perception of things as true and false, can readily be conceived as without such laws, but not without necessary law as we have just defined it.

(2.) I have stated that these laws depend on human decree because it is well to define and explain things by their proxi mate causes. The general consideration of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us very little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning particular questions. Let us add that as to the actual co-ordination and concate nation of things, that is, how things are ordained and linked together, we are obviously ignorant ; therefore, it is more profitable for right living, nay, it is necessary for us to con sider things as contingent. So much about law in the abstract.

Now the word law seems to be only applied to natural phenomena by analogy, and is commonly taken to signify a command which men can either obey or neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within certain originally ex ceeded limits, and therefore lays down no rule beyond human strength. Thus it is expedient to define law more particu larly as a plan of life laid down by man for himself or others with a certain object.

However, as the true object of legislation is only per ceived by a few, and most men are almost incapable of grasping it, though they live under its conditions, legis lators, with a view to exacting general obedience, have wisely put forward another object, very different from that which necessarily follows from the nature of law : they promise to the observers of the law that which the masses chiefly de sire, and threaten its violators with that which they chiefly fear : thus endeavouring to restrain the masses, as far as may be, like a horse with a curb ; whence it follows that the word law is chiefly applied to the modes of life enjoined on men by the sway of others ; hence those who obey the law are said to live under it and to be under compulsion. In truth, a man who renders everyone their due because he fears the gallows, acts under the sway and compulsion of others, and cannot be called just. But a man who does the same from a knowledge of the true reason for laws and their necessity, acts from a firm purpose and of his own accord, and is therefore properly called just. This, I take

CHAP. IV.] OP THE DIVINE LAW. 59

it, is Paul's meaning when lie says, tliat those who live under the law cannot be justified through the law, for jus tice, as commonly denned, is the constant and perpetual will to render every man his due. Thus Solomon says (Prov. xxi. 15), " It is a joy to the just to do judgment," but the wicked fear.

Law, then, being a plan of living which men have for a certain object laid down for themselves or others, may, as it seems, be divided into Jmman law and Divine law.

By human law I mean a plan of living which serves only to render life and the state secure.

By Divine law I mean that which only regards the highest good, in other words, the true knowledge of God and love. °" I call this law Divine because of the nature of the highest good, which I will here shortly explain as clearly as I can.

Inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our being, it is evident that we should make every effort to perfect it as far as possible if we desire to search for what is really pro fitable to us. For in intellectual perfection the highest good should consist. Now, since all our knowledge, and the certainty which removes every doubt, depend solely on the knowledge of God ; — firstly, because without God nothing can exist or be conceived ; secondly, because so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God we may remain in universal doubt — it follows that our highest good and per fection also depend solely on the knowledge of God. Fur ther, since without God nothing can exist or be con ceived, it is evident that all natural phenomena involve and express the conception of God as far as their essence and perfection extend, so that we have greater and more perfect knowledge of God in proportion to our knowledge of natural phenomena : conversely (since the knowledge of an effect through its cause is the same thing as the know ledge of a particular property of a cause) the greater our knowledge of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of the essence of God (which is the cause of all things). So, then, our highest good not only depends on the knowledge of God, but wholly consists therein ; and it further follows that man is perfect or the reverse in propor tion to the nature and perfection of the object of his special desire ; hence the most perfect and the chief sharer in the

fiQ A TTTFOLOOICO-rOLITICAL TREATISE. [CHAP. IV,

highest blessedness is he who prizes above all else, and takes especial delight in, the intellectual knowledge of God, the most perfect Being.

Hither, then, our highest good and our highest blessed ness aim — namely, to the knowledge and love of God; there fore the means demanded by this aim of all human actions, that is, by God in so far as the idea of him is in us, may be called the commands of God, because they proceed, as it were, from God Himself, inasmuch as He exists in our minds, and the plan of life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called the law of God.

The nature of the means, and the plan of life which this aim demands, how the foundations of the best states folios- its lines, and how men's life is conducted, are questions per taining to general ethics. Here I only proceed to treat of the Divine law in a particular application.

As the love of God is man's highest happiness and blessed ness, and the ultimate end and aim of all human actions, it follows that he alone lives by the Divine law who loves God not from fear of punishment, or from love of any other object, such as sensual pleasure, fame, or the like; but solely because he has knowledge of God, or is convinced that the knowledge and love of God is the highest good. The sum and chief precept, then, of the Divine law is to love God as the highest good, namely, as we have said, not from fear of any pains and penalties, or from the love of any other object in which we desire to take pleasure. The idea of God lays down the rule that God is our highest good — in other words, that the knowledge and love of God is the ulti mate aim to which all our actions should be directed. The worldling cannot understand these things, they appear foolishness to him, because he has too meagre a knowledge of God, and also because in this highest good he can dis cover nothing which he can handle or eat, or which affects the fleshly appetites wherein he chiefly delighfs, for it con sists solely in thought and the pure reason. They, on the other hand, who know that they possess no greater gift than in tellect and sound reason, will doubtless accept what I have said without question.

We have now explained that wherein the Divine law chiefly consists, and what are human laws, uamelv, all those which

CHAP. IV.] OF THE DIVINE LAW. 61

have a different aim unless they have been ratified by revelation, for in this respect also things are referred to God (as we have shown above) and in this sense the law of Moses, although it was not universal, but entirely adapted to the disposition and particular preservation of a single people, may yet be called a law of God or Divine law, inas much as we believe that it was ratified by prophetic insight. If we consider the nature of natural Divine law as we have just explained it, we shall see

I. That it is universal or common to all men, for we have deduced it from universal human nature.

IE. That it does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative whatsoever, for inasmuch as this natural Divine law is comprehended solely by the consideration of human nature, it is plain that we can conceive it as existing as well in Adam as in any other man, as well in a man living among his fellows, as in a man who lives by himself.

The truth of a historical narrative, however assured, can not give us the knowledge nor consequently the love of God, for love of God springs from knowledge of Him, and knowledge of Him should be derived from general ideas, in themselves certain and known, so that the truth of a his torical narrative is very far from being a necessary requisite for our attaining our highest good.

Still, though the truth of histories cannot give us the knowledge and love of God, I do not deny that reading them is very useful with a view to life in the world, for the more we have observed and known of men's customs and circumstances, which are best revealed by their actions, the more warily we shall be able to order our lives among them, and so far as reason dictates to adapt our actions to their dispositions.

III. We see that this natural Divine law does not demand the performance of ceremonies — that is, actions in themselves indifferent, which are called good from the fact of their institution, or actions symbolizing something profitable for salvation, or (if one prefers this definition) actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding. The natural light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself unable to supply, but only such as it can very clearly show to be good, or a means to our blessedness. Such things as

62 A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE. [CHAP. IV.

are good simply because they have been commanded or instituted, or as being symbols of something good, are mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among actions that are the offspring, as it were, or fruit of a sound mind and of intellect. There is no need for me to go into this now in more detail.

IV. Lastly, we see that the highest reward of the Divine law is the law itself, namely, to know God and Lo love Him of our free choice, and with an undivided and fruitful spirit ; while its penalty is the absence of these things, and being in bondage to the flesh — that is, having an inconstant and wavering spirit.

These points being noted, I must now inquire

I. Whether by the natural light of reason we can con ceive of God as a law-giver or potentate ordaining laws for men ?

II. What is the teaching of Holy Writ concerning this natural light of reason and natural law ?

III. With what objects were ceremonies formerly insti tuted?

IV. Lastly, what is the good gained by knowing the sac-red histories and believing them ?

Of the first two I will treat in this chapter, of the re maining two in the following one.

Our conclusion about the iirst is easily deduced from the nature of God's will, which is only distinguished from His understanding in relation to our intellect — that is, the will and the understanding of God are in reality one and the bame, and are only distinguished in relation to our thoughts which we form concerning God's understanding. For instance, if we are only looking to the fact that the nature of a triangle is from eternity contained in the Divine nature as an eternal verity, we say that God possesses tin- idea of a triangle, or that He understands the nature of a triangle; but if afterwards we look to the fact that tin- nature of a triangle is thus contained in the Divine nature, solely by the necessity of the Divine nature, and not by the necessity of the nature and essence of a triangle — in fact, t hat the necessity of a triangle's essence and nature, in so far as they are conceived of as eternal verities, depends aololy on the necessity of the Divine nature and intellect,

CHAP. IV.] of THE DIVINK LAW. 63

we then style God's will or decree, that which before we styled His intellect. Wherefore we make one and the same affirmation concerning God when we say that He has from eternity decreed that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, as when we say that He has under- stood it.

Hence the affirmations and the negations of God always involve necessity or truth; so that, for example, if God said to Adam that He did not wish him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, it would have involved a contradiction that Adam should have been able to eat of it, and would therefore have been impossible that he should have so eaten, for the Divine command would have involved an eternal necessity and truth. But since Scripture never theless narrates that God did give this command to Adam, and yet that none the less Adam ate of the tree, we must perforce say that God revealed to Adam the evil which would surely follow if he should eat of the tree, but did not disclose that such evil would of necessity come to pass. Thus it was that Adam took the revelation to be not an eternal and necessary truth, but a law— that is, an ordinance followed by gain or loss, not depending necessarily on the nature of the act performed, but solely on the will and absolute power of some potentate, so that the revelation in question was solely in relation to Adam, and solely through his lack of knowledge a law, and God was, as it were, a law giver and potentate. From the same cause, namely, from lack of knowledge, the Decalogue in relation to the Hebrews was a law, for since they knew not the existence of God as an eternal truth, they must have taken as a law that which was revealed to them in the Decalogue, namely, that God exists, and that God only should be worshipped. But if God had spoken to them without the intervention of any bodily means, immediately they would have perceived it not as a law, but as an eternal truth.

What we have said about the Israelites and Adam, applies also to all the prophets who wrote laws in God' a name— they did not adequately conceive God's decrees as eternal truths. For instance, we must say of Moses that from revelation, from the basis of what was revealed to him, he perceived the method by which the Israelitish nation

64 A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE. [CHAP. IV.

could best be united in a particular territory, and could form a body politic or state, and further that he perceived the method by which that nation could best be constrained to obedience ; but he did not perceive, nor was it revealed to him, that this method was absolutely the best, nor that the obedience of the people in a certain strip of territory would necessarily imply the end he had in view. Where fore he perceived these things not as eternal truths, but as precepts and ordinances, and he ordained them as laws of God, and thus it came to be that he conceived God as a ruler, a legislator, a king, as merciful, just, &c., whereas such qualities are simply attributes of human nature, and utterly alien from the nature of the Deity. Thus much we may affirm of the prophets who wrote laws in the name of God ; but we must not affirm it of Clirist, for Christ, although He too seems to have written laws in the name of God, must be taken to have had a clear and adequate per ception, for Christ was not so much a prophet as the mouthpiece of God. For God made revelations to mankind through Christ as He had before done through angels — that is, a created voice, visions, &c. It would be as unreasonable to say that God had accommodated his revelations to the opinions of Christ as that He had before accommodated them to the opinions of angels